VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE
COMMENTARY BY SANKARÂKÂRYA.
(Brahma Sutras)
Here the following objection is raised.--Vaisvânara cannot be the highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding within. The term, viz. the term Vaisvânara, cannot be applied to the highest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the passage (Sat. Brâ. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vaisvânara.' The word '&c.' (in the Sûtra) hints at the fiction concerning the three sacred fires, the gârhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on, of the Vaisvânara Self (Kh. Up. V, 18, 2 1).--Moreover, the passage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place of homa' (Kh. Up. V, 19,1), contains a glorification of (Vaisvânara) being the abode of the oblation to Prâna 2. For these reasons we have to understand
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by Vaisvânara the gastric fire.--Moreover, Scripture speaks of the Vaisvânara as abiding within. 'He knows him abiding within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire only.--With reference to the averment that on account of the specifications contained in the passage, 'His head is Sutegas,' &c., Vaisvânara is to be explained as the highest Self, we (the pûrvapakshin) ask: How do you reach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with both interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only, and not to the gastric fire?--Or else we may assume that the passage speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that that fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we understand from the mantra, 'He who with his light has extended himself over earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere' (Rig-veda Samh. X, 88, 3).--Or else the attribute of having the heavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power, be attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its body.--Therefore Vaisvânara is not the highest Lord.
To all this we reply as follows.--Your assertions are unfounded, 'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' The reasons (adduced in the former part of the Sûtra), viz. the term, and so on, are not sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which Vaisvânara is the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of perception being taught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set aside. For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the gastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1).--Or else they teach that the object of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the gastric fire called Vaisvânara for his limiting condition; analogously to such passages as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 2 1). If it were the aim of the passages about the "Vaisvânara
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to make statements not concerning the highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be no possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His head is Sutegas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vaisvânara being either the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found for the said specifications, we shall show under the following Sûtra.--Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be room only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is man. But, as a matter of fact, the Vâgasaneyins speak of him--in their sacred text--as man, 'This Agni Vaisvânara is man; he who knows this Agni Vaisvânara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (Sat. Brâ. X, 6, I, II). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within man.--Those who, in the latter part of the Sûtra, read 'man-like' (purushavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the following meaning: If Vaisvânara were assumed to be the gastric fire only, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as man-like. But the Vâgasaneyins do speak of him as man-like,' He who knows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'--The meaning of the term man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the devout worshipper 1).
Footnotes
146:1 Na ka gârhapatyâdihridayâditâ brahmanah sambhavinî. Bhâmatî.146:2 Na ka prânâhutyadhikaranatâ # nyatra gatharâgner yugyate. Bhâmatî.
147:1 According to the former explanation the gastric fire is to be looked on as the outward manifestation (pratîka) of the highest Lord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.
148:1 I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head and so on of the devout worshipper.
The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the passage 'His head is Sutegas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world, &c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons
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already stated Vaisvânara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot be the Self of another effect.--Again, the heavenly world cannot be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect), and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the inapplicability of the term 'Self.'
The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the passage 'His head is Sutegas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world, &c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons
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already stated Vaisvânara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot be the Self of another effect.--Again, the heavenly world cannot be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect), and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the inapplicability of the term 'Self.'
Above (Sûtra 26) it has been said that Vaisvânara is the highest Lord, to be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward manifestation or for his limiting condition; which interpretation was accepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as abiding within--and so on.--The teacher Gaimini however is of opinion that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no objection to refer the passage about Vaisvânara to the direct worship of the highest Lord.--But, if you reject the interpretation based on the gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that Vaisvânara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c. (Sû. 26).--To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in opposition to the statement that Vaisvânara abides within. For the passage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by any means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name before.--What then does it refer to?--It refers to that which forms the subject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self) which is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of the head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as man-like,
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as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it abides within the tree 1.--Or else we may adopt another interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as abiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness (sâkshin; i.e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting conditions).--The consideration of the context having thus shown that the highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the passage, the term 'Vaisvânara' must denote the highest Self in some way or other. The word 'Visvânara' is to be explained either as 'he who is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls belong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the highest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vaisvânara' has the same meaning as 'Visvânara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the former word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just as in the case of râkshasa (derived from rakshas), and vâyasa (derived from vayas).--The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we adopt the etymology agni = agranî, i.e. he who leads in front.--As the Gârhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the highest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.
But, if it is assumed that Vaisvânara denotes the highest Self, how can Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?--On the explanation of this difficulty we now enter.
Footnotes
150:1 Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that it forms a part of the tree.--The Vaisvânara Self is identified with the different members of the body, and these members abide within, i.e. form parts of the body.The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The highest Lord manifests
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himself as measured by a span, i.e. he specially manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived. Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher Âsmarathya, the scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may refer to the highest Lord.
Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means of prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that barley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered manifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the highest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by means of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for the Sruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.--Or else 1 the Sûtra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although not really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an appropriate sense.--Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span may, according to the opinion of the teacher Bâdari, be referred to the highest Lord, on account of remembrance.
Footnotes
151:1 Parimânasya hridayadvârâropitasya smaryamâne katham âropo vishayavishayitvena bhedâd ity âsankya vyâkhyântaram âha prâdeseti. Ânanda Giri.Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be considered to rest on imaginative combination.--Why?--Because the passage of the Vâgasaneyi-brâhmana
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which treats of the same topic identifies heaven, earth, and so on--which are the members of Vaisvânara viewed as the Self of the threefold world--with certain parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper part of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative identity of Vaisvânara with something whose measure is a span. There we read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to identify him (the Vaisvânara) with that whose measure is a span; thus he said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what stands above (i.e. the heavenly world) as Vaisvânara (i.e. the head of Vaisvânara 1). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good light (i.e. the sun) as Vaisvânara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the air) as Vaisvânara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether) within his mouth he said: This is the full one (i.e. the ether) as Vaisvânara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is wealth as Vaisvânara (i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing to the chin he said: This is the base as Vaisvânara (i.e. the feet of V.).'--Although in the Vâgasaneyi-brâhmana the heaven is denoted as that which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which has the attribute of good light, while in the Khândogya the heaven is spoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still this difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidyâ) 2, because both texts equally use the term 'measured by a span,' and because all sâkhâs intimate the same.--The above explanation of the term 'measured by a span,' which rests on imaginative identification, the teacher Gaimini considers the most appropriate one.
Footnotes
152:1 Atra sarvatra vaisvânarasabdas tadangaparah. Go. Ân.152:2 Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the Sat. Brâ. for the explanation of the passage from the Kh. Up.
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(the highest Lord) in that (i.e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is measured by a span).
Moreover the Gâbâlas speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in the interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved infinite Self abides in the avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where does that avimukta abide? It abides in the Varanâ and the Nâsî, in the middle. What is that Varanâ, what is that Nâsî?' The text thereupon etymologises the term Varanâ as that which wards off (vârayati) all evil done by the senses, and the term Nâsî as that which destroys (nâsayati) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what is its place?--The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part of the head) and of the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the chin).' (Gâbâla Up. I.)--Thus it appears that the scriptural statement which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate. That the highest Lord is called abhivimâna refers to his being the inward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all animate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near everywhere--as the inward Self--and who at the same time is measureless' (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who, as the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this it is proved that Vaisvânara is the highest Lord.
THIRD PÂDA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the term 'own,' i.e. Self.We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the Immortal.'--Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated by the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the highest Brahman or something else.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it is known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some further bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume something further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is called 'endless, without a further shore' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if the abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be supposed to be either the pradhâna known from Smriti, which, as being the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known from Sruti, of which it is said (Bri. Up. III, 7, 2, 'Air is that thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the other world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all things; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be considered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.
Against this view we argue with the sûtrakâra as follows:--'Of the world consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is spoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the abode.'--Why?--On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word 'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self.' This term 'Self' is
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thoroughly appropriate only if we understand the highest Self and not anything else.--(To propound another interpretation of the phrase 'svasabdât' employed in the Sûtra.) Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in Sruti as the general abode by its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for instance (Kh. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the being 1.'--(Or else we have to explain 'svasabdena' as follows), In the passages preceding and following the passage under discussion Brahman is glorified with its own names 2; cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal Brahman is before, is behind, Brahman is to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the co-ordination expressed in the passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we distinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion the text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as the Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that on which Devadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self,' teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self which constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural passage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects,
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[paragraph continues] 'From death to death goes he who sees any difference here'(Ka. Up. II, 4, 11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman' aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world, and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in nature 1; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly stated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13).--For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.--Against the objection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a bridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a bridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by any means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si, which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is rather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something beyond (a further bank).
According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of the Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as the Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave off other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality, the expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies 2. On that account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word 'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.
Footnotes
155:1 From passages of which nature we may infer that in the passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.155:2 From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman.
156:1 Yat sarvam avidyâropitam tat sarvam paramârthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity arthah. Bhâmatî.
156:2 So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That, viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.'
By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to which the Released have to resort.--The conception that the body and other things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self, constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions with regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and confusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed themselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is said that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the released, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all desires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the pradhâna and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from any source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover, the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition which, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the knowledge of) Brahman; cp. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise Brâhmana, after he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'--For that
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reason also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.
While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else. Hence he (the sûtrakâra) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the pradhâna assumed by the Sânkhya-smriti, is not to be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.--Why?--On account of the terms not denoting it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the non-intelligent pradhâna, on the ground of which we might understand the latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent being opposed to the pradhâna in nature.--For the same reason the air also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.
Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting it.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not omnipresent) 1.--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is caused by what follows 2.--The individual soul is not to be
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accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.
Footnotes
158:1 Bhogyasya bhoktriseshatvât tasyâyatanatvam uktam âsankyâha na keti, gîvasyâdrishtadvârâ dyubhvâdinimittatve#pi na sâkshât tadâyatanatvam aupâdhikatvenâvibhutvâd ity arthah. Ânanda Giri.158:2 It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sûtra p. 159 for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sûtra--if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sûtra which applies to the individual soul only.
Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting it.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not omnipresent) 1.--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is caused by what follows 2.--The individual soul is not to be
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accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.
Footnotes
158:1 Bhogyasya bhoktriseshatvât tasyâyatanatvam uktam âsankyâha na keti, gîvasyâdrishtadvârâ dyubhvâdinimittatve#pi na sâkshât tadâyatanatvam aupâdhikatvenâvibhutvâd ity arthah. Ânanda Giri.158:2 It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sûtra p. 159 for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sûtra--if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sûtra which applies to the individual soul only.
The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.
The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter), as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is known.--Another reason against the individual soul follows.
With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' referring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works,
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and the clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would contain a statement about something not connected with the general topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.--But, it may be objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual soul as separate from the Lord.--Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul. From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth. The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer to him merely casually 1.--
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[paragraph continues] That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of the Lord--and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2, 11.--And if, according to the interpretation given in the Paingi-upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction (between that interpretation and our present averment that the individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).--How so?--Here (i.e. in the present Sûtra and the Sûtras immediately preceding) it is denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate existence in separate bodies--its division being analogous to the division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces within jars and the like--is that which is called the abode of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is discussed under the Sûtra quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which heaven and
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earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikarana the subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.
Footnotes
160:1 If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven, earth, &c., the statement regarding Îsvara made in the passage about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I subjoin Ânanda Giri's commentary on the entire passage: Gîvasyopâdhyaikyenâvivakshitatvât tadgñâne#pi sarvagñânasiddhes tasyâyatanatvâdyabhâve hetvantaram vâkyam ity âsankya sûtrena pariharati kutasketyâdinâ. Tad vyâkashte dyubhvâdîti. Nirdesam eva darsayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham âha tâbhyâm keti. Sthityesvarasyâdanâg gîvasamgrahe#pi katham îsvarasyaiva visvâyatanatvam tadâha yadîti. Îsvarasyâyanatvenâprakritatve gîvaprithakkathanânupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvârâha anyatheti. Gîvasyâyatanatvenâprakritatve tulyânupapattir iti sankate nanviti. Tasyaikyârtham lokasiddhasyânuvâdatvân naivam ity âha neti. Gîvasyâpûrvatvâbhâvenâpratipâdyatvam eva prakatayati kshetragño hîti. Îsvarasyâpi lokavâdisiddhatvâd apratipâdyatety âsankyâha îsvaras tv iti.We read (Kh. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much (bhûman) we must desire to understand.--Sir, I desire to understand it.--Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what is much (bhûman). Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the Little.'--Here the doubt arises whether that which is much is the vital air (prâna) or the highest Self.--Whence the doubt?--The word 'bhûman,' taken by itself, means the state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pânini, VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what constitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at first the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is bhûman.--On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter, where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage it would appear that the bhûman is the highest Self.--Hence there arises a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which is to be set aside.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the bhûman is the vital air, since there is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir, is there something which is more than a name?'--'Speech is more than name.'--'Is there something which is more than speech?'--' Mind is more than speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital air (such as, 'Is there something
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which is more than vital air?'--'Such and such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,' &c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be an ativâdin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativâdin. He may say I am an ativâdin; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But he in reality is an ativâdin who declares something beyond by means of the True' 1),--not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the quality of an ativâdin which is founded on the vital air,--proceeds, by means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhûman; so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the bhûman.--But, if the bhûman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how have we to explain the passage in which the bhûman is characterised. 'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.--As, the pûrvapakshin replies, in the state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as seeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV, 2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The fires of the prânas are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.--That passage also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhûman ('The bhûman is bliss,' Kh. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra. Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his body').--Again, the statement, 'The bhûman is immortality' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1), may
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likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural passage says, 'Prâna is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).--But how can the view according to which the bhûman is the vital air be reconciled with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self overcomes grief,' &c.)?--By the Self there referred to, the pûrvapakshin replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother, the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is Brâhmana' (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self of everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest in the nave, so all this rests in prâna,' declares the prâna to be the Self of all--by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave of a wheel--the prâna may be conceived under the form of bhûman, i.e. plenitude.--Bhûman, therefore, means the vital air.
To this we make the following reply.--Bhûman can mean the highest Self only, not the vital air.--Why?--'On account of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasâda) means the state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether pleased--samprasîdati')--and, secondly, from the fact of samprasâda being mentioned in the Brihadâranyaka together with the state of dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital air remains awake, the word 'samprasâda' is employed in the Sûtra to denote the vital air; so that the Sûtra means, 'on account of information being given about the bhûman, subsequently to (the information given about) the vital air.' If the bhûman were the vital air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about the bhûman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the text does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has been said about name, a new statement is
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made about speech, which is something different from name (i. e. the text says, 'Speech is more than name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent statement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhûman also, the statement about which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other than the vital air. But--it may be objected--we meet here neither with a question, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an answer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can it be said that the information about the bhûman is given subsequently to the information about the vital air?--Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being an ativâdin, which is exclusively connected with the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in reality he is an ativâdin who makes a statement surpassing (the preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no information additional to the information about the vital air.--To this objection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage last quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an ativâdin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,' states a specification.--But, the objector resumes, this very statement of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativâdin who makes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the quality of being an ativâdin depends on speaking the truth, but merely expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who knows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativâdin must be considered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.--This
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objection we rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality of being an ativâdin depends on speaking the truth; the sense being: An ativâdin is he who is an ativâdin by means of the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only on the ground of general subject-matter (prakarana) 1; which would involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of prakarana 2.--Moreover, the particle but ('But in reality he is,' &c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the prâna explanation). The following passage also, 'But we must desire to know the True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new topic is going to be entered upon.--For these reasons we have to consider the statement about the ativâdin in the same light as we should consider the remark--made in a conversation which previously had turned on the praise of those who study one Veda--that he who studies the four Vedas is a great Brâhmana; a remark which we should understand to be laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer only; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter under discussion is as follows: Nârada at first listens to the instruction which Sanatkumâra gives him about various matters, the last of which is Prâna, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumâra explains to him spontaneously (without being
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asked) that the quality of being an ativâdin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital air--which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,--is devoid of substance, and that he only is an ativâdin who is such by means of the True. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for Brahman is the Real, and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural passage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Nârada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might I, Sir, become an ativâdin by the True?') and Sanatkumâra then leads him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge of bhûman. We therefrom conclude that the bhûman is that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the (knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the bhûman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhûman must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the pûrvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place, cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at the outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief' (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), 'To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumâra showed the other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.--Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on something else. But the brâhmana (Kh. Up. VII, 36, 1) does say, 'The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected against this last argument that the concluding
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part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhûman (mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhûman rest? In its own greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhûman forms the continuous topic up to the end of the chapter.--The quality of being the bhûman--which quality is plenitude--agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of everything.
Footnotes
163:1 As might be the primâ facie conclusion from the particle 'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.166:1 It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding past of the chapter.
166:2 And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of the Mîmâmsâ
The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhûman agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhûman,' gives us to understand that in the bhûman the ordinary activities of seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing the nature of the prâna; for the highest Self (not the vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture says (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'--The passage under discussion also ('The bhûman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is little (limited). The bhûman only is bliss') by denying the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhûman, i.e. in its plenitude,--Again, the passage, 'The bhûman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one,
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and another scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman) is perishable' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2).--Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as belonging to the bhûman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to anything else.--By all this it is proved that the bhûman is the highest Self.
We read (Bri. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?--He said: O Gârgî, the Brâhmanas call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on.--Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable' or 'the highest Lord.'
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable' merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samâmnâya, the meaning of 'syllable;' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om is all this,' Kh. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the object of devotion, to be the Self of all.
To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word 'akshara.'--Why?--Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with earth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question, 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then, O Gârgî, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'--Now the attribute of supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but Brahman. The text (quoted from the Kh. Up.) says indeed that the syllable Om is all this, but that statement
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is to be understood as a mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman.--Therefore we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades;' on the ground of either of which explanations it must be identified with the highest Brahman.
But--our opponent resumes--while we must admit that the above reasoning holds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who declare the pradhâna to be the general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the pradhâna)?--The reply to this is given in the next Sûtra.
The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord only.--Why?--On account of the command.--For the sacred text speaks of a command ('By the command of that akshara, O Gârgî, sun and moon stand apart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent pradhâna. For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.
Also on account of the reason stated in this Sûtra Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sûtra is as follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,' from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the
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support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gârgî, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhâna also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the pradhâna is non-intelligent.--Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover, limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions does not exist 1.--It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.
(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, 'O Satyakâma, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three mâtrâs on the highest Person,' &c.--Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt based on the former passage, according to which both are under discussion.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower
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Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principal (prâna) may be called 'higher' with reference to the body 1.
To this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only.--Why?--On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body; purusham purisayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition 2 is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'--But--an objection will be raised--as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical?--The two passages, we
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reply, have in common the terms 'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and 'person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term gîvaghana 1 refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word gîvaghana as 'He whose shape 2 is characterised by the gîvas;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of gîvas, i e. individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with regard to the senses and their objects.
Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word gîvaghana' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence ('by the Sâman verses he is led up to the world of Brahman'), and again in the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because it is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called gîvaghana because all individual souls (gîva) with their organs of action may be viewed as comprised (sanghâta = ghana) within Hiranyagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the Brahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that gîvaghana, i. e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight, also constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover, expressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, 'the highest person,' can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the
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sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the lower Brahman ('the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'), and afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by means of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person is nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of meditation), 'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.'--With reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three mâtrâs, obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition.
Footnotes
172:1 Pindah sthûlo dehah, prânah sûtrâtmâ. Ânanda Giri.--The lower Brahman (hiranyagarbha on sûtrâtman) is the vital principle (prâna) in all creatures.172:2 Samyagdarsana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or 'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.
173:1 Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual soul.'
173:2 Pânini III, 3, 77, 'mûrttam ghanah.'
We read (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1),' There is this city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be understood,' &c.--Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual soul (vigñânâtman), or the highest Self. This doubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' For the word 'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether the small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether, i. e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression 'city of Brahman,' in the second place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of Brahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i.e. in consequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to
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the nature of the small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the city.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of the word âkâsa. The elemental ether is here called small with reference to its small abode (the heart).--In the passage, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is represented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the outer and the inner ether 1; and it is said that 'heaven and earth are contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is space, is one 2.--Or else, the pûrvapakshin continues, the 'small one' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term, 'the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman because it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is acquired by means of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume that the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body as its lord. The lord of the city, i.e. the soul, is represented as dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, and the mind chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only can be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; Svet. Up. V, 8) compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is compared (in the passage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate its non difference from Brahman.--
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[paragraph continues] Nor does the scriptural passage say that the 'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in the clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a mere distinguishing attribute of something else 1.
To all this we make the following reply:--The small ether can mean the highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual soul.--Why?--On account of the subsequent reasons, i. e. on account of the reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text declares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined as the object of sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon follows an objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then he should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that the ether within the heart is small--which conception is based on the statement as to the smallness of the lotus, i. e. the heart--and thereby precludes the possibility of our understanding by the term 'the small ether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language gives to the word 'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the elemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be compared with itself.--But, has it not been stated above, that the ether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of an assumed difference between the outer and the inner ether?--That explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit that a comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary difference. And even if we admitted
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the possibility of such a comparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural passage declares that he is greater than ether (Sa. Brâ, X, 6, 3, 2), we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing the inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the idea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is primâ facie established by the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence 1 would result.--Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and the outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion of the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing within itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in the following passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true purposes.'--Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the passage quoted) may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of the individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be impossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted by limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad, the attribute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being enclosed in the lotus of the heart.--Let it then be assumed--our opponent remarks--that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its non-difference from Brahman.--Well, we reply, if you suppose that the small ether is called all-pervading because it is one with Brahman, our own supposition,
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viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.--Concerning the assertion that the term 'city of Brahman' can only be understood, on the assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the term is more properly interpreted to mean 'the body in so far as it is the city of the highest Brahman;' which interpretation enables us to take the term 'Brahman' in its primary sense 1. The highest Brahman also is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for the perception of Brahman 2. Other scriptural passages also express the same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, 'He sees the highest person dwelling in the city' (purusha = purisaya), &c., and Bri. Up. II, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller within the city (purisaya).'--Or else (taking brahmapura to mean gîvapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the city of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as Vishnu is near to us in the Sâlagrâma-stone.--Moreover, the text (VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as here on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c.), and afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general subject of discussion ('those who depart from hence after having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds'). From this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest Self.--We now turn to the statement made by the pûrvapakshin, 'that the sacred text does not represent the small ether as that
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which is to be sought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If the (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be understood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given in the passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart'), would be devoid of purport.--But--the opponent might say--that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth the nature of the thing abiding within (the ether); for the text after having raised an objection (in the passage, 'And if they should say to him: Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e. the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what is there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven, earth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to which the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.--Your reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow that heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small ether, constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the complementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on, as the subject of discussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven, earth, &c.--by means of the clauses, 'In it all desires are contained,' 'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage, 'But those who depart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in which passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the desires to the Self)--declares that the Self as well, which is the abode of the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects of knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together with whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on, is represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons explained, that ether is the highest Lord.
Footnotes
175:1 So that the interpretation of the pûrvapakshin cannot be objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to itself.175:2 So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.
176:1 Viz. of that which is within it. Ânanda Giri proposes two explanations: na keti, paraviseshanatvenety atra paro daharâkâsa upâdânât tasminn iti saptamyanta-takkhabdasyeti seshah. Yadvâ parasabdo # ntahsthavastuvishayas tadviseshanatvena tasminn iti daharâkâsasyokter ity arthah. Takkhabdasya samnikrishtânvayayoge viprakrishtânvayasya gaghanyatvâd âkâsântargatam dhyeyam iti bhâvah.
177:1 A vâkyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place according to the Mîmâmsâ when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different.
178:1 While the explanation of Brahman by gîva would compel us to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual soul.
178:2
Upalabdher adhishthânam brahmana deha ishyate
Tenâsâdhâranatvena deho brahmapuram bhavet
Bhâmatî.
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the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i. e. that the individual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture); and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word 'brahmaloka').
It has been declared (in the preceding Sûtra) that the small (ether) is the highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent passages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth.--For this reason also the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a mention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In the first place, we read (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This passage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to the small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going to it of the creatures, i. e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual souls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep sleep, is seen, i.e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1, 'He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life also we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,' 'he is gone into the state of Brahman.'--In the second place, the word 'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is Brahman.--But could not the word 'Brahma-world' convey as well the idea of the world of him whose throne is the lotus 1?--It might do so indeed, if we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the coordination of both members of the compound--so that
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[paragraph continues] 'Brahma-world' denotes that world which is Brahman--then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.--And that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is, moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound 'Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordination of its two constituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman; which world is commonly called the Satyaloka, i. e. the world of the True.
And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the highest Lord only.--How?--The text at first introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage, 'In it is that small ether;' declares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the universal ether, and that everything is contained in it; subsequently applies to it the term 'Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of being free from sin, &c.; and, finally, declares with reference to the same general subject of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a limitary support (vidhriti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As 'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a limitary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the different castes and âsramas may not be confounded. In accordance with this our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of holding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject of discussion; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon; are held apart"(Bri. Up. III, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose referring to the highest
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Lord there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a limitary support, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 12)--Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small (ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.
The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the settled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in which the word 'ether' is used in Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names;' and Kh. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we do not meet with any passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the sense of 'individual soul.'--We have already shown that the word cannot, in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be compared to itself, &c. &c.
If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account of a complementary passage, then, the pûrvapakshin resumes, we point out that another complementary passage contains a reference to the other one, i. e. to the individual soul: 'Now that serene being (literally: serenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4). For there the word 'serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural passage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual soul only when it is in
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that state, not of anything else. The 'rising from the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in ordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such passages as, 'The ether is the revealer of forms and names,' because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul Hence the term 'the small ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the individual soul, 'on account of the reference to the other.'
Not so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the ether. And, in the second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in the first Sûtra of the present adhikarana, and is again mentioned here in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the highest Self. That the reference pointed out by the pûrvapakshin is not to the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next Sûtras (I, 3, 21).
The doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the ground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom amrita has been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the subsequent chapter which treats of Pragâpati. For there he (Pragâpati)
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at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to understand (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that he points out that the seer within the eye, i. e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that person that is seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3); refers again and again to the same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you,' VIII, 9, 3; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its different states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,' VIII, 10, 1; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is the Self,' VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to both these explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that is Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free from sin, and the like. After that Pragâpati, having discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the expostulation of Indra, 'In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know these beings,' VIII, 11, 2), enters on a further explanation ('I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than this'), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and finally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body, to be the highest person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light. That is the highest person.')--From this it appears that there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to the individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term, 'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.
This position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its nature has become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the Sûtra) is meant to set aside the view of the pûrvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sûtra is, 'Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sûtra uses the expression 'he whose nature has become manifest,'
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which qualifies gîva., the individual soul, with reference to its previous condition 1.--The meaning is as follows. Pragâpati speaks at first of the seer characterised by the eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.); shows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the body; refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then spoken of him as subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the individual soul in its real nature, i.e. in so far as it is the highest Brahman, not in so far as it is individual soul ('As soon as it has approached the highest light it appears in its own form'). The highest light mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is distinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like. That same highest Brahman constitutes--as we know from passages such as 'that art thou'--the real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature, i.e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the individual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of duality--which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man--and does not rise to the knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal Cognition--which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman'--so long it remains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body, sense-organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form part of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self, whose nature is pure intelligence; then
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knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such scriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in its own form.
Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the true nature (svarûpa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then say that 'it appears in its own form (true nature)?' Of gold and similar substances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific qualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest when they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance; so it may be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime overpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in their true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But it is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be contradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing, hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual soul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even in the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the body. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising; otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the other hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul only which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical existence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising, would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein consists that (alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that appearing (of the soul) in its own form?
To this we make the following reply.--Before the rise of
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discriminative knowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure light, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts consisting of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and appears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly--to quote an analogous case from ordinary experience--the true nature of a pure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer), non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue colour; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished its true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it had already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected by Sruti, on the part of the individual soul which previously is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the body, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its accomplishment in its true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in agreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22), and the statement of Smriti as to the non-difference between embodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though dwelling in the body, O Kaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 31). The individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is non-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative knowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on account of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and non-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible, since its nature is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always the same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality, since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with anything.
And wherefrom is all this to be known?--From the instruction
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given by Pragâpati who, after having referred to the giva ('the person that is seen in the eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, it would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is not spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the eye), for that would render Pragâpati obnoxious to the reproach of saying deceitful things.--So also, in the second section, the passage, 'He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory clause, 'I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover 1, a person who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the same person who saw something in the dream.--Thus in the third section also Pragâpati does indeed declare the absence of all particular cognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity of the cognising Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor all these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to utter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is no destruction of the knowing of the knower as--according to another scriptural passage (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30)--that is imperishable.--Thus, again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Pragâpati is, 'I shall explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he thereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and other limiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the individual soul--which is there called 'the serene being'--
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in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest Brahman whose characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.
Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but) to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII, 1).--Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in 'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section. Moreover, if Pragâpati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This I shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.--Hence (our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as such--which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected with evils of various kinds--is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i.e. into its true state in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.
Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadîyâs ka kekit), are of opinion that the individual soul as such
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is real. To the end of refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete intuition of the unity of the Self this sârîraka-sâstra has been set forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition 1, and who, by means of Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other substance of cognition.--If, now, the Sûtrakâra raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he does in this and the preceding Sûtras 2, he does so for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are erroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to disprove the doctrine of duality--which passages he strengthens by arguments--he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul, refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not stultified.--That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real purport of the sâstra's teaching, the Sûtrakâra declares, for instance, in I, 1, 30 3. The refutation of the reproach of
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futility raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as do not.
Footnotes
185:1 The masculine 'âvirbhûtasvarûpah' qualifies the substantive gîvah which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the gîva whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is no longer gîva; hence the explanatory statement that the term gîva is used with reference to what the gîva was before it became Brahman.188:1 To state another reason showing that the first and second chapters of Pragâpati's instruction refer to the same subject.
190:1 I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.
190:2 Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual soul.
190:3 Nanu gîvabrahmanor aikyam na kvâpi sûtrakâro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ishtam tatrâha pratipâdyam tv iti.
The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out (by the pûrvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of meaning.--On that account the Sûtra declares that the reference has another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the nadîs of the body, and enjoys the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there represented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is meant.
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declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that has been explained (before).
The pûrvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it having been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sûtra points out--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large is the ether within the heart.')
We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (prâgña âtman).
A luminous substance, the pûrvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun, which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and the sun himself, does not
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shine is likewise a thing of light. The 'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to some luminous body.
To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage, 'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the prâgña Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that prâgña Self another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts are true' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body. Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the pûrvapakshin asserted) that acting after is observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts after, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the acting after' (which forms part of the Sûtra) points to the shining after (mentioned in the scriptural sloka under discussion); the clause 'and of him' points to the fourth pâda of the same sloka. The meaning of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted') intimates the prâgña Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c, should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not known; and, in the second place, absurd
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as one (physical) light is counteracted by another.--Or else the cause assigned for the shining does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the sloka; but the meaning (of the last pâda) rather is--as we may conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text shows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.) that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage under discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage giving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is occasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another luminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is denied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the Self alone as his light man sits,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended '(Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).
Moreover that aspect of the prâgña Self is spoken of in Smriti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gîtâ (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'
We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may, by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Smriti also confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and helpless' (Mahâbh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.
To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only
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be the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the future.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, l4).--'On account of the term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a designation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord is meant 1.--But still the question remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is given, in the next Sûtra.
Footnotes
196:1 This last sentence is directed against the possible objection that 'sabda,' which the Sûtra brings forward as an argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence' (vâkya), and is therefore of less force than linga, i.e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the angushthamâtratâ of the purusha, and favours the gîva interpretation. Sabda, the text remarks, here means sruti, i.e. direct enunciation, and sruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than linga.The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection may be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different classes of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration
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of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with reference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sûtra replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the sâstra, although propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does in reality entitle men 1 only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the sâstra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the sâstra); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on 2. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikâra (Pûrva Mîm. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the sâstra, the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart, be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the pûrvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on account of Smriti we can understand by him who is of the size of a thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--analogously to such passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our passage
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teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedânta-passages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).
Footnotes
197:1 I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.197:2 The first reason excludes animals, gods, and rishis. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. Rishis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral rishis of the sacrificer are invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the Sûdras who are indirectly disqualified for sâstric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Pûrva Mîmâmsâ Sûtras VI, 1.
It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to study and act according to the sâstra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion.--It is true that the sâstra entitles men, but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Bâdarâyana, rather thinks that the sâstra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above men, viz. gods, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of possibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, purânas, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like Sûdras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title; for that
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ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and one years Indra lived as a disciple with Pragâpati' (Kh. Up. VIII, ii, 3), and 'Bhrigu Vâruni went to his father Varuna, saying, "Sir, teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been given above against gods and rishis being entitled to perform religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being no other rishis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bhrigu and other rishis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bhrigu, &c. What, then, should stand in the way of the gods' and rishis' right to acquire knowledge?--Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted; it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).
If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of subordinate members (anga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person
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just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many sacrifices.
To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.--How is that known?--From observation.--For a scriptural passage at first replies to the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are 'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently, on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms.--Smriti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays.' If such Smriti passages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the
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while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.
The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahmana, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many actions at the same time; one Brâhmana, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.
Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the 'word' (sabda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal) connection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified') 1. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations
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which form part of several sacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.
To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection will be raised--in Sûtra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Âdityas, the Visvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name Yagñadatta is given to him (lit. made for him) 2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the 'word.'
This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species 3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although
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the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavâdas, &c. Terms such as 'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the âkritis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origination from those words.
How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes Smriti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At the word these Pragâpati created the gods; at the words were poured out he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the sastra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i. e. the word of the Veda.--Bri. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation.--Smrti also delivers itself as follows, 'In the beginning
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a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhû, from which all activities proceeded. 'By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahesvara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Pragâpati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Brâ. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhûr he created the earth,' &c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were created from the words bhûr, &c. which had become manifest in the mind (of Pragâpati).
Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the sphota, the pûrvapakshin says. 1 For on the assumption
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that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yagñadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption; 1 nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception. 2 Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those impressions
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are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the sphote is the word. After the apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the sphota presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.--As that sphota is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the sphota and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.
Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again, can it be said
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that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Yagñadatta reading.--Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in
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the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the udâtta, the anudâtta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal 1? Or else 2--and this is the preferable explanation--we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udâtta, anudâtta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udâtta, the anudâtta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of udâtta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udâtta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that from the difference of the udâtta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals
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are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself.
The assumption of the sphota is further gratuitous, because the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here objects--I do not assume the existence of the sphota. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the sphota all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the sphota--i. e. something different from the letters of the given word--then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one sense in many letters 1; in the same way as the idea of a
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wood, an army, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object of one mental act, such couples of words as gârâ and râgâ or pika and kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one couple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of the different order in which they are arranged.
The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word consists--assisted by a certain order and number--have, through traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i. e. in their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the sphota is the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the sphota, and the sphota in its turn is said to manifest the sense.
Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the species.
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From all this it follows that the theory according to which the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is unobjectionable.
Footnotes
201:1 The reference is to Pûrva Mîmâmsâ Sûtras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).202:1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.
202:2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.
202:3 Âkriti, best translated by εἶδος.
204:1 The pûrvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called sphota which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests the sense of the word. The term sphota may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.--The sphota is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called vâkaka or abhidhâyaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhîhetu).
205:1 For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.
205:2 In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to p. 206 infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.
208:1 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.
208:2 With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upâdhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.
209:1 I. e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters, although more than one, express one sense only.
As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sûtra.--The present Sûtra now confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the rishis,' Rig-veda Samh. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the rishis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyâsa also speaks as follows: 'Formerly the great rishis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhû, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the itihâsas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'
If--the pûrvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical existence including denominations, things denominated and agents denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word (raised in Sûtra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as Sruti and Smriti declare, the whole threefold
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world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to have been removed?
To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the beginningless samsâra we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush. Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes one with that prâna alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prânas proceed, each towards its place; from the prânas the gods, from the gods the worlds.'
Well, the pûrvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a mahâpralaya (i. e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.
This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahâpralaya does cut short the entire current of practical
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existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords (îsvara), such as Hiranyagarbha and so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is observed--although they all have the common attribute of being animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to Hiranyagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which Sruti and Smriti mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as Hiranyagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hiranyagarbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Saunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukramanîs of the Veda) that the ten books (of the Rig-veda) were seen by Madhukkhandas and other rishis. 1And, similarly, Smriti tells us, for every Veda, of men of exalted mental vision (rishis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of their respective Vedas, such as kândas and so on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the rishi and so on, 'He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he
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does not know the rishi, the metre, the divinity, and the Brâhmana, runs against a post, falls into a pit 1, &c. &c., therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Ârsheya Brâhmana, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Smriti also declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed; hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahâpralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (sakti) of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the different conditions based on caste, âsrama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in the beginningless samsara, subject to a certain determinateness analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in different creations, so
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that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves. As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and, owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in Sruti as well as Smriti; compare, for instance, Rik. Samh. X, 190, 3, 'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air, and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brâhm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the Krittikâs.' This passage, which forms part of the injunction of the ishti to the Nakshatras, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered 1.
Smriti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the rishis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahâpralaya). As the various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the
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past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in name and form.'
Footnotes
213:1 Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not only to Hiranyagarbha, but to many beings.214:1 Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.
215:1 Asmin kalpe sarveshâm prâninâm dâhapâkaprakâsakârî yo#yam agnir drisyate so#yam agnih pûrvasmin kalpe manushyah san devatvapadaprâpakam karmânushthâyâsmin kalpa etag ganma labdhavân atah pûrvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhâvinîm samgñâm âsrityâgnir iti vyapadisyate.--Sâyana on the quoted passage.
A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Gaimini, considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidyâ, &c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidyâ ('the knowledge of the honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas' (Kh. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god Âditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can Âditya meditate upon another Âditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, Maruts, and Sâdhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c. But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to attain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Âditya is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is indeed the absorber' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves
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are not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the rishis themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with rishis, such as expressed in passages like Bri. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are the rishis Gautama and Bharadvâga; the right Gautama, the left Bharadvâga.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is stated in the following Sûtra.
To that sphere of light, the pûrvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms such as Âditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary passages 1. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes 2. For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence. The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas is known from the mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, purânas, and from the conceptions of ordinary life 3; but we contest the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the
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matter under discussion. Itihâsas and purânas again being of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The arthavâda passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation, &c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of authoritative knowledge for anything 1.--For these reasons the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
Footnotes
217:1 As, for instance, 'So long as Âditya rises in the east and sets in the west' (Kh. Up. III, 6, 4).217:2 Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
217:3 Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person with a staff in his hand, Varuna with a noose, Indra with a thunderbolt, &c. &c.
218:1 On the proper function of arthavâda and mantra according to the Mîmâmsâ, cp. Arthasamgraha, Introduction.
The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the pûrvapaksha. The teacher, Bâdarâyana, maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidyâ, and similar topics of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c. 2 Nor does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything, Brâhmanas, for instance, not for the râgasûya-sacrifice 3.
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[paragraph continues] And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare, for instance, Bri. Up. 1, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with rishis;' Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Virokana from the Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Smriti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yâgñavalkya 1.--Against the objection raised in the preceding Sûtra (32) we argue as follows. Words like âditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and arthavâda passages. For the devas possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavâda passage explaining the words 'ram of Medhâtithi,' which form part of the Subrahmanya-formula, that 'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhâtithi, the descendant of Kanva' (Shadv. Br. I, 1). And thus Smriti says that 'Âditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kuntî.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as 'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the case of the sun (âditya), &c. also; but--as already remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and
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arthavâdas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).
We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pûrvapakshin) that mantras and arthavâdas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the pûrvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an arthavâda, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own. For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavâda, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavâda form a separate group of their own which refers to some accomplished
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thing 1, and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vâyu a white animal.' All the words contained in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding arthavâda passage, 'For Vâyu is the swiftest deity; Vâyu he approaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of this arthavâda are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vâyu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavâda) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavâda acts as a mere anuvâda, i.e. a statement referring to something (already known) 2. When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gunavâda, i.e. a statement of a quality 3. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavâda is to be taken as a gunavâda on account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an arthavâda referring to something known (i.e. an anuvâda) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.
There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because
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without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say vaushat' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1). Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only 1; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavâdas.--Moreover, itihâsas and purânas also--because based on mantra and arthavâda which possess authoritative power in the manner described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the devas. Itihâsa and purâna can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smriti also declares that Vyâsa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the râgasûya-sacrifice 2would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and âsramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious
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merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Smriti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sûtra II, 44). And that Yoga does, as Smriti declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (Svet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the rishis who see the mantras and brâhmana passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this it appears that the itihâsas and purânas have an adequate basis.--And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, purânas, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation 1agree with this latter supposition only.
Footnotes
218:2 See above, p. 197.218:3 Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.
219:1 Srautalingenânumânabâdham darsayitvâ smârtenâpi tadbâdham darsayati smârtam iti. Kim atra brahma amritam kim svid vedyam anuttamam, kintayet tatra vai gatvâ gandharvo mâm aprikkhata, Visvâvasus tato râgan vedântagñânakovida iti mokshadharme ganakayâgñavalkyasamvâdât prahlâdâgagarasamvâdâk koktânumânâsiddhir ity arthah.
221:1 As opposed to an action to be accomplished.
221:2 Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavâda, 'Fire is a remedy for cold.'
221:3 Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).
222:1 And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.
222:2 The râgasûya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.
223:1 In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a deva.
(In the preceding adhikarana) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The present adhikarana is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
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claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the Sûdras also possess such a claim.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the Sûdras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text, 'Therefore 1 the Sûdra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Samh. VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the Sûdras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the Sûdras; for in the so-called samvarga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Gânasruti Pautrâyana, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of Sûdra 'Fie, necklace and carnage be thine, O Sûdra, together with the cows' (Kh. Up. IV, 2, 3). Smriti moreover speaks of Vidûra and others who were born from Sûdra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the Sûdra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the Sûdras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a Sûdra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the Sûdras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the Sûdra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because
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founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both cases 1--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the word 'Sûdra' being enounced in the samvarga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the Sûdra's qualification for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage quoted. 2 Besides, the word 'Sûdra' which occurs in the samvarga-vidyâ would establish a claim on the part of the Sûdras to that one vidyâ only, not to all vidyâs. In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavâda, to establish the Sûdras' claim to anything.--The word 'Sûdra' can moreover be made to agree with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When Gânasruti Pautrâyana heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car?' IV, i, 3), grief (suk) arose in his mind, and to that grief the rishi Raikva alludes with the word Sûdra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be accepted because a (real) born Sûdra is not qualified (for the samvarga-vidyâ. If it be asked how the grief (suk) which had arisen in Gânasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word Sûdra, we reply: On account of the rushing on (âdravana) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word Sûdra by dividing it into its parts, either as 'he rushed into grief (Sukam abhidudrâva) or as 'grief rushed on
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him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend 1.
Footnotes
224:1 The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Samh.225:1 The Sûdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyâ.
225:2 The linga contained in the word 'Sûdra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavâda-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the linga in the arthavâda-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the Sûdras' qualification for Vedic matters.
226:1 Hamsavâkyâd âtmano#nâdaram srutvâ gânasruteh sug utpannety etad eva katham gamyate yenâsau sûdrasabdena sûkyate tatrâha sprisyate keti. Ânanda Giri.
34. Grief of him (i.e. of Gânasruti) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief) (Raikva called him Sûdra); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by Raikva).
(In the preceding adhikarana) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The present adhikarana is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
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claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the Sûdras also possess such a claim.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the Sûdras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text, 'Therefore 1 the Sûdra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Samh. VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the Sûdras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the Sûdras; for in the so-called samvarga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Gânasruti Pautrâyana, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of Sûdra 'Fie, necklace and carnage be thine, O Sûdra, together with the cows' (Kh. Up. IV, 2, 3). Smriti moreover speaks of Vidûra and others who were born from Sûdra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the Sûdra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the Sûdras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a Sûdra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the Sûdras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the Sûdra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because
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founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both cases 1--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the word 'Sûdra' being enounced in the samvarga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the Sûdra's qualification for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage quoted. 2 Besides, the word 'Sûdra' which occurs in the samvarga-vidyâ would establish a claim on the part of the Sûdras to that one vidyâ only, not to all vidyâs. In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavâda, to establish the Sûdras' claim to anything.--The word 'Sûdra' can moreover be made to agree with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When Gânasruti Pautrâyana heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car?' IV, i, 3), grief (suk) arose in his mind, and to that grief the rishi Raikva alludes with the word Sûdra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be accepted because a (real) born Sûdra is not qualified (for the samvarga-vidyâ. If it be asked how the grief (suk) which had arisen in Gânasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word Sûdra, we reply: On account of the rushing on (âdravana) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word Sûdra by dividing it into its parts, either as 'he rushed into grief (Sukam abhidudrâva) or as 'grief rushed on
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him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend 1.
Footnotes
224:1 The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Samh.225:1 The Sûdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyâ.
225:2 The linga contained in the word 'Sûdra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavâda-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the linga in the arthavâda-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the Sûdras' qualification for Vedic matters.
226:1 Hamsavâkyâd âtmano#nâdaram srutvâ gânasruteh sug utpannety etad eva katham gamyate yenâsau sûdrasabdena sûkyate tatrâha sprisyate keti. Ânanda Giri.
Gânasruti cannot have been a Sûdra by birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya Kaitraratha Abhipratârin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage complementary to the samvarga-vidyâ, a kshattriya Kaitrarathi Abhipratârin is glorified, 'Once while Saunaka Kâpeya and Abhipratârin Kâkshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of them' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratârin was a Kaitrarathi (i.e. a descendant of Kitraratha) we have to infer from his connexion with a Kâpeya. For we know (from Sruti) about the connexion of Kitraratha himself with the Kâpeyas ('the Kâpeyas made Kitraratha perform that sacrifice;' Tândya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from him a Kaitrarathi descended who was a prince 2') that he (Kaitraratha) was a prince, we must
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understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now of Gânasruti being praised in the same vidyâ with the kshattriya Abhipratârin intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals. That Gânasruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text).--Hence the Sûdras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).
Footnotes
226:2 I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of Sankara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read kaitrarathinâmaikah). Ânanda Giri expressly explains tasmâd by kaitrarathâd ity arthah.--The text of the Tândya Br. runs: tasmâk kaitrarathînâm ekah kshatrapatir gâyate, and the commentary explains: tasmât kâranâd adyâpi kitravamsotpannânâm madhye eka eva râgâ kshatrapatir p. 227 balâdhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise the form kaitraratha used in the Sûtra.That the Sûdras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also that in different places of the vidyâs such ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, Sat. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Kh. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir! thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippalâda, thinking that he would teach them all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Kh. Up. V, 11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony 1.--With reference to the Sûdras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as 'once born' only ('the Sûdra is the fourth caste, once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the Sûdra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony.'
The Sûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having ascertained Gâbâla not to be a Sûdra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brâhmana would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth' (Kh. Up. IV, 4, 5); which scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the Sûdras not being capable of initiation).
The Sûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Smriti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a Sûdra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of a Sûdra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express prohibition (of the Sûdras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart knowledge to the Sûdra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those Sûdras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be withheld,
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since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit. Smriti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihâsas and purânas; compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahâbh.).--It remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.
The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedânta-texts.--We read (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the prâna. It (the prâna) is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal 1.'--This passage declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in prâna, and that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear what the prâna is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, prâna denotes the air with its five modifications, that the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms--which is here called prâna--and the terrible thunderbolts also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of Parganya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of that air immortality
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also can be obtained; for another scriptural passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.
To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in prâna we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word prâna can denote the highest Self also, appears from such passages as 'the prâna of prâna' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a quality which, properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the prâna and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and Vâyu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly
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carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15).--That immortality which the pûrvapakshin asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic being started (Bri. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Nakiketas in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to the highest Self.
We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word 'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.
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The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word. For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the nâdîs of the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our passage, the ordinary light.
To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin '); it is thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person' (VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the pûrvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall show later on.
Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (âkâsa) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these
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forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1).
There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the pûrvapakshin declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and, secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.
To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,' designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self (gîva âtman), and evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (VIII, 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.
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In the sixth prapâthaka of the Brihadâranyaka there is given, in reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the prânas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the prânas who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.
In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage, 'This person embraced by the intelligent (prâgña) Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,' must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one' the individual
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soul which is the Lord of the body, while the 'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the passage.--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first place the introductory passage ('He among the prânas who consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving 1, 'aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words, 'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the prânas, is the great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident from the circumstance that on Ganaka's question, which is repeated in every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yâgñavalkya replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to anything' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by
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good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.
That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance, 'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.
(My humble salutations to the translator Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
