VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE
COMMENTARY BY SANKARÂKÂRYA.
(Brahma Sutras)
Translated by George Thibaut
THIRD ADHYÂYA
FIRST PÂDA
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. In obtaining a different (body) (the soul) goes enveloped (by subtle parts of the elements), (as appears from) question and explanation.In the second adhyâya we have refuted the objections raised against the Vedântic of Brahman on the ground of Smriti and reasoning; we have shown that all other opinions are devoid of foundation, and that the alleged mutual contradictions of Vedic texts do not exist. Further we have demonstrated that the entities different from--but subordinate to--the individual soul (such as prâna, &c.) spring from Brahman.--Now in the third adhyâya we shall discuss the following subjects: the manner in which the soul together with its subordinate adjuncts passes through the samsâra (III, 1); the different states of the soul and the nature of Brahman (III, 2); the separateness or non-separateness of the vidyâs and the question whether the qualities (of Brahman) have to be cumulated or not (III, 3); the accomplishment of man's highest end by means of perfect knowledge (samyagdarsana), the different injunctions as to the means of perfect knowledge and the absence of certain rules as to release which is the fruit (of perfect knowledge 1) (III, 4). As occasion leads some other matters also will be explained.--The first pâda explains, on the ground of the so-called vidyâ of the five fires (Kh. Up. V, 3-10), the different modes of the soul's passing through the samsâra; the reason of that doctrine being (the inculcation of) absence
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of all desire (vairâgya), in accordance with the scriptural remark at the end (of the vidyâ), 'hence let a man take care to himself.'--The soul accompanied by the chief vital air, the sense-organs and the mind, and taking with itself nescience (avidyâ), moral good or ill-desert (karman), and the impressions left by its previous existences 1, leaves its former body and obtains a new body; this is known from the scriptural passage extending from Bri. Up. IV, 4, 1 ('Then those prânas gather around him') up to IV, 4, 4 ('It makes to itself another newer and more beautiful shape'); which passage forms part of a chapter treating of the samsâra-state. And it moreover follows from the possibility (thus resulting) of the soul enjoying the fruits of good and evil actions.--Here the question arises whether the soul when going to the new body is enveloped or not by subtle parts of the elements constituting the seeds of the body.--It is not so enveloped, the pûrvapakshin.--Why?--Because scripture, while stating that the soul takes the organs with itself, does not state the same with regard to the elements. For the expression 'those parts of light' (tegomâtrâh) occurs in the passage 'He taking with him those parts of light,' &c., intimates that the organs only are taken (and not the elements), since in the complementary portion of the passage the eye, &c., are spoken of, and not the subtle parts of the elements. The subtle parts of the elements can moreover easily be procured anywhere; for wherever a new body is to be originated they are present, and the soul's taking them with itself would, therefore, be useless. Hence we conclude that the soul when going is not enveloped by them.
To this the teacher replies, 'in obtaining another it goes enveloped.' That means: we must understand that the soul when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new
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body.--How do we know this?--'From the question and the explanation.' The question is, 'Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?' (V, 3, 3.) The explanation, i.e. answer, is given in the entire passage which, after having explained how the five libations in the form of sraddhâ, rain, food, seed are offered in the five fires, viz. the heavenly world, Parganya, the earth, man and woman, concludes, 'For this reason is water in the fifth oblation called man.' Hence we understand that the soul goes enveloped by water.--But--an objection will be raised--another scriptural passage declares that like a caterpillar the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an approach to another body 1. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3, 'And as a caterpillar.')--We reply that what there is compared to the (action of the) caterpillar is (not the non-abandonment of the old body but) merely the lengthening out of the creative effort whose object is the new body to be obtained, which (new body) is presented by the karman of the soul 2Hence there is no contradiction.--As the mode of obtaining a new body is thus declared by Sruti, all hypotheses which owe their origin to the mind of man only are to be set aside because they are contradicted by scripture. So e.g. the opinion (of the Sâṅkhyas) that the Self and the organs are both all--pervading 3, and when obtaining a new body only begin to function in it in consequence of the karman; or the opinion (of the Bauddhas) that the Self alone
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(without the organs) begins to function in a new body, and that as the body itself, so new sense-organs also are produced in the new abode of fruition 1; or the opinion (of the Vaiseshikas) that the mind only proceeds to the new abode of fruition 2; or the opinion (of the Digambara Gainas) that the individual soul only flying away from the old body alights in the new one as a parrot flies from one tree to another.--But--an objection will be raised--from the quoted question and answer it follows that the soul goes enveloped by water only, according to the meaning of the word made use of by scripture, viz. water. How then can the general statement be maintained that the soul goes enveloped by subtle parts of all elements?--To this doubt the next Sûtra replies.
Footnotes
101:1 I.e. the absence of a rule laying down that release consequent on knowledge takes place in the same existence in which the means of reaching perfect knowledge are employed.102:1 I read avidyâ the commentators (Go. Ân., however, mentions the reading 'vidyâ,' also); although vidyâ appears preferable. Cp Max Müller's note 2, p. 175, Upan. II; Deussen, p. 405.--Pûrvagpragñâ ganmântarîya-samskârah. Ân Gi.
103:1 Evam hi sûkshmadehaparishvakto ramhet yady asya sthûlam sarîram ramhato na bhavet, asti tv asya vartamânasthûlasarîrayogah âdehântaraprâptes trinagalâyukânidarsanena, tasmân nidarsanasrutivirodhân na sûkshmadehaparishvakto ramhatîti. Bhâ.
103:2 Pratipattavyah prâptavyo yo dehas tadvishayâyâ bhâvanâyâ utpâdanâyâ dîrghibhâvamâtram galûkayopamîyate. Bhâ.--Ân. Gi. explains: prâptavyo yo dehas tadvishayabhâvanâyâ devoऽham ityâdikâyâ dîrghîbhâvo vyavahitârthâlambanatvam tâvanmâtram ityâdi.
103:3 Karanânâm âhamkârikatvât tasya vyâpitvât teshâm api tadâtmakânâm vyâpitvam. Go. Ân.--The organs are, according to the Sâṅkhya, the immediate effects of the ahamkâra, but why all-pervading on that account?
104:1 Âtmâ khalv alayagñânasamtânas tasya vrittayah sabdâdigñânâni tallâbhah sarîrântare bhavati, kevalasabdas tu karanasâhityam âtmano vârayati. Go. Ân.
104:2 Kevalam karanair âtmanâ ka rahitam iti yâvat, karanâni nûtanany eva tatrârabhyante âtmâ tu vibhutvâd akriyoऽpi tatra vrittimâtram âpnoti. Ân. Gi.
The word 'but' disposes of the objection raised.--Water consists of three elements, as we know from the scriptural statement regarding tripartition. If, therefore, water is admitted to originate (the new body) the other two elements also have necessarily to be admitted (as taking part in the origination). The body moreover consists of three elements, as the effects of the three, i.e. fire, water, and earth, are observed in it, and further as it contains three materials, viz. wind, bile, and phlegm 3. Being such it cannot originate from mere water, the other elements being left aside. Hence the term water made use of in the scriptural question and answer refers to the fact of water preponderating,
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not to its being the only element. As a matter of fact we see that in all animated bodies liquid substances such as juices, blood, and the like preponderate.--But we likewise observe in bodies a large amount of earthy matter!--True, but the amount of water is larger than that of any other matter. Moreover, liquid matter prevails in that which is the seed of the body. Further, we know that works (karman) constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a new body, and (sacrificial) works such as the agnihotra, &c., consist in the offering of liquid substances such as Soma, butter, milk and the like. Thereby also the preponderance of water is established. And on account of that preponderance the word 'water' implies the subtle parts of all the elements which constitute the seed of the body.
Scripture states that, when a new body is obtained, the prânas also go (from the old body to the new one). Cp. 'When he thus departs the (chief) prâna departs after him, and when the prâna thus departs all the other prânas depart after it' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2), and similar passages. Now this going of the prânas is not possible without a base; hence we infer that water also--mixed with parts of the other elements--goes (from the old body to the new one), serving the purpose of supplying a base for the moving prânas. For the prânas cannot, without such a base, either move or abide anywhere; as we observe in living beings.
Well, the pûrvapaksha resumes, we deny that at the time when a new body is obtained the prânas go with the soul, because scripture speaks of their going to Agni, &c. For that at the time of death speech and the other prânas go to Agni and the other gods the following passage expressly declares: 'When the speech of the dead person
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enters into the fire, breath into the air,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 2. l3).--To this we reply that the objection is of no force on account of the metaphorical character of those statements. The entering of speech, &c., into Agni is metaphorical, because we observe no such entering in the case of the hairs of the head and body. For although the text says that 'the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the hairs of the head into the trees;' still we cannot understand this to mean that the hairs actually fly away from the body and enter into trees and shrubs. On the other hand, the soul could not go at all if we denied to it the limiting adjunct formed by the prânas, and without the latter it could not, in the new body, enter into the state of fruition. Besides, other passages distinctly declare that the prânas go with the soul.--From all this we conclude that the passage about speech, &c. entering into Agni, metaphorically expresses that Agni and the other divinities who act as guides of the prânas and cooperate with them stop their cooperation at the time of death.
Well, the pûrvapakshin resumes, but how can it be ascertained that 'in the fifth oblation water is called man,' considering that water is not mentioned by scripture with reference to the first fire (altar)? For the text enumerates five fires--the first of which is the heavenly world--as the abodes of the five oblations. With reference to the first of those fires--introduced by the words 'The fire is that world, O Gautama,' it is stated that sraddhâ (faith) is the material constituting the oblation ('on that altar the devas offer sraddhâ'); while nothing is said about water being the offered material. If, with reference to the four following fires, viz. Parganya, &c., water is assumed to constitute the offering, we have no objection because in the substances stated there as forming the oblations, viz. Soma, and so on, water may preponderate. But to set aside, in the case of
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the first fire, sraddhâ (i.e. faith) which is directly mentioned in the text, and to substitute in its place the assumption of water, about which the text says nothing, is an arbitrary proceeding. In reality sraddhâ be explained, in conformity with its ordinary meaning, as a kind of mental state, viz. faith. Hence it is objectionable to maintain that water, in the fifth oblation, becomes man.
To this view of the pûrvapakshin we demur, because, in the case of the first fire, the word sraddhâ is to be taken in the sense of 'water.'--On what ground?--On the ground of fitness. For on that explanation only beginning, middle, and end of the passage harmonise so that the syntactical unity of the whole remains undisturbed. On the other explanation (i.e. sraddhâ being taken in the sense of 'faith'), if the question were asked how water, in the fifth oblation, can be called man, and if, in way of reply, the text could point only to faith, i.e. something which is not water, as constituting the material of the oblation; then question and answer would not agree, and so the unity of the whole passage would be destroyed. The text, moreover, by concluding 'For this reason is water in the fifth oblation called man,' indicates the same interpretation 1.--Further, the text points out, as effects of sraddhâ, substances in which water in its gross form preponderates, viz. Soma, rain, &c. And this again furnishes a reason for interpreting sraddhâ as water, because the effect generally is cognate in nature to the cause. Nor again can the mental conception called faith be taken out from the mind or soul, whose attribute it is, and be employed as an offering, as the heart can be cut out of the sacrificial animal. For this reason also the word sraddhâ be taken to mean 'water.' Water can, moreover, be fitly called by that name, on the ground of Vedic usage, cp. 'sraddhâ is indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 8, 1). Moreover, water when forming the seed of the body enters into the state of thinness, subtilty, and herein again resembles faith, so that its being called sraddhâ
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is analogous to the case of a man who is as valiant as a lion being himself called a lion.--Again, the word sraddhâ may fitly be applied to water, because water is intimately connected with religious works (sacrifices, &c.) which depend on faith; just as the word 'platform' is applied to men (standing on the platform). And finally the waters may fitly be called sraddhâ, on account of their being the cause of faith, according to the scriptural passage, 'Water indeed produces faith in him for holy works 1.'
Well, let it be granted that, on account of question and answer, water, passing through the forms of sraddhâ, &c., may in the fifth oblation obtain the shape of man. But still we cannot allow that the souls when moving from one body into another are enveloped by water. For this is not directly stated by scripture, there being in the whole passage no word referring to the souls, while there are words referring to water. Hence the assertion that the soul goes enveloped by water is unfounded.--This objection is invalid, we reply, 'on account of those who perform ishtis, &c., being understood.' For in the passage beginning 'But they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of public utility and alms, they go to the smoke' (V, 3, 10), it is said that those who perform ishtis reach, on the road of the fathers leading through smoke. &c.. the moon, 'From ether they go to the moon; that is Soma, the king.' Now these same persons are meant in the passage about the five fires also, as we conclude from the equality of scriptural statement in the passage, 'In that fire the devas offer
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[paragraph continues] sraddhâ. From that oblation rises Soma the king 1.' To those 2 (persons who have performed ishtis, &c.) water is supplied in the shape of the materials employed to perform the agnihotra darsapûrnamâsa and other sacrifices, viz. sour milk, milk, &c., which substances, as consisting mostly of water, may directly be considered as water. Of these, when offered in the âhavanîya, the subtle parts assume the form of an apûrva resulting from the oblation 3, and attach themselves to the performer of the sacrifice. Then (when the sacrificer dies) the priests offer his body, with the funeral ceremonies 4, into the crematory fire, with the mantra, '(may) he (go) to the heavenly world, svâhâ.' Then the water forming the oblation--which has connected with deeds resulting from faith 5--having assumed the form of an apûrva envelops the souls of those who had performed the sacrifices, and leads them up to the heavenly world to receive their reward.--In accordance with the preceding interpretation scripture says in the agnihotra chapter also--in the complementary passage constituting the reply to the six questions--that the two agnihotra-obligations go up to the other world in order to originate the fruit (of the work of the sacrificer), 'Those two oblations when offered go up, &c.' (Sat. Br. XI, 6, 2, 6).--Hence we conclude that the
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souls, when going to the enjoyment of the fruits of their works, are enveloped by the water of which the oblations consist 1.
But how can it be maintained that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go to the enjoyment of the fruit of their works, considering that scripture declares them when having reached the moon--by the path leading through smoke, &c.--to become food, 'That is Soma the king; that is the food of the gods; the gods do eat it' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 4); and the corresponding passage, 'Having reached the moon they become food, and then the Devas feed on them there as sacrificers feed on Soma as it increases and decreases' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16)? If, in accordance with these passages, they are eaten by the gods as by tigers, &c., it is not possible that they should enjoy the fruit of their deeds.--To this the following Sûtra replies.
Footnotes
109:1 Both passages speak of something reaching, i.e. becoming the moon. Now, as that something is, in the passage about the road of the fathers, the gîvas of those who have performed ishtis, &c., we conclude that by the sraddhâ also, from which in the other passage the moon is said to rise, those gîvas are meant, or, properly speaking, the subtle body of water which envelops those gîvas.--Dhûmâdivâkye pañkâgnivâkye ka somaragatvaprâptisravanâviseshâd ishtâdikârinah sraddhâsabditâdbhir veshthitâ dyulokam yântîti bhâtîty arthah. Ân. Gi.109:2 An. Gi. introduces this clause by: nanu mahad iha srutyor vailakshanyam, sraddhâsabditânâm apâm kvakid dyuloke homah srutah kvakid ishtâdikârinâm dhûmâdikramenâkâsaprâptir na ka teshâm âpah santi yena tadveshthitânâm gatis tatrâha teshâm keti.
109:3 I read, with a MS. of An. Gi., âhutyapûrvarûpâh.
109:4 The so-called antyeshti.
109:5 And is on that account properly called sraddhâ.
110:1 Saṅkara's attempts to render plausible the interpretation of sraddhâ by 'water,' and to base thereon the doctrine of the souls when going to a new body being enveloped by a subtle involucrum of water (and the other elements contained therein) are, of course, altogether artificial. I do not, however, see that he can be taxed with inconsistency (as he is by Deussen, p. 408). Sraddhâ is to him in the first place the gross water which constitutes the chief material employed in the sacrifices; in the second place the apûrva which results from the sacrifice, and which is imagined to consist of the subtle parts of the water whose gross parts have been consumed by the sacrificial fire. These subtle parts attach themselves to the soul, accompany it as an involucrum when it goes to another world, and form the base of any new body which the soul may have to assume in accordance with its previous deeds.
The word 'or' is meant to set aside the started objection. The souls' being food has to be understood in a metaphorical, not a literal, sense, as otherwise all scriptural statements of claims (adhikâra)--such as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice'--would be contradicted. If
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the performers of sacrifices, &c., did not, in the sphere of the moon, enjoy the fruits of their works, why should they undertake works such as sacrifices, which are to him who performs them the cause of great trouble? We see, moreover, that the word 'food,' as denoting in general whatever is the cause of enjoyment, is metaphorically used of that also which is not food (in the narrower sense), as, for instance, in such phrases as 'the Vaisyas are the food of kings, the animals are the food of the Vaisyas.' Hence what is meant there by the term 'eating' is the rejoicing of the gods with the performers of sacrifices, &c., who stand in a subordinate (instrumental) relation to that rejoicing--a rejoicing analogous to that of an ordinary man with beloved persons such as wife, children, friends, and so on--not actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweetmeats. For that the gods eat in the ordinary way a scriptural passage expressly denies (Kh. Up. III, 6, 1), 'The gods do not eat or drink; by seeing the nectar they are satisfied.' At the same time the performers of sacrifices, although standing in a subordinate relation to the gods. may themselves be in a state of enjoyment, like servants who (although subordinate to the king) themselves live on the king.--That the performers of sacrifices are objects of enjoyment for the gods follows, moreover, from their quality of not knowing the Self. For that those who do not know the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods the following scriptural passage shows, 'Now, if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does not know. He is like a beast for the Devas' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). That means: he, in this life, propitiating the gods by means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast, and does so in the other world also, depending on them like a beast and enjoying the fruits of his works as assigned by them.--The latter part of the Sûtra can be explained in another manner also 1. Those who do not know the Self are those who perform works only, such as sacrifices, &c.,
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and do not join knowledge to works. We then take the expression, 'the knowledge of the Self,' as indirectly denoting the knowledge of the five fires; an explanation which rests on the general subject-matter. And on account of the performers of sacrifices being destitute of the knowledge of the five fires the circumstance of their serving as food is brought forward as a mere gunavâda 1 for the purpose of glorifying the knowledge of the five fires. For the latter is what the text aims at enjoining, as we infer from the general purport of the passage.--'For thus' another scriptural passage 'declares,' viz. that enjoyment (on the part of the gîva) takes place in the sphere of the moon, 'Having enjoyed greatness in the Soma world he returns again' (Pr. Up. V, 4). Another scriptural passage also declares that the performers of sacrifices dwelling together with the gods obtain enjoyment, 'A hundred blessings of the fathers who have conquered this world make one blessing of the work-gods, who obtain their godhead by work' (Bri. Up. IV, 3. 33).--As thus the statement about the performers of sacrifices becoming food is metaphorical only, we understand that it is their souls which go, and hence there is no longer any objection to the doctrine that they go enveloped by water.
Scripture states that the souls of those who perform sacrifices, and the like, rise on the road leading through smoke, and so on, to the sphere of the moon, and when they have done with the enjoyment (of the fruits of their works) again descend, 'Having dwelt there, yâvatsampâtam 2, they return again that way as they came,' &c., up to 'Those whose conduct has been good obtain some good birth, the
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birth of a Brâhmana, &c.--Those whose conduct has been evil obtain the birth of a dog, &c.' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 5-7). Here it must be considered whether the souls, after having enjoyed the fruits of all their works, descend without a remainder (anusaya, of their works), or with such a remainder (of unrequited works).--The pûrvapakshin says: without such a remainder.--Why?--On account of the specification 'yâvat sampâtam.' The word sampâta here denotes the aggregate of works (karmâsaya) 1, which is so called because by it the souls pass from this world to that world for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of the works. So that the entire clause 'Having dwelt there as far as the aggregate of the works extends' indicates their works being completely requited there. The same thing is indicated by another scriptural passage, 'But when in their case that (i.e. the effect of their works) ceases' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16).--Well, but why should we not assume that these passages (do not mean that all works are requited there but) only indicate that the soul enjoys in the other world so long as there are works to be enjoyed there?--It is impossible to assume this, because elsewhere a reference is made to the totality of works. For the passage, Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to action,' intimates, by means of the comprehensive term 'whatever,' that all works done here are exhausted there.--Moreover, death has the power of manifesting those works whose fruit has not yet begun 2; the manifestation of those works not being possible previously to death because then they are obstructed by those works whose fruits have already begun. Now death must manifest alike all works whose fruits had not begun previously, because the cause being the same the effects cannot be different. Analogously a lamp which is placed at the same distance from a jar and a piece of cloth
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illuminates the latter as well as the former.--Hence it follows that the souls descend without a remainder of unrequited works.
To this we reply as follows: 'On the passing away of the works with a remainder.' That means: when the aggregate of works with which the souls had risen to the moon for the purpose of the enjoyment of their fruits is, by such enjoyment, exhausted, then the body, consisting of water, which had originated in the moon for the purpose of such enjoyment, is dissolved by contact with the fire of the grief springing from the observation that the enjoyment comes to an end; just as snow and hail are melted by contact with the rays of the sun, or the hardness of ghee by contact with the heat of fire. Then, at the passing away of the works, i.e. when the works performed, such as sacrifices, &c., are, by the enjoyment of their fruits, exhausted, the souls descend with a remainder yet left.--But on what grounds is that remainder assumed?--On the ground of what is seen (Sruti) and Smriti. For scripture declares manifestly that the souls descend joined with such a remainder, 'Those whose conduct (karana) has been good will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brâhmana, or a Kshattriya, or a Vaisya. But those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a Kândâla.' That the word karana here means the remainder (of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover, the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a remainder of works. For we know from scripture that good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and evil works. Smriti also teaches that the members of the different castes and âsramas do, in accordance with their works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter into new existences, in which they are distinguished from each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life, knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence, which doctrine implies that they descend with a remainder of their works.--Of what kind then is that so-called remainder?--
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[paragraph continues] Some say that thereby we have to understand a remainder of the works which had been performed (in the previous existence) for the sake of the heavenly world, and whose fruits have (for the greater part) been enjoyed. That remainder might then be compared to the remainder of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled with oil even after it has been emptied.--But you have no right to assume a remainder in the case of works, the fruits of which have been enjoyed already, since the adrishta (which springs from works) is opposed to the works (so as to destroy them completely 1).--This objection, we reply, is not valid, as we do not maintain that the works are completely requited (previously to the new existence).--But the souls do ascend to the sphere of the moon for the express purpose of finding there a complete requital of their works!--True; but when only a little of the effects of their works is left, they can no longer stay there. For as some courtier who has joined the king's court with all the requisites which the king's service demands is unable to remain at court any longer, when in consequence of his long stay most of his things are worn out, so that he is perhaps left with a pair of shoes and an umbrella only; so the soul, when possessing only a small particle of the effects of its works, can no longer remain in the sphere of the moon.--But all this reasoning is in fact altogether unfounded 2. For it has already been stated that, on account of (the adrishta) being opposed to the work, the continued existence of a remainder cannot be admitted in the case of works which had been performed with a view to the heavenly world, and which have been requited in the moon.--But has it not also been said above that not all the work whose fruit the heavenly world is meets with requital there?--Yes, but that statement is not defensible. For works which are performed for
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the purpose of obtaining the heaven, world produce their entire heavenly fruit for the soul only as being as it stays in heaven, and if we take our stand on scripture we have no right to assume that they produce even a particle of fruit for the souls after those have again descended from heaven. That some part of the oil continues to remain in the vessel is unobjectionable because we see it, and we likewise see that some part of the courtier's equipment continues to remain with him; but that some part of those works which led the soul to heaven continues to exist, that we neither see nor are able to surmise, because it would contradict the texts declaring that the heavenly world (alone) is the fruit of the works.--That of works whose fruit is heaven, such as sacrifices and the like, no remainder continues to exist, we must necessarily acknowledge for the following reason also. If some part of those good works such as sacrifices, &c., on account of which the agents enjoyed the heavenly world, were surmised to continue in existence as a remainder, that remainder would in all cases be itself a good one, would never be of a contrary nature. But then our supposition would be in conflict with the scriptural passage which distinguishes remainders of a different kind, viz. 'Those whose conduct has been good;--those whose conduct has been evil,' &c. Hence after the fruits of that set of works which is requited in the other world have been (completely) enjoyed, the remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed in this world constitutes the so-called anusaya with which the souls re-descend.--It was said above that we must assume the souls to descend without any such remainder, after having reached, by the enjoyment of the fruits, the end of all the works alone here below, on account of the comprehensive statement implied in the expression 'whatever.' But that assertion cannot be upheld as the existence of such a remainder has been proved. Hence we have to understand that the souls re-descend after having exhausted, by the enjoyment of its fruits, only that entire part of the works done here below whose fruit belongs to the other world and is begun to be enjoyed there.--The proof given by us of the existence of the remainder refutes at the same
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time the other assertion made above, viz. that death manifests equally all works the enjoyment of whose fruits was not begun here below, and that on that account we are not entitled to draw a line between works whose fruits begin in the other world and works whose fruits begin in this world only (i.e. in a new existence on earth).--We moreover, have to ask for what reason it is maintained that death manifests (i.e. lays open and makes ready for requital those works whose fruits have not begun here below. The answer will be that in this life the operation of certain words cannot begin because it is obstructed by other works whose fruits already begin here below, that, however, that operation does begin as soon as, at the moment of death, the obstruction ceases. Well, then, if previously to death those actions whose fruits have already begun prevent other actions from beginning their operation, at the time of death also certain works of less force will be obstructed in their operation by other works of greater force, it being impossible that the fruits of works of opposite tendency should begin at the same time. For it is impossible to maintain that different deeds whose fruits must be experienced in different existences should, merely because they have this in common that their fruits have not begun (previously to death), become manifest on the occasion of one and the same death, and originate one new existence only; against this militates the fact of the definite fruits (attached to each particular work) being of contrary natures 1. Not, on the other hand, can we maintain that at the time of death some works manifest themselves while others are altogether extinguished; for that would contradict the fact that absolutely all works have their fruits. No work in fact can be extinguished except by means of expiatory actions, &c. 2 Smriti also declares that works whose operation is obstructed
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by other works leading to fruits of a contrary nature last for a long time, 'Sometimes a good deed persists immovable as it were, the doer meanwhile remaining immerged in the samsâra, until at last he is released from pain.'
Moreover, if all unrequited works becoming manifest on the occasion of one and the same death were to begin one new existence only, the consequence would be that those who are born again in the heavenly world, or in hell, or as animals, could, as not entitled thereto, perform no religious works, and being thus excluded from all chance of acquiring religious merit and demerit could not enter on any new forms of existence, as all reason for the latter would be absent 1. And that would further contradict Smriti, which declares that some single actions, such as the murder of a Brâhmana, are the causes of more than one new existence. Nor can we assume, for the knowledge of the particular results springing from religious merit and demerit, any other cause than the sacred texts 2. Nor, again, does death manifest (bring about the requital of) those works whose fruit is observed to be enjoyed already here below, as, for instance, the kârîreshti, &c. 3 How then can we allow the assumption that death manifests all actions? The instance of the lamp (made use of by the pûrvapakshin) is already refuted by our having shown the relative strength of actions 4. Or else we may look on the matter as analogous to the manifestation (by a lamp) of bigger and smaller objects. For as a lamp, although equally distant from a big and a very small thing, may manifest the former only
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and not the latter, so death provokes the operation of the stronger works only, not of the weaker ones, although an equal opportunity presents itself for both sets of works as hitherto unrequited.--Hence the doctrine that all works are manifested by death cannot be maintained, as it is contradicted by Sruti, Smriti, and reason alike. That the existence of a remainder of works should stand in the way of final release is a misplaced fear, as we know from Sruti that all works whatever are destroyed by perfect knowledge. It therefore is a settled conclusion that the souls re-descend with a remainder of works. They descend 'as they came' (mounted up); 'not thus,' i.e. in inverted order. We conclude that they descend 'as they came' from the fact of ether and smoke, which the text includes in the road of the fathers, being mentioned in the description of the descent also, and from the expression 'as they came.' That they follow the inverted order we conclude from night, &c., not being mentioned, and from the cloud, &c., being added.
Footnotes
112:2 About which term see further on.113:1 The Comm. on Kh. Up. V, 10, 5, explains it by 'sampatanti yeneti sampâtah karmanah kshayah, yâvat sampâtam yâvat karmanah kshayah.'
113:2 Abhivyaktis ka karmanâm phalâdanâyonmukhatvam. Ân. Gi.
115:1 Bhândânusârinah snehasyâvirodhâd yuktah seshah, karma tu phalodayavirodhitvât phalam keg gâtam nashtam eveti na tasya seshasiddhir iti saṅkate nanv iti. Ân. Gi.
115:2 Ivakâro madhuroktyâ prayukto vastutas tv evakâro vivakshitah. Ân. Gi.
117:1 On which account they cannot be experienced in one and the same existence.
117:2 Works are extinguished either by expiatory ceremonies or by the knowledge of Brahman or by the full fruition of their consequences.
118:1 And in consequence of this they could never obtain final release.
118:2 We have the sacred texts only to teach us what the effects of particular good or evil actions may be.
118:3 The kârîreshti is a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous of rain.
118:4 I.e. by our having shown that death does not equally manifest all works, but that, after death has taken place, the stronger works bring about their requital while the operation of the weaker ones is retarded thereby.
But--an objection may be raised--the scriptural passage, which has been quoted for the purpose of proving that the existence of a remainder of works ('those whose conduct has been good,' &c.), declares that the quality of the new birth depends on karana, not on anusaya. Now karana and anusaya are different things; for karana is the same as karitra, âkâra, sîla, all of which mean conduct 1, while anusaya denotes work remaining from requited work. Scripture also speaks of actions and conduct as different things, 'According as he acts and according as he conducts himself so will he be' (Bri, Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'Whatever
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works are blameless those should be regarded, not others; whatever our good conduct was that should be observed by thee' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2). From the passage which proclaims the dependence of the quality of birth on conduct the existence of an unrequited remainder of works cannot therefore be proved.--This objection is without force, we reply, because the scriptural term 'conduct' is meant to connote the remainder of the works. This is the opinion of the teacher Kârshnâgini.
That may be; but for what reason should we abandon that meaning which the term 'karana' directly conveys, viz. the meaning 'conduct,' and accept the merely connotative meaning 'remainder of the works?' Conduct, which the text directly mentions, may be supposed to have for its fruit either a good or an evil birth, according as it is enjoined or prohibited, good or evil. Some fruit will have to be allowed to it in any case; for otherwise it would follow that it is purposeless.--This objection is without force 'on account of the dependence on it.' Such works as sacrifices, and the like, depend on conduct in so far as somebody whose conduct is not good is not entitled to perform them. This we know from Smriti-passages, such as the following, 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.'--And also if conduct is considered as subservient to man 1 it will not be purposeless. For when the aggregate of works such as sacrifices, &c.. begins to originate its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the sacrifice will originate there (i.e. in the fruit) some addition.
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[paragraph continues] And it is known from Sruti as well as Smriti that work effects everything 1. It is, therefore, the opinion of Kârshnâgini that the remainder of works only--which is connoted by the term 'conduct'--is the cause of the souls entering on new births. For as work may be the cause of new births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will surely not creep on his knees.
Footnotes
120:1 I.e. as something which produces in man a samskâra analogous to that produced by other preparatory or purificatory rites such as bathing, &c.--In the preceding sentences conduct had been spoken of not as purushârtha but as karmâṅga. In that case it produces no separate result; while if considered as purushârtha it has a special result of its own.121:1 A clause added to guard against the assumption--which might be based on the preceding remarks--that conduct is, after all, the cause of the quality of the new birth.
The teacher Bâdari, however, thinks that the word 'karana' denotes nothing else but good works and evil works. It means the same as anushthâna (performance) or karman (work). For we see that the root kar (to walk, to conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. Of a man who performs holy works such as sacrifices, &c., people say in ordinary language, 'that excellent man walks in righteousness.' The word âkâra also denotes only a kind of religious duty. That works and karana (conduct) are sometimes spoken of as different things is analogous to the distinction sometimes made between Brâhmanas and Parivrâgakas 2. We, therefore, decide that by men of good karana are meant those whose works are worthy of praise, by men of evil karana those whose works are worthy of blame.
It has been said that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go to the moon. The question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon or not.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that it cannot be asserted that men belonging to the former class only go to the moon,
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because scripture speaks of the moon as being resorted to by those also who have not performed sacrifices. For the Kâushîtakins make the following general statement, 'All who depart from this world go to the moon' (Kau. Up. I, 2). Moreover, the origination of a new body in the case of those who are born again is not possible without their having (previously) reached the moon, on account of the precise definition of number contained in the statement, 'In the fifth oblation' (Kh. Up. V, 9, 1) 1. Hence all men must be supposed to resort to the moon. If it be objected that it does not appear proper that those who perform sacrifices and those who do not should go to the same place, we reply that there is no real objection, because those who do not perform sacrifices do not enjoy anything in the moon.
'But' discards the pûrvapaksha. It is not true that all men go to the moon. For the ascent to the moon is for the purpose of enjoyment only; it is neither without a special purpose nor for the mere purpose of subsequent re-descent. Just as a man climbs on a tree for the purpose of breaking fruit or blossoms, not either without any aim or for the mere purpose of coming down again. Now it has been admitted already that for those who do not offer sacrifices there is not any enjoyment in the moon; hence those only who perform sacrifices rise to the moon, not any other persons. The latter descend to Samyamana, the abode of Yama, suffer there the torments of Yama corresponding to their evil deeds, and then again re-ascend to this world. Such is their ascent and descent; as we maintain on the ground of such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural passage embodying Yama's own words declares that those who die without having offered sacrifices fall into Yama's
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power.' The other world never rises before the eyes of the careless child deluded by the delusion of wealth. This is the world, he thinks, there is no other; thus he falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6). Scripture contains many other passages likewise leading us to infer that men fall into Yama's power; cp. e.g. 'Yama, the gathering-place of men' (Ri. Samh. X, 14, 1).
Moreover, authorities like Manu, Vyâsa, &c., declare that in the city Samyamana evil works are requited under Yama's rule; cp. the legend of Nâkiketa and others.
Moreover, the purâna-writers record that there are seven hells, Raurava, &c., by name, which serve as abodes of enjoyment of the fruits of evil deeds. As those who do not sacrifice, &c. go there, how should they reach the moon?--But, an objection is raised, the assertion that evil doers suffer punishments allotted by Yama is contradicted by the circumstance that Smriti mentions different other beings, such as Kitragupta, &c., who act as superintendents in Raurava and the other hells.--This objection the next Sûtra refutes.
There is no contradiction, as the same Yama is admitted to act as chief ruler in those seven hells. Of Kitragupta and others Smriti merely speaks as superintendents employed by Yama.
In that place of the knowledge of the five fires, where the answer is expected to the question, 'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text runs as follows: 'On neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.'
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[paragraph continues] By the two ways mentioned in this passage we have to understand knowledge and works.--Why?--On account of their being the subjects under discussion. That means: knowledge and works are under discussion as the means for entering on the road of the gods and the road of the fathers. The clause, 'those who know this,' proclaims knowledge to be the means whereby to obtain the road of the gods; the clause, 'sacrifices, works of public utility, and alms,' proclaims works to be that by which we obtain the road of the fathers. Under the heading of these two paths there stands the subsequent passage, 'on neither of these two ways, &c.' To explain. Those who are neither entitled, through knowledge, to follow the road of the gods, nor, by works, to follow the road of the fathers, for those there is a third path on which they repeatedly return to the existence of small animals. For this reason also those who do not perform sacrifices. &c. do not reach the moon.--But why should they not first mount to the sphere of the moon and thence descending enter on the existence of small animals?--No, that would imply entire purposelessness of their mounting. Moreover, if all men when dying would reach the sphere of the moon, that world would be filled by the departed, and from that would result an answer contrary to the question (viz. 'why does not that world become full?'). For an answer is expected showing that that world does not become full.--Nor can we admit the explanation that the other world possibly does not become full because re-descent is admitted; since this is not stated by scripture. For it is true, indeed, that the not becoming full might be explained from their re-descending; but scripture actually explains it from the existence of a third place, 'Theirs is a third place; therefore that world never becomes full.' Hence the fact of the other world not becoming full must be explained from their not-ascending only. For, otherwise, the descent equally taking place in the case of those who do perform sacrifices, &c., it would follow that the statement of a third place is devoid of purpose.--The word 'but' (in the Sûtra) is meant to preclude the idea--arising from the passage of another sâkhâ (i.e. the Kaush. Up.)
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[paragraph continues] --that all departed go to the moon. Under the circumstances the word 'all' which occurs in that passage has to be when as referring only to those qualified, so that the sense is 'all those who depart from this world properly qualified go to the moon.'--The next Sûtra is directed against the averment that all must go to the moon for the purpose obtaining a new body, in accordance with the definite statement of number ('in the fifth oblation &c.').
With regard to third place, the rule of the oblations being five in number need not be attended to for the purpose of obtaining a new body.--Why?--On account of it being perceived thus. That means; because it is seen that the third place is reached in the manner described without any reference to the oblations being limited to the number five, 'Live and die. That is the third place.'--Moreover, in the passage, 'In the fifth oblation water is called man,' the number of the oblations is stated to be the cause of the water becoming the body of a man, not of an insect or moth, &c.; the word 'man' applying to the human species only.--And, further, the text merely teaches that in the fifth oblation the waters are called man, and does not at the same time deny that, where there is no fifth oblation, they are not called man; for if it did the latter, the sentence would have the imperfection of having a double sense. We therefore have to understand that the body of those men who are capable of ascending and descending originates in connexion with the fifth oblation, that in the case of other men, however, a body forms itself from water mixed with the other elements even without a settled number of oblations.
There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Veda, that certain persons like Drona, Dhrishtadyumna, Sîtâ, Draupadî, &c., were not born in the ordinary way from
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mothers. In the case of Drona and others there was absent the oblation which is made into the woman; while in the case of Dhrishtadyumna and others, even two of the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one offered into man, were absent. Hence in other cases also birth may be supposed to take place independently of the number of oblations.--It is, moreover, commonly known that the female crane conceives without a male.
It is, moreover, observed that out of the four classes of organic beings--viviparous animals, oviparous animals, animals springing from heat, and beings springing from germs (plants)--the two latter classes are produced without sexual intercourse, so that in their case no regard is had to the number of oblations. The same may therefore take place in other cases also.--But, an objection may here be raised, scripture speaks of those beings as belonging to three classes only, because there are three modes of origin only; 'That which springs from an egg, that which springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1). How then can it be maintained that there are four classes?--To this objection the next Sutra replies.
The third term in the scriptural passage quoted, i.e. 'that which springs from a germ,' must be understood as implying those beings also which spring from heat; the two classes having in common that they spring from earth or water, i.e. from something stable. Different from their origin is the origin of those beings which spring from moving things (viz. animals).--In other places the beings springing from heat and those springing from germs are spoken of as constituting separate classes.--Hence there is no contradiction.
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moon) there is entering into similarity of being (with ether and so on); as this (only) is possible.
It has been explained that the souls of those who perform sacrifices, &c., after having reached the moon dwell there as long as their works last and then re-descend with a remainder of their works. We now have to inquire into the mode of that descent. On this point scripture makes the following statement: 'They return again the way they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud, having become a cloud he rains down.'--Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls pass over into a state of identity with ether, &c., or into a state of similarity.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the state is one of identity, because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there would take place so-called indication (lakshanâ). Now whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and a merely indicated meaning the former is to be preferred. Thus the following words also, 'Having become air he becomes smoke,' &c., are appropriate only if the soul be understood to identify itself with them.--Hence it follows that the souls become identical with ether, &c.--To this we reply that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c. When the body, consisting of water which the soul had assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of enjoyment, dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes thereupon into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, 'They return as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air, &c.'--How is this known to be the meaning?--Because thus only it is possible. For it is not possible that one thing should become another in the literal sense of the word. If, moreover, the souls became identified with ether they could no longer descend through air, &c. And as connexion with the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no other connexion (of the souls) with it can here be meant
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but their entering into a state of similarity to it 1. And in cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated.--For these reasons the souls' becoming ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on.
Footnotes
128:1 It might be said that the relation to ether, &c., into which the souls enter, is the relation of conjunction (samyoga), not the relation of similarity. But as nothing can enter into the relation of samyoga with ether (everything being in eternal samyoga with it) we must assume that 'becoming ether' means 'becoming like ether,' and by parity of reasoning, that 'becoming air, &c.,' means 'becoming like air.'A doubt arises with reference to the period beginning with the soul's becoming ether and extending up to its entering into rice, &c., viz. whether the soul remains a long time in the state of similarity to each of the stages of its way before it enters into similarity to the next one, or only a short time.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that, on account of the absence of a definite text, no binding rule exists.--To this we reply that the souls remain in the state of similarity to ether. &c., for a short period only before they fall to the earth in raindrops. We infer this from the circumstance of the text making a special statement. For after having said that the souls enter into rice, &c., it adds, 'From thence the escape is beset with more pain;' a statement implying that the escape from the previous states was comparatively easy and pleasant. Now this difference in point of pleasantness must be based on the comparative shortness or length of the escape; for as, at that time, the body is not yet formed, enjoyment (in the ordinary sense) is not possible. Hence we conclude that, up to the moment when the souls enter into rice, &c., their descent is accomplished in a short time.
In the description of the souls' descent we read, after their coming down in raindrops has been mentioned, 'Then they are born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans.'--Here a doubt arises whether, at this stage of their descent, the souls to which a remainder of their works continues to cling really pass over into the different species of those immoveable things (plants) and enjoy their pleasures and pains, or if they enter merely into a state of conjunction with the bodies of those plants which are animated by different souls.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that they pass over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pains, on account of the remainder of works still attaching to them; firstly, because that enables us to take the verb 'to be born' in its literal sense; secondly, because we know from Sruti and Smriti that the condition of a plant may be a place of enjoyment (of the fruits of actions); and thirdly, because sacrifices and similar actions, being connected with harm done to animals, &c., may lead to unpleasant results. We therefore take the 'being born as rice,' &c., of those to whom a remainder of their works attaches, in its literal sense, and consider the case to be analogous to that of a man who is born either as a dog or a hog or a Kândâla, where we have to understand that the man really becomes a dog, and so on, and experiences the pleasures and pains connected with that condition.
To this reasoning we reply as follows:--The souls to which a remainder attaches enter merely into conjunction with rice plants, &c., which are already animated by other souls; and do not enjoy their pleasures and pains; 'as in the previous cases.' As the souls' becoming air, smoke, &c., was decided to mean only that they become connected with them 1, so here too their becoming rice, &c. merely means that they
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become connected with those plants--How is this known?--From the fact of the statement here also being of the same nature--Of what nature?--Here, also, as in the case of the souls becoming ether, &c., down to rain, the text does not refer to any operation of the works; hence we conclude that the souls do not enjoy pleasure and pain. Where, on the other hand, the text wants to intimate that the souls undergo pleasure and pain, there it refers to the operation of the former works; so e.g. in the passage which treats of men of good or evil conduct. Moreover, if we should take the souls' being born as rice, &c., in its literal sense, it would follow that when the rice plants are reaped, unhusked, split, cooked and eaten, the souls which have descended into them and are animating them would have to leave them; it being generally known that when a body is destroyed the soul animating it abandons it. And then (if the souls left the plants) the text could not state (as it does state. V, 10, 6) that the souls which had entered into the plants are transmitted by animal generation (on the part of those who eat the plants). Hence it follows that the souls which have descended are merely outwardly connected with the plants animated by other souls. This suffices to refute the assertions that 'to be born' must be taken in its literal sense; and that the state of vegetable existence affords a place for enjoyment. We do not entirely deny that vegetable existence may afford a place for enjoyment; it may do so in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their unholy deeds, have become plants. We only maintain that those souls which descend from the moon with an unrequited remainder of works do not experience the enjoyment connected with plant life.
We proceed to refute the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that sacrificial works are unholy because involving harm done to animals, &c., that they may therefore lead to unpleasant results, and that hence the statement as to the souls being born as plants, &c., may be taken in its
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literal sense; in consequence of which it would be uncalled-for to assume a derived sense.--This reasoning is not valid, because our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of duty depends entirely on scripture. The knowledge of one action being right and another wrong is based on scripture only; for it lies out of the cognizance of the senses, and there moreover is, in the case of right and wrong, an entire want of binding rules as to place, time, and occasion. What in one place, at one time, on one occasion is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in another place, at another time, on another occasion; none therefore can know, without scripture, what is either right or wrong. Now from scripture we derive the certain knowledge that the gyotishtoma-sacrifice, which involves harm done to animals (i.e. the animal sacrifice), &c., is an act of duty; how then can it be called unholy?--But does not the scriptural precept, 'Do not harm any creature,' intimate that to do harm to any being is an act contrary to duty?--True, but that is a general rule, while the precept, 'Let him offer an animal to Agnîshomau,' embodies an exception; and general rule and exception have different spheres of application. The work (i.e. sacrifice) enjoined by the Veda is therefore holy, being performed by authoritative men and considered blameless; and to be born as a plant cannot be its fruit. Nor can to be born as rice and other plants be considered analogous to being born as dogs, &c. For the latter birth scripture teaches with reference to men of evil conduct only; while no such specific qualification is stated in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that when scripture states that the souls descending from the moon become plants, it only means that they become enclosed in plants.
The conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sûtra is confirmed also by scripture stating that the souls, after having entered into plants, 'become' beings performing the
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act of generation, 'for whoever eats the food, whoever performs the act of generation, that again he (the soul) becomes.' Here again the soul's 'becoming' he who performs the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense; for a person becomes capable of generation a long time after his birth only, viz. when he reaches puberty. How then should the soul contained in the food eaten enter into that condition in its true sense? Hence we must interpret the passage to mean only that the soul enters into conjunction with one who performs the act of generation; and from this we again infer that the soul's becoming a plant merely means its entering into conjunction with a plant.
Then, subsequently to the soul having been in conjunction with a person of generative power, generation takes place, and a body is produced in which the soul can enjoy the fruits of that remainder of works which still attaches to it. This scripture declares in the passage, 'Those whose conduct has been good,' &c. From this, also, it appears that the souls to which a remainder clings, when descending and becoming rice plants, and so on, do not enter into the state of forming the body of those plants with its attendant pleasure and pain, but are 'born as plants' in so far only as they enter into conjunction with them.
(My humble salutations to Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
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