VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
With the Commentary by
SAṄKARÂKÂRYA
translated by GEORGE THIBAUT
Third Adhyâya. Second Pâda.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. In the intermediate place there is (a real) creation; for (scripture) says (that).In the preceding pâda we have set forth, with reference to the knowledge of the five fires, the various stages of the soul's passing through the samsâra. We shall now set forth the soul's different states (waking, dreaming, &c.)--Scripture says (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 9; 10), 'When he falls asleep--; there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads,' &c.--Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking place in dreams is a real one (pâramârthika) like the creation seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of illusion (mâyâ).--The pûrvapakshin maintains that 'in the intermediate place (or state) there is (a real) creation.' By intermediate place we have to understand the place of dreams, in which latter sense the word is used in the Veda, 'There is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 9). That place is called the intermediate place because it lies there where the two worlds, or else the place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join. In that intermediate place the creation must be real; because scripture, which is authoritative, declares it to be so, 'He creates chariots, horses, roads,' &c. We, moreover, infer this from the concluding clause, 'He indeed is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10).
Moreover the members of one sâkhâ state that the Self is, in that intermediate state, the shaper of lovely things, 'He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep, shaping one lovely thing after another' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).
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[paragraph continues] Kâma (lovely things) in this passage means sons, &c., that are so called because they are beloved.--But may not the term 'kâmâh' denote desires merely?--No, we reply; the word kâma is here used with reference to sons, &c.; for those form the general subject of discussion, as we see from some preceding passages, 'Choose sons and grandsons,' &c., and 'I make thee the enjoyer of all kâmas' (Ka. Up. I, 1, 23; 24).--And that that shaper is the highest Self (prâgña) we infer from the general subject-matter and from the complementary sentence. That the highest Self is the general subject-matter appears from II, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that.' And to that highest Self there also refers the complementary sentence II, 5, 8, 'That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond.'--Now it is admitted that the world (creation) of our waking state of which the highest Self (prâgña) is the maker is real; hence the world of our dreaming state must likewise be real. That the same reasoning applies to the waking and the sleeping state a scriptural passage also declares, 'Here they say: No, this is the same as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the same he sees while asleep' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14).--Hence the world of dreams is real.--To this
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha. It is not true that the world of dreams is real; it is mere illusion and there is not a particle of reality in it.--Why?--'On account of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality,' i.e. because the nature of the dream world does not manifest itself with the totality of the attributes of real things.--What then do you mean by the 'totality'?--The fulfilment of the conditions of place, time, and cause, and the circumstance of non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real things, but cannot be applied to dreams. In the first place there is, in a dream, no space for chariots and the like; for
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those cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of the body.--Well, but why should not the dreaming person see the objects of his dream outside of his body? He does as a matter of fact perceive things as separated from himself by space; and Sruti, moreover, declares that the dream is outside the body, 'Away from the nest the Immortal moves; that immortal one goes wherever he likes' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 12). And this distinction of the conceptions of staying and going would have no good sense if the being (the soul) did not really go out.--What you maintain is inadmissible, we reply. A sleeping being cannot possibly possess the power to go and return in a moment the distance of a hundred yoganas. Sometimes, moreover, a person recounts a dream in which he went to some place without returning from it, 'Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country of the Pañkâlas, and being there I awoke.' If, now, that person had really gone out of his country, he would on waking find himself in the country of the Pañkâlas to which he had gone in his dream; but as a matter of fact he awakes in the country of the Kurus.--Moreover, while a man imagines himself in his dream going, in his body, to another place, the bystanders see that very same body lying on the couch. Further, a dreaming person does not see, in his dream, other places such as they really are. But if he in seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to him like the things he sees in his waking state. Sruti, moreover, declares that the dream is within the body, cp. the passage beginning 'But when he moves about in dream,' and terminating 'He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). Hence the passage about the dreamer moving away from his nest must be taken in a metaphorical sense, as otherwise we should contradict scripture as well as reason; he who while remaining within his own body does not use it for any purpose may be said to be outside the body as it were. The difference of the ideas of staying within the body and going outside must, therefore, be viewed as a mere deception.--In the second place we see that dreams are in conflict with
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the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night dreams that it is day in the Bhârata Varsha; another lives, during a dream which lasts one muhûrta only, through many crowds of years.--In the third place there do not exist in the state of dreaming the requisite efficient causes for either thought or action; for as, in sleep, the organs are drawn inward, the dreaming person has no eyes, &c. for perceiving chariots and other things; and whence should he, in the space of the twinkling of an eye, have the power of--or procure the material for--making chariots and the like?--In the fourth place the chariots, horses, &c., which the dream creates, are refuted, i.e. shown not to exist by the waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself refutes what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning; what at first was considered to be a chariot turns, in a moment, into a man, and what was conceived to be a man has all at once become a tree.--Scripture itself, moreover, clearly declares the chariots, &c., of a dream to have no real existence, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, &c.'--Hence the visions of a dream are mere illusion.
Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not contain a particle of reality?--Not so, we reply; for dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For scripture teaches as follows, 'When a man engaged in some work undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision.' Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams indicate speedy death, so, e.g. 'If he sees a black man with black teeth, that man will kill him.'--Those also who understand the science of dreams hold the opinion that to dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky; while it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey, &c.; and that certain other dreams also caused by special mantras or devatâs or substances contain a particle of truth.--In all
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these cases the thing indicated may be real; the indicating dream, however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the waking state. The doctrine that the dream itself is mere illusion thus remains uncontradicted.--On this account the Vedic passage to which the first Sûtra of this pâda refers is to be explained metaphorically. When we say 'the plough bears, i.e. supports the bullocks,' we say so because the plough is the indirect cause of the bullocks being kept 1, not because we mean that the plough directly supports the bullocks. Analogously scripture says that the dreaming person creates chariots, &c., and is their maker, not because he creates them directly but because he is the cause of their creation. By his being their cause we have to understand that he is that one who performs the good and evil deeds which are the cause of the delight and fear produced by the apparition, in his dream, of chariots and other things 2.--Moreover, as in the waking state, owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and the resulting interference of the light of the sun, &c., the self-luminousness of the Self is, for the beholder, difficult to discriminate, scripture gives the description of the dreaming state for the purpose of that discrimination. If then the statements about the creation of chariots, &c., were taken as they stand (i.e. literally) we could not ascertain that the Self is self-luminous 3. Hence we have to explain the passage relative to the creation of chariots, &c., in a metaphorical sense, so as to make it agree with the statement about the non-existence of chariots, &c. This explains also the scriptural passage about the shaping (III, 2, 2). The statement made above that in the Kâthaka the highest Self is spoken of as the shaper
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of dreams is untrue; for another scriptural passage ascribes that activity to the individual soul, 'He himself destroying, he himself shaping dreams with his own splendour, with his own light' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 9) 1. And in the Kâthaka Upanishad itself also we infer from the form of the sentence, 'That one who wakes in us while we are asleep,'--which is an anuvâda, i.e. an additional statement about something well known--that he who is there proclaimed as the shaper of lovely things is nobody else than the (well-known) individual soul. The other passage which forms the complementary continuation of the one just quoted ('That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman') discards the notion of the separate existence of the individual soul and teaches that it is nothing but Brahman, analogously to the passage 'That art thou.' And this interpretation does not conflict with Brahman being the general subject-matter.--Nor do we thereby deny altogether that the highest (prâgña) Self is active in dreams; for as being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide and ruler of the soul in all its states. We only maintain that the world connected with the intermediate state (i.e. the world of dreams) is not real in the same sense as the world consisting of ether and so on is real. On the other hand we must remember that also the so-called real creation with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real; for as we have proved before (II, 1, 14) the entire expanse of things is mere illusion. The world consisting of ether, &c., remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul cognizes that Brahman is the Self of all; the world of dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the waking state. That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be understood with a distinction.
Footnotes
137:1 Bullocks have to be kept because the fields must be tilled.137:2 The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening and frightening the sleeper; so as to requite him for his good and evil works. His adrishta thus furnishes the efficient cause of the dreams.
137:3 Because then there would be no difference between the dreaming and the waking state.
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the soul, becomes manifest); for from him (the Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and release.
Well, but the individual soul is a part of the highest Self as the spark is a part of the fire. And as fire and spark have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so the individual soul and the Lord have in common the powers of knowledge and rulership; hence the individual soul may, by means of its lordship, effect in the dreaming state a creation of chariots and the like, springing from its wishes (samkalpa).--To this we reply that although the Lord and the individual soul stand to each other in the relation of whole and part, yet it is manifest to perception that the attributes of the two are of a different nature.--Do you then mean to say that the individual soul has no common attributes with the Lord?--We do not maintain that; but we say that the equality of attributes, although existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience. In the case of some persons indeed who strenuously meditate on the Lord and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last, obtain through the favour of the Lord extraordinary powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes manifest--just as through the action of strong medicines the power of sight of a blind man becomes manifest; but it does not on its own account reveal itself to all men.--Why not?--Because 'from him,' i.e. from the Lord there are bondage and release of it, viz. the individual soul. That means: bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of the Lord's true nature; release is due to the presence of such knowledge. Thus Sruti declares, 'When that god is known all fetters fall off; sufferings are destroyed and birth and death cease. From meditating on him there arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that of universal Lordship; he who is alone is satisfied' (Svet. Up. I, 11), and similar passages.
But if the soul is a part of the highest Self, why should its knowledge and lordship be hidden? We should rather
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expect them to be as manifest as the light and the heat of the spark.--True, we reply; but the state of concealment of the soul's knowledge and lordship is due to its being joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind, buddhi, sense-objects, sensations, &c. And to this state of things there applies the simile: As the heat and light of the fire are hidden as long as the fire is still hidden in the wood from which it will be produced by friction, or as long as it is covered by ashes; so, in consequence of the soul being connected with limiting adjuncts in the form of a body, &c., founded on name and form as presented by Nescience, its knowledge and lordship remain hidden as long as it is possessed by the erroneous notion of not being distinct from those adjuncts.--The word 'or' in the Sûtra is meant to discard the suspicion that the Lord and the soul might be separate entities.--But why should not the soul be separate from the Lord, considering the state of concealment of its knowledge and power? If we allow the two to be fundamentally separate, we need not assume that their separateness is due to the soul's connexion with the body.--It is impossible, we reply, to assume the soul to be separate from the Lord. For in the scriptural passage beginning with 'That divinity thought' &c. (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2) we meet with the clause, 'It entered into those beings with this living Self (gîva âtman); where the individual soul is referred to as the Self. And then we have the other passage, 'It is the True; it is the Self; that art thou, O Svetaketu,' which again teaches that the Lord is the Self of the soul. Hence the soul is non-different from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the body. From this it follows that the dreaming soul is not able to create, from its mere wishes, chariots and other things. If the soul possessed that power, nobody would ever have an unpleasant dream; for nobody ever wishes for something unpleasant to himself.--We finally deny that the scriptural passage about the waking state ('dream is the same as the place of waking' &c.) indicates the reality of dreams. The statement made there about the equality of the two states
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is not meant to indicate that dreams are real, for that would conflict with the soul's self-luminousness (referred to above), and scripture, moreover, expressly declares that the chariots, &c., of a dream have no real existence; it merely means that dreams, because due to mental impressions (vâsanâ) received in the waking state, are equal to the latter in appearance.--From all this it follows that dreams are mere illusion.
The state of dream has been discussed; we are now going to enquire into the state of deep sleep. A number of scriptural passages refer to that state. In one place we read, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those nâdîs' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 3). In another place it is said with reference to the nâdîs, 'Through them he moves forth and rests in the surrounding body' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 19). So also in another place, 'In these the person is when sleeping he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the prâna alone' (Kau. Up. IV, 20). Again in another place, 'That ether which is within the heart in that he reposes' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). Again, 'Then he becomes united with that which is; he is gone to his Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, i). And, 'Embraced by the highest Self (prâgña) he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21). Here the doubt arises whether the nâdîs, &c., mentioned in the above passages are independent from each other and constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep sleep, or if they stand in mutual relation so as to constitute one such place only. The pûrvapakshin takes the former view on account of the various places mentioned serving one and the same purpose. Things serving the same purpose, as, e.g. rice and barley 1, are never seen to be dependent
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on each other. That the nâdîs, &c., actually serve the same purpose appears from the circumstance of their being all of them exhibited equally in the locative case, 'he has entered into the nâdîs,' 'he rests in the pericardium,' &c. 1--But in some of the passages quoted the locative case is not employed, so, e.g. in 'He becomes united with that which is' (satâ, instrumental case)!--That makes no difference, we reply, because there also the locative case is meant. For in the complementary passage the text states that the soul desirous of rest enters into the Self, 'Finding no rest elsewhere it settles down on breath' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2); a passage in which the word 'breath' refers to that which is (the sat). A place of rest of course implies the idea of the locative case. The latter case is, moreover, actually exhibited in a further complementary passage, 'When they have become merged in that which is (sati), they know not that they are merged in it.'--In all these passages one and the same state is referred to, viz. the state of deep sleep which is characterised by the suspension of all special cognition. Hence we conclude that in the state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of those places, either the nâdîs, or that which is, &c.
To this we make the following reply--'The absence of that,' i.e. the absence of dreams--which absence constitutes the essence of deep sleep-takes place 'in the nâdîs and in the Self;' i.e. in deep sleep the soul goes into both together, not optionally into either.--How is this known?--'From scripture.'--Scripture says of all those things, the nâdîs, &c., that they are the place of deep sleep; and those statements we must combine into one, as the hypothesis of option would involve partial refutation 2. The assertion
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made above that we are compelled to allow option because the nâdîs, &c., serve one and the same purpose, is without foundation; for from the mere fact of two things being exhibited in the same case it does not follow by any means that they serve the same purpose, and that for that reason we have to choose between them. We on the contrary see that one and the same case is employed even where things serve different purposes and have to be combined; we say, e.g. 'he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on the couch 1.' So in the present case also the different statements can be combined into one, 'He sleeps in the nâdîs, in the surrounding body, in Brahman.' Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'In these the person is when sleeping he sees no dream; then he becomes one with the prâna alone,' declares, by mentioning them together in one sentence, that the nâdîs and the prâna are to be combined in the state of deep sleep. That by prâna Brahman is meant we have already shown (I, 1, 28). Although in another text the nâdîs are spoken of as an independent place of deep sleep as it were ('then he has entered into those nâdîs'), yet, in order not to contradict other passages in which Brahman is spoken of as the place of deep sleep, we must explain that text to mean that the soul abides in Brahman through the nâdîs. Nor is this interpretation opposed to the employment of the locative case ('into--or in--those nâdîs'); for if the soul enters into Brahman by means of the nâdîs it is at the same time in the nâdîs; just as a man who descends to the sea by means of the river Gaṅgâ is at the same time on the Gaṅgâ.--Moreover that passage about the nâdîs, because its purpose is to describe the road, consisting of the rays and nâdîs, to the Brahma world, mentions the entering of the soul into the nâdîs in order to glorify the latter (not in order to describe the state of deep sleep); for the clause following upon the one which refers to the entering
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praises the nâdîs, 'There no evil touches him.' The text, moreover, adds a reason for the absence of all evil, in the words, 'For then he has become united with the light.' That means that on account of the light contained in the nâdîs (which is called bile) having overpowered the organs the person no longer sees the sense-objects. Or else Brahman may be meant by the 'light;' which term is applied to Brahman in another passage also, 'It is Brahman only, light only' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). The passage would then mean that the soul becomes, by means of the nâdîs, united with Brahman, and that hence no evil touches it. That the union with Brahman is the reason for the absence of all contact with evil, is known from other scriptural passages, such as, 'All evils turn back from it; for the world of Brahman is free from all evil' (Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1). On that account we have to combine the nâdîs with Brahman, which from other passages is known to be the place of deep sleep.--Analogously we conclude that the pericardium also, because it is mentioned in a passage treating of Brahman, is a place of deep sleep only in subordination to Brahman. For the ether within the heart is at first spoken of as the place of sleep ('He lies in the ether which is in the heart,' Bri. Up. II, 1, 17), and with reference thereto it is said later on, 'He rests in the pericardium' (II, 1, 19). Pericardium (purîtat) is a name of that which envelops the heart; hence that which rests within the ether of the heart--which is contained in the pericardium--can itself be said to rest within the pericardium; just as a man living in a town surrounded by walls is said to live within the walls. That the ether within the heart is Brahman has already been shown (I, 3, l4).--That again the nâdîs and the pericardium have to be combined as places of deep sleep appears from their being mentioned together in one sentence ('Through them he moves forth and rests in the purîtat). That that which is (sat) and the intelligent Self (prâgña) are only names of Brahman is well known; hence scripture mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the nâdîs, the pericardium, and Brahman. Among these three again Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep; the
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nâdîs and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it. Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the nâdîs, the pericardium and Brahman respectively), the nâdîs and the pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the limiting adjuncts of the soul; in them the soul's organs abide 1. For apart from its connexion with the limiting adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide anywhere, because being non-different from Brahman it rests in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a difference between the abode and that which abides, but that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text says, 'With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to his Self;' which means that the sleeping person has entered into his true nature.--It cannot, moreover, be said that the soul is at any time not united with Brahman--for its true nature can never pass away--; but considering that in the state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else, as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes not 2. Moreover, even if we admit that there are different places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result, from that difference of place, any difference in the quality of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the cessation of special cognition; it is, therefore, more appropriate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize on account of its oneness, having become united with Brahman; according to the Sruti, 'How should he know another?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, l5).--If, further, the sleeping soul did rest in the nâdîs and the purîtat, it would be impossible
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to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that case it would continue to have diversity for its object; according to the Sruti, 'When there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other,' &c.--But in the case of him also who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like may be reasons for absence of cognition!--What you say might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknowledged to be limited in itself; then its case would be analogous to that of Vishnumitra, who, when staying in a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation.--Well, then, great distance, &c., residing in the adjuncts may be the reason of non-cognition!--Yes, but that leads us to the conclusion already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become one with Brahman.
Nor do we finally maintain that the nâdîs, the pericardium, and Brahman are to be added to each other as being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge that the nâdîs and the pericardium are places of sleep, nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is the subordinate member of some work, &c., connected with certain results. We, on the other hand, do want to prove that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state of deep sleep; that is a knowledge which has its own uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the place of deep sleep.
Footnotes
141:1 Either of which may be employed for making the sacrificial cake.142:1 The argument of the pûrvapakshin is that the different places in which the soul is said to abide in the state of deep sleep are all exhibited by the text in the same case and are on that account co-ordinate. Mutual relation implying subordination would require them to be exhibited in different cases enabling us to infer the exact manner and degree of relation.
142:2 By allowing option between two Vedic statements we lessen the p. 143 authority of the Veda; for the adoption of either alternative sublates, for the time, the other alternative.
143:1 Where the two locatives are to be combined into one statement, 'he sleeps on the couch in the palace.'
145:1 Ân. Gi. explains karanâni by karmâni: nâdîshu purîtati ka gîvasyopâdhyantarbhûtani karanâni karmâni tishthantîty upâdhyâ-dhâratvam, gîvasya tv âdhâro brahmaiva.
145:2 But with the nâdîs or the pericardium only.
And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep invariably teach that the awaking takes place from that Self. In the Bri. Up. when the time comes for the answer to the question, 'Whence did he come back?' (II, 1, 16) the text
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says, 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all prânas come forth from that Self (II, 1, 20). And Kh. Up. VI, 10, 2, we read: 'When they have come back from the True they do not know that they have come back from the True.' If there were optional places to which the soul might resort in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes sometimes from the nâdîs, sometimes from the pericardium, sometimes from the Self.--For that reason also the Self is the place of deep sleep.
Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking from the union with Brahman is the same which entered into union with Brahman, or another one.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point. For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quantity of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it should be the very same drop: thus the sleeping soul, when it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul.--To this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred text, and precept; which four reasons we will treat separately. In the first place the person who wakes from sleep must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left unfinished before. Men finish in the morning what they had left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible that one man should proceed to complete work half done by another man, because this would imply too much. 1
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[paragraph continues] Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former.--In the second place the person rising from sleep is the same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day before; for what one man sees another cannot remember. And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of personal identity (âtmânusmarana) expressed in the words, 'I am the same I was before,' would not be possible.--In the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the same person rises again, 'He hastens back again as he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16); 'All these creatures go day after day into the Brahma-world and yet do not discover it' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again and again' (Kh. Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper sense only if the same soul rises again.--In the fourth place we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the injunctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period, and of knowledge?--Moreover on the hypothesis of another person rising from sleep, that other person would either be a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal life in another body; in that case it would follow that the practical existence carried on by means of that body would be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that that would be an altogether useless hypothesis; for what advantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in another?--Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be
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one which had obtained final release, and that would imply that final release can have an end. But it is impossible that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience.--Further, on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited for what they have done.--From all this it follows that the person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from the mass of water into which it had been poured. We admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge (of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not analogous.--Further, we point out that the flamingo, e.g. is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of distinguishing.--Moreover, what is called individual soul is not really different from the highest Self, so that it might be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop of water from the mass of water; but as we have explained repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep as well as of waking; in the former it is like a seed, in the latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
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there is half-union; on account of this remaining (as the only possible hypothesis).
There now arises the question of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned. Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that we know only of three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body, viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep; to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from Sruti nor Smriti; hence what is called fainting must be one of the four states mentioned.--To this we make the following reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be said to be awake; for he does not perceive external objects by means of his senses.--But, it might be objected, may not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker? Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else; so the man also who is stunned, e.g. by a blow, may be awake, but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time perceive anything else.--No, we reply, the case is different, on account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker says, 'For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but the arrow;' the man, on the other hand, who returns to consciousness from a swoon, says, 'For such a length of time I was shut up in blind darkness; I was conscious of nothing.'--A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright; while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake.--Nor, in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is altogether unconscious.--Nor, in the third place, is he dead; for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive
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neither warmth nor breath, they conclude that he is dead, and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it; if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath, they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him with cold water so that he may recover consciousness.--That a man who has swooned away is not dead follows, moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious life); for from Yama's realm none ever return.--Let us then say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead!--No, we reply; this also is impossible, on account of the different characteristics of the two states. A man who has become senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time; his body trembles; his face has a frightful expression; his eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, his body does not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by a gentle stroking with the hand; a person lying in a swoon not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness and sleep have different causes; the former is produced by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that stunned or swooning people are asleep.--It thus remains for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swooning, &c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence) 1, as it coincides in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not coincide in so far as it has different characteristics.--But how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c., be called half-coincidence (with deep sleep)? With regard to deep sleep scripture says, 'He becomes united with the True' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1); 'Then a thief is not a thief (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 22); 'Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds' (Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but
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they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a swoon; hence we must maintain that, on account of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place, not only half-union.--To this we make the following reply.--We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman; but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (unrequited) work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the senseless person); if no work remains, breath and warmth depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union.--The objection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is without much weight; for as that state occurs occasionally only it may not be generally known. All the same it is known from ordinary experience as well as from the âyurveda (medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth state is due to its being avowedly compounded of other states.
We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of Sruti, the nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts.--The scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double character; some indicate that Brahman is affected by difference, so, e.g. 'He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Kh. Up. III, 14,2); others, that it is without difference, so, e.g. 'It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). Have we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brahman
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has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either, that it is affected with difference, or without difference? This is the point to be discussed.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that, in conformity with the scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double nature is to be ascribed to Brahman.
To this we reply as follows.--At any rate the highest Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics; for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is impossible to admit that one and the same thing should by itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c.. and should not possess them.--Nor is it possible that Brahman should possess double characteristics 'on account of place,' i.e. on account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as earth, &c. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an altogether different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a limiting adjunct in the form of red colour; for that it is pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erroneous notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely 1. Hence (as the upâdhis are the product of Nescience) if we embrace either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all passages whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman (such as, 'It is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay,' Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) teach that it is free from all difference.
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being not such, with reference to each (declaration of difference).
Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and does not possess double attributes either in itself or on account of difference of station.--Why not?--'On account of difference.' The various vidyâs teach different forms of Brahman; it is said to have four feet (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1); to consist of sixteen parts (Pr. Up. VI, 1); to be characterised by dwarfishness (Ka. Up. V, 3); to have the three worlds for its body (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); to be named Vaisvânara (Kh. Up. V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit that Brahman is qualified by differences also.--But above it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold characteristics!--That also does not contradict our doctrine; for the difference of Brahman's forms is due to its limiting adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which refer to those differences would be objectless.
All this reasoning, we say, is without force 'on account of the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each,' i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the following: 'This bright immortal person in this earth, and that bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed is the same as that Self (Bri. Up. II, 5, 1). It, therefore, cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman with various forms is taught by the Veda.
The members of one sâkhâ also make a statement about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by a censure of the perception of difference, 'By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to death' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). Others also ('By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been declared to be threefold, and this is Brahman,' Svet. Up. I, 12)
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record in their text that the entire world, characterised by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman for its true nature.--But as among the scriptural passages referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form, how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not also the contrary?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form, colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form, and so on.--Why?--'On account of this being the main purport (of scripture).'--' It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which forms and names are, that is Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That Brahman is without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and omniscient' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19). These and similar passages have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as non-connected with any world, and have not any other purport, as we have proved under I, 1, 4. On the ground of such passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brahman is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class, they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however, contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those of the other kind.--This is the reason for our deciding that although there are two different classes of scriptural texts, Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not
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at the same time of an opposite nature.--But what then is the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as possessing form?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having passed through space enters into contact with a finger or some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were; so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to Brahman are devoid of sense; a conclusion altogether unacceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authoritative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning.--But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet maintained above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double characteristics although it is connected with limiting adjuncts?--By no means, we reply. What is merely due to a limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a substance, and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience leaves room for all practical life and activity--whether ordinary or based on the Veda--we have explained more than once.
And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is altogether without difference; 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether
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a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). That means: That Self has neither inside nor outside any characteristic form but intelligence; simple non-differentiated intelligence constitutes its nature; just as a lump of salt has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, not any other taste.
That Brahman is without any difference is proved by those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. 'Next follows the teaching by No, no' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6); 'It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown' (Ke. Up. I, 4); 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it' (Taitt. Up. II, 9). Of a similar purport is that scriptural passage which relates how Bâhva, being questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to him by silence, 'He said to him, "Learn Brahman, O friend," and became silent. Then, on a second and third question, he replied, "I am teaching you indeed, but you do not understand. Silent is that Self."' The same teaching is conveyed by those Smriti-texts which deny of Brahman all other characteristics; so, e.g. 'I will proclaim that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which one reaches immortality; the highest Brahman without either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to be or not to be' (Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 12). Of a similar purport is another Smriti-passage, according to which the omniform Nârâyana instructed Nârada, 'The cause, O Nârada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all beings is the Mâyâ emitted by me; do not cognize me as being such (in reality).'
Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be
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described only by denying of it all other characteristics, therefore the Moksha Sâstras compare it to the images of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the two following passages: 'As the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the one divine unborn Self;' and 'The one Self of all beings separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it appears one and many at the same time, just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.'
The next Sûtra raises an objection.
Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be
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described only by denying of it all other characteristics, therefore the Moksha Sâstras compare it to the images of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the two following passages: 'As the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the one divine unborn Self;' and 'The one Self of all beings separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it appears one and many at the same time, just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.'
The next Sûtra raises an objection.
Since no substance comparable to the water is apprehended in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brahman and the reflected images of the sun cannot be established. In the case of the sun and other material luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance occupying a different place, viz. water; hence the light of the sun, &c., may be reflected. The Self, on the other hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts different from it and occupying a different place.--Therefore the instances are not parallel.
The next Sûtra disposes of this objection.
The parallel instance (of the sun's reflection in the water) is unobjectionable, since a common feature--with reference to which alone the comparison is instituted--does exist.
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[paragraph continues] Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison. Nor does the sûtrakâra institute the comparison objected to on his own account; he merely sets forth the purport of a comparison actually met with in scripture.--Now, the special feature on which the comparison rests is 'the participation in increase and decrease.' The reflected image of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands; it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided. It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same.--Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared possess certain common features no objection can be made to the comparison.
Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, 'He made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet. Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as purusha' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 18); and 'Having entered into them with this living (individual) Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2).--For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sutra 18 is unobjectionable.
Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion (beginning from Sutra 11) comprises two adhikaranas, of which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the apparent world is; while the latter tries to determine
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whether Brahman--whose absolute uniformity was established in the former adhikarana--is to be defined as that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence; bodha), or as both.--Against this we remark that in no case there is a valid reason for beginning a second adhikarana. For what should be the subject of a special second adhikarana? Sûtra 15 and foll. cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman possesses a plurality of characteristics; for that hypothesis is already sufficiently disposed of in Sûtras 11-14. Nor can they be meant to show that Brahman is to be defined only as 'that which is,' not also as 'thought;' for that would imply that the scriptural passage, 'consisting of nothing but knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12), is devoid of meaning. How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul? Nor again can the hypothetical second adhikarana be assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as 'thought' only, not at the same time as 'that which is;' for if it were so, certain scriptural passages--as e.g. Ka. Up. II, 6, 13, 'He is to be conceived by the words, He is'--would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we admit thought apart from existence?--Nor can it be said that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that would contradict something already admitted. For he who would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought different from existence, and at the same time by existence different from thought, would virtually maintain that there is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been disproved in the preceding adhikarana.--But as scripture teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no objection to such a doctrine!--There is, we reply, for one being cannot possibly possess more than one nature.--And if it finally should be said that existence is thought and thought existence and that the two do not exclude each other; we remark that in that case there is no reason for the doubt 1 whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence,
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or both.--On the other hand we have shown that the Sûtras can be explained as constituting one adhikarana only. Moreover, as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the position of the other texts, and if taken in that sense the Sûtras (15-21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which speak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality referred to has to be annihilated; we reply that this opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed, where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in the passage, Bri. Up. II, 5, 19, 'His horses are yoked hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and the thousands, many and endless,' which passage is immediately followed by the words, 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside.' But where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prâna, whose form is light' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 2), which is connected with an injunction of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage, 'Let him have this will and belief.' In passages of the latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there would be no opportunity for stating the determinative reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all form) as was done in Sûtra 14. And further scripture
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informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as characterised by form have results of their own, viz. either the warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else release by successive steps. All these reasons determine us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole?--Our opponent will perhaps reply, 'Because we apprehend them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the case of the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice and the oblations called prayâgas.'--But this reply we are unable to admit, since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under I, 1, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz. Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, according to our opponent's view, meant to enjoin? For whenever an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to some kind of work to be undertaken by him.--Our opponent will perhaps make the following reply. The object of the injunction is in the present case, the annihilation of the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known; hence the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release. Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa; therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and forms.
This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent
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of what nature that so-called annihilation of the apparent world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into contact with fire? or is the apparent world of names and forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is removed by the application of medicine 1? If the former, the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible; for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually could be done, the first released person would have done it once for all, so that at present the whole world would be empty, earth and all other substances having been finally annihilated.--If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience, such as 'Brahman is one, without a second;' 'That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it.' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and this whole world of names and forms, which had been hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not so indicated, you may say a hundred times, 'Cognize Brahman! Dissolve this world!' and yet we shall be unable to do either the one or the other.
But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to dissolve the world.--Not so, we reply; for both these
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things are already effected by the indication of the true nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality; just as the pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or the like. And what is done once need not be done again 1.--We moreover ask the following question: Does the individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge of Brahman's true nature has arisen, and on whom then should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release?--If the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and hence there is no room for injunctions at all.
What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as something to be seen, to be heard, and so on?--They aim, we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in ordinary life imperative phrases such as 'Listen to this!' 'Look at this!' are frequently meant to express not that we are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge may either arise or not; all that another person wishing to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to him; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of itself, according to the object of knowledge and according
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to the means of knowledge employed.--Nor must it be said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by some other means of knowledge 1. For the modified knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i.e. without a deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably exists.--For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge of Brahman cannot be admitted.
A further point has to be considered here. If we admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the, after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman--which is not subject to any injunction--is the Self of all.--Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man the cognition of that truth; for that would involve the conclusion that the one Brahma-sâstra has two--and moreover conflicting--meanings.--The theory combated by us gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which nobody can refute; it compels us to set aside the text as it stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the text; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen
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principle (adrishta), and non-permanent &c. &c.--We therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the pretended reason of 'their being apprehended as parts of one injunction' cannot induce us to look upon the entire Veda as one whole.
And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concerning Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing; for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of the several means of proof such as difference of terms 1, and so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions. The passages respectively enjoining the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice and the offerings termed prayâgas may indeed be considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the two 2. But the statements about the Brahman devoid of qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not any element in common; for qualities such as 'having light for one's body' contribute in no way towards the dissolution of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined in one and the same subject.--The preferable theory, therefore, is to distinguish with us two classes of texts, according as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as devoid of it.
Footnotes
160:1 And hence no reason for a separate adhikarana.163:1 i.e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only?
164:1 I.e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known, there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this apparent world.
165:1 The pûrvapakshin might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction, 'he is to meditate upon woman as fire,' and maintain that the object of this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from perception &c., according to which a woman is not fire.
166:1 'Difference of terms' (sabdântaram) is according to the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda or niyogabheda. Cp. Sabara bhâshya on II, 1, 1.
166:2 For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate part--the offering of the prayâgas--has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world.
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discussion; and (the text) enounces something more than that.
We read, Bri. Up. II, 3, 'Two forms of Brahman there are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the solid and the fluid, sat and tya.' The text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes, predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial--which it calls purusha--saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on to say, 'Now then the teaching by Not so, not so! For there is nothing else higher than this (if one says): It is not so.' Here we have to enquire what the object of the negative statement is. We do not observe any definite thing indicated by words such as 'this' or 'that;' we merely have the word 'so' in 'Not so, not so!' to which the word 'not' refers, and which on that account indicates something meant to be denied. Now we know that the word 'so' (iti) is used with reference to approximate things, in the same way as the particle 'evam' is used; compare, e.g. the sentence 'so (iti) indeed the teacher said' (where the 'so' refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in our passage, the context points out what has to be considered as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brahman, and that Brahman itself to which the two forms belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' negatives both Brahman and its two forms, or only either; and if the latter, whether it negatives Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two forms and leaves Brahman.--We suppose, the pûrvapakshin says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As the word 'not' is repeated twice, there are really two negative statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman itself. Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is negatived. For as Brahman transcends all speech and thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being negatived; the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls within the sphere of perception and the other means of right
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knowledge, and can, therefore, not be negatived.--On this latter interpretation the repetition of 'not' must be considered as due to emphasis only.
To this we make the following reply. It is impossible that the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' should negative both, since that would imply the doctrine of a general Void. Whenever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to something real; the unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with reference to the real rope. But this (denial of something unreal with reference to something real) is possible only if some entity is left. If everything is denied, no entity is left, and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which we may wish to undertake, becomes impossible, i.e. that latter entity becomes real and as such cannot be negatived.--Nor, in the second place, can Brahman be denied; for that would contradict the introductory phrase of the chapter, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 1); would show disregard of the threat conveyed in Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing;' would be opposed to definitive assertions such as 'By the words "He is" is he to be apprehended' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 13); and would involve a stultification of the entire Vedânta.--The phrase that Brahman transcends all speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that Brahman does not exist; for after the Vedânta-part of scripture has established at length the existence of Brahman--in such passages as 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest;' 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'--it cannot be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. For, as the common saying is, 'Better than bathing it is not to touch dirt at all.' The passage, 'from whence all speech with the mind turns away unable to reach it' (Taitt. Up. II, 4), must, therefore, rather be viewed as intimating Brahman.
The passage of the Bri. Up. under discussion has, therefore, to be understood as follows. Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom; it transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the category of 'object,' and constitutes the inward Self of all. Of this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms; but
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[paragraph continues] Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sûtra expresses in the words, 'for it denies the suchness which forms the topic of discussion.' That means: The passage 'Not so,' &c., denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well as immaterial, which in the preceding part of the chapter is described at length with reference to the gods as well as the body, and also the second form which is produced by the first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term purusha, rests on the subtle Self (liṅgâtman) and is described by means of comparisons with saffron-colour, &c., since the purusha, which is the essence of what is immaterial, does not itself possess colour perceivable by the eye. Now these forms of Brahman are by means of the word 'so' (iti), which always refers to something approximate brought into connexion with the negative particle 'not.' Brahman itself, on the other hand (apart from its forms), is, in the previous part of the chapter, mentioned not as in itself constituting the chief topic, but only in so far as it is qualified by its forms; this appears from the circumstance of Brahman being exhibited in the genitive case only ('These are two forms of Brahman'). Now, after the two forms have been set forth, there arises the desire of knowing that to which the two forms belong, and hence the text continues, 'Now then the teaching by means of "Not so, not so."' This passage, we conclude, conveys information regarding the nature of Brahman by denying the reality of the forms fictitiously attributed to it; for the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' negatives the whole aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman. Effects we know to have no real existence, and they can therefore be negatived; not so, however, Brahman, which constitutes the necessary basis for all fictitious superimposition.--Nor must the question be asked here, how the sacred text, after having itself set forth the two forms of Brahman, can negative them in the end, contrary to the principle that not to touch dirt is better than bathing after having done so. For the text does not set forth the two forms of Brahman as something the truth of which is to be established, but merely mentions those two forms, which in
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the sphere of ordinary thought are fictitiously attributed to Brahman, in order finally to negative them and establish thereby the true nature of the formless Brahman.
The double repetition of the negation may either serve the purpose of furnishing a special denial of the material as well as the immaterial form of Brahman; or the first 'Not so' may negative the aggregate of material elements, while the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that whatever can be thought is not Brahman. This is, perhaps, the better explanation. For if a limited number of things are denied each individually, there still remains the desire to know whether something else may not be Brahman; an emphatic repetition of the denial on the other hand shows that the entire aggregate of objects is denied and that Brahman is the inward Self; whereby all further enquiry is checked.--The final conclusion, therefore, is, that the text negatives only the cosmic plurality fictitiously superimposed on Brahman, but leaves Brahman itself untouched.
The Sutra gives another argument establishing the same conclusion, 'and the text enounces something more than that,' i.e. more than the preceding negation. The words of the text meant are '(not) is there anything beyond.'--If the negation, 'Not so, not so!' were meant to negative all things whatever, and this terminated in absolute non-existence, the text could not even allude to 'anything beyond.'--The words of the text are to be connected as follows. After the clause, 'Not so, not so!' has given information about Brahman, the clause next following illustrates this teaching by saying: There is nothing beyond or separate from this Brahman; therefore Brahman is expressed by 'Not so, not so!' which latter words do not mean that Brahman itself does not exist. The implied meaning rather is that different from everything else there exists the 'non-negatived' Brahman.--The words of the text admit, however, of another interpretation also; for they may mean that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that teaching which is implied in the negation of plurality expressed by 'Not so, not so!' On this latter interpretation
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the words of the Sûtra, 'and the text enounces something more than that,' must be taken to refer to the name mentioned in the text, 'Then comes the name, the True of the True; the senses being the True and he the True of them.'--This again has a sense only if the previous negative clause denies everything but Brahman, not everything but absolute non-existence. For, if the latter were the case, what then could be called the True of the True?--We therefore decide that the clause, 'Not so, not so!' negatives not absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman.
If that highest Brahman which is different from the world that is negatived in the passage discussed above really exists, why then is it not apprehended?--Because, the Sûtrakâra replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by the senses; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended (i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus Sruti says, 'He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other senses, not by penance or good works' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'That which cannot be seen nor apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6); 'When in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Similar statements are made in Smriti-passages; so e.g. 'He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by thought, unchangeable.'
If that highest Brahman which is different from the world that is negatived in the passage discussed above really exists, why then is it not apprehended?--Because, the Sûtrakâra replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by the senses; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended (i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus Sruti says, 'He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other senses, not by penance or good works' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'That which cannot be seen nor apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6); 'When in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Similar statements are made in Smriti-passages; so e.g. 'He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by thought, unchangeable.'
At the time of perfect conciliation the Yogins see the unevolved Self free from all plurality. By 'perfect conciliation' we understand the presentation before the mind (of the highest Self), which is effected through meditation and devotion.--This is vouched for by Sruti as well as
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[paragraph continues] Smriti. So, e.g. Ka. Up. IV, 1, 'The Self-existent pierced the openings of the senses so that they turn outward; therefore man looks without, not within himself. Some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality, saw the Self within.' And Mu. Up. III, 1, 8, 'When a man's mind has become purified by the serene light of knowledge then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts.' Smriti-passages of the same tendency are the following ones, 'He who is seen as light by the Yogins meditating on him sleepless, with suspended breath, with contented minds, with subdued senses; reverence be to him 1!' and 'The Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.'
But if in the state of perfect conciliation there is a being to be conciliated and a being conciliating, does not this Involve the distinction of a higher and a lower Self?--No, the next Sûtra replies.
As light, ether, the sun and so on appear differentiated as it were through their objects such as fingers, vessels, water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts 2, while in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiatedness; so the distinction of different Selfs is due to limiting adjuncts only, while the unity of all Selfs is natural and original. For on the doctrine of the non-difference of the individual soul and the highest Self the Vedânta-texts insist again and again. 3
Footnotes
172:2 Light is differentiated as it were by the various objects on which it shines; the all-pervading ether is divided into parts as it were by hollow bodies; the sun is multiplied as it were by its reflections in the water.172:3 It certainly looks here as if the Bhâshyakâra did not know what to do with the words of the Sûtra. The 'karmani,' which is p. 173 as good as passed over by him, is explained by Go. Ân. as 'dhyânâdikarmany upâdhau.' Ân. Gi. says, 'âtmâprakâsasabditoऽgñânatatkârye karmany upâdhau saviseshas' &c.
Hence i.e. because the non-difference of all Selfs is essential and their difference due to Nescience only, the individual soul after having dispelled Nescience by true knowledge passes over into unity with the highest Self. For this is indicated by scripture, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. III, 2, 9, 'He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even Brahman;' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6, 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'
In order to justify his own view as to the relation of the conciliating individual soul and the conciliated highest Self, the Sûtrakâra mentions a different view of the same matter.--Some scriptural passages refer to the highest Self and the individual soul as distinct entities, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. III, 1, 8,' Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts,' where the highest Self appears as the object of the soul's vision and meditation; Mu. Up. III, 2, 8, 'He goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great;' and 'Bri. Up. III, 7, 15, 'Who rules all beings within;' in which passages the highest Self is represented as the object of approach and as the ruler of the individual soul. In other places again the two are spoken of as non-different, so e.g. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7, 'Thou art that;' Bri. Up. I, 4, 10, 'I am Brahman;' Bri. Up. III, 4, 1, 'This is thy Self who is within all;' Bri. Up. III, 7, 15, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal.'--As thus difference and non-difference are equally vouched for by scripture, the acceptation of absolute non-difference would render futile all those
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texts which speak of difference. We therefore look on the relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect posture and so on.
Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows. Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun himself, are not absolutely different--for they both consist of fire--and yet are spoken of as different, so also the soul and the highest Self.
Or else the relation of the two has to be conceived in the manner suggested by Sûtra 25. For if the bondage of the soul is due to Nescience only, final release is possible. But if the soul is really and truly bound--whether the soul be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest Self as suggested in Sûtra 27, or as a part of the highest Self as suggested in Sûtra 28--its real bondage cannot be done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final release becomes absurd.--Nor, finally, can it be said that Sruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. For non-difference only is what it aims at establishing; while, when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely refers to difference as something known from other sources of knowledge (viz. perception, &c.).--Hence the conclusion stands that the soul is not different from the highest Self, as explained in Sûtra 25.
The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intelligent being apart from the highest Self. Cp. 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23). And the same
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conclusion follows from those passages which deny the existence of a world apart from Brahman and thus leave Brahman alone remaining, viz. 'Now then the teaching, Not so, not so!' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6); 'That Brahman is without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19).
With reference to this Brahman which we have ascertained to be free from all plurality there now arises the doubt--due to the conflicting nature of various scriptural statements--whether something exists beyond it or not. We therefore enter on the task of explaining the true meaning of those scriptural passages which seem to indicate that there is some entity beyond, i.e. apart from Brahman.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that some entity must be admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken of as being a bank; as having size; as being connected; as being separated.--As a bank it is spoken of in the passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1, 'That Self is a bank, a boundary.' The word 'bank' (setu) ordinarily denotes a structure of earth, wood and the like, serving the purpose of checking the flow of water. Here, being applied to the Self, it intimates that there exists something apart from the Self, just as there exists something different from an ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the words, 'Having passed the bank' (VIII, 4, 2). For as in ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank reaches some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest; so, we must understand, a man after having crossed, i.e. passed beyond the Self reaches something which is not the Self.--As having size Brahman is spoken of in the following passages, 'This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight hoofs, sixteen parts.' Now it is well known from ordinary experience that wherever an object, a coin, e.g. has a definite limited size, there exists something different from that object; we therefore must assume that there also
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exists something different from Brahman.--Brahman is declared to be connected in the following passages, 'Then he is united with the True' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), and 'The embodied Self is embraced by the highest Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21). Now we observe that non-measured things are connected with things measured, men, e.g. with a town. And scripture declares that the individual souls are, in the state of deep sleep, connected with Brahman. Hence we conclude that beyond Brahman there is something unmeasured.--The same conclusion is finally confirmed by those texts which proclaim difference, so e.g. the passage, I, 6, 6 ff. ('Now that golden person who is seen within the sun' &c.), which at first refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions a Lord residing in the eye, distinct from the former ('Now the person who is seen within the eye'). The text distinctly transfers to the latter the form &c. of the former 1 ('The form of that person is the same as the form of the other' &c.), and moreover declares that the lordly power of both is limited, 'He obtains through the one the worlds beyond that and the wishes of the devas' &c.; which is very much as if one should say, 'This is the reign of the king of Magadha and that the reign of the king of Videha.'
From all this it follows that there exists something different from Brahman.
The word 'but' is meant to set aside the previously established conclusion.--There can exist nothing different from Brahman, since we are unable to observe a proof for such existence. That all existences which have a beginning spring from, subsist through, and return into Brahman we have already ascertained, and have shown that the effect is non-different from the cause.--Nor can there exist, apart from Brahman, something which has no beginning, since scripture affirms that 'Being only this was
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in the beginning, one, without a second.' The promise moreover that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known, renders it impossible that there should exist anything different from Brahman.--But does not the fact that the Self is called a bank, &c. indicate that there exists something beyond the Self?--No, we reply; the passages quoted by the pûrvapakshin have no power to prove his conclusion. For the text only says that the Self is a bank, not that there is something beyond it. Nor are we entitled to assume the existence of some such thing, merely to the end of accounting for the Self being called a bank; for the simple assumption of something unknown is a mere piece of arbitrariness. If, moreover, the mere fact of the Self being called a bank implied the existence of something beyond it, as in the case of an ordinary bank, we should also be compelled to conclude that the Self is made of earth and stones; which would run counter to the scriptural doctrine that the Self is not something produced.--The proper explanation is that the Self is called a bank because it resembles a bank in a certain respect; as a bank dams back the water and marks the boundary of contiguous fields, so the Self supports the world and its boundaries. The Self is thus glorified by the name of bank because it resembles one.--In the clause quoted above, 'having passed that bank,' the verb 'to pass' cannot be taken in the sense of 'going beyond,' but must rather mean 'to reach fully.' In the same way we say of a student, 'he has passed the science of grammar,' meaning thereby that he has fully mastered it.
In reply to the pûrvapakshin's contention that the statements as to Brahman's size, prove that there exists something different from Brahman, we remark that those statements merely serve the purposes of the mind, i.e. of devout meditation.--But how can the cognition of something consisting
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of four, or eight, or sixteen parts be referred to Brahman?--Through its modifications (effects), we reply, Brahman is assumed to be subject to measure. For as some men are of inferior, others of middling, others again of superior intelligence, not all are capable of fixing their mind on the infinite Brahman, devoid of all effects. 'In the manner of the four feet,' i.e. in the same way as (Kh. Up. III, 18), for the purpose of pious meditation, speech and three other feet are ascribed to mind viewed as the personal manifestation of Brahman, and fire and three other feet to the ether viewed as the cosmic manifestation of Brahman.--Or else the phrase, 'in the manner of the four quarters,' may be explained as follows. In the same way as to facilitate commerce, a kârshâpana is assumed to be divided into four parts--for there being no fixed rule as to the value of bargains, people cannot always carry on their transactions with whole kârshâpanas only--, (so, in order to facilitate pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people, four feet, &c., are ascribed to Brahman).
The present Sûtra refutes the allegation that something different from Brahman exists, firstly, because things are said to be connected with Brahman, and secondly, because things are said to be separate from it. The fact is, that all those statements regarding connexion and difference are made with a view to difference of place. When the cognition of difference which is produced by the Selfs connexion with different places, i.e. with the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts, ceases on account of the cessation of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connexion with the highest Self is metaphorically said to take place; but that is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with a view to any limitation on the part of the Self.--In the same way, all statements regarding difference have reference to the difference of Brahman's limiting adjuncts only, not to any difference affecting Brahman's own nature.--All this
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is analogous to the case of light and the like. For the light of the sun or the moon also is differentiated by its connexion with limiting adjuncts, and is, on account of these adjuncts, spoken of as divided, and, when the adjuncts are removed, it is said to enter into connexion (union). Other instances of the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether entering into connexion with the eyes of needles and the like.
Moreover, only such a connexion as described above is possible. For scriptural passages, such as 'He is gone to his Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), declare that the connexion of the soul with the highest Self is one of essential nature. But as the essential nature of a thing is imperishable, the connexion cannot be analogous to that of the inhabitants with the town, but can only be explained with reference to an obscuration, owing to Nescience, of the soul's true nature.--Similarly the difference spoken of by scripture cannot be real, but only such as is due to Nescience; for many texts declare that there exists only one Lord. Analogously, scripture teaches that the one ether is made manifold as it were by its connexion with different places 'The ether which is outside man is the ether which is inside man, and the ether within the heart' (Kh. Up. III, 12, 7 ff.).
Having thus refuted the arguments of the pûrvapakshin, the Sûtrakâra in conclusion strengthens his view by a further reason. A great number of Vedic passages--which, considering the context in which they stand, cannot be explained otherwise--distinctly deny that there exists anything apart from Brahman; 'He indeed is below; I am below; the Self is below' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 1; 2); 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman
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alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2): 'In it there is no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'He to whom there is nothing superior, from whom there is nothing different' (Svet. Up. III, 9); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19).--And that there is no other Self within the highest Self, follows from that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within everything (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19).
The preceding demonstration that the texts calling Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally, and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality must be accepted as they stand., moreover, serves to prove that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited.--That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts proclaiming its extent, &c., cp. Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 3, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart;' 'Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal;' 'He is greater than the sky, greater than the ether' (Sat. Br. X, 6, 3, 2); 'He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable' (Bha. Gîtâ II, 24); and other similar passages from Sruti and Smriti.
We now turn to another characteristic belonging to Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of his rule.--There arises the question whether the threefold fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their
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samsâra-state--viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the two-spring from the actions themselves or come from the Lord.--The Sûtrakâra embraces the latter alternative, on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital which are in accordance with the merit of the agents; actions, on the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be overcome by the assumption that an action passes away only after having produced some result according to its nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such only through being enjoyed by the agent; only at the moment when some pleasure or some pain--the result of some deed--is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people understand it to be a 'fruit.'--Nor in the second place. have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous principle (apûrva), which itself is supposed to be a direct result of the deed; for that so-called supersensuous principle is something of non-intelligent nature, comparable to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an apûrva.--But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are actually requited?--By no means, we reply; for the fact of requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions, not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but also because we have direct scriptural statement on our side. Cp. e.g. the passage, 'This indeed is the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth' (Bri. Up. IV. 4, 24).
Gaimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified in the last two Sûtras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims injunctions such as the following one, 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' Now as it is admitted that such scriptural injunctions must have an object, we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result, i.e. the obtainment of the heavenly world; for if this were not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless.--But has not this view of the matter already been abandoned, on the ground that an action which passes away as soon as done can have no fruit?--We must, the reply is, follow the authority of scripture and assume such a connexion of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural statement. Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result at some future time, unless, before passing away, it gives birth to some unseen result; we therefore assume that there exists some result which we call apûrva, and which may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result. This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects; in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with partiality and cruelty; and in the third place, if the deed itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless to perform it at all.--For all these reasons the result springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non-meritorious.
41. Bâdârayana, however, thinks the former (i.e. the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action), since he is designated as the cause (of the actions themselves).
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The teacher Bâdârayana thinks that the previously-mentioned Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The word 'however' sets aside the view of the fruit being produced either by the mere deed or the mere apûrva.--The final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it be so preferred, with a view to the apûrva springing from the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau. Up. III, 8, 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed.' The same is said in the Bhagavadgîtâ (VII, 21), 'Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me.'
All Vedânta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures in forms and conditions corresponding to--and retributive of--their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the objections raised above--as to one uniform cause being inadequate to the production of various effects, &c.--are without any foundation.
(My humble salutations to Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE
COMMENTARY BY SANKARÂKÂRYA.
(Brahma Sutras)
Translated by George Thibaut
Third Adhyâya. Third Pâda.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedânta-texts (are identical), on account of the non-difference of injunction and so on.In the preceding part of this work we have explained the nature of the object of cognition, i.e. Brahman. We now enter on the discussion of the question whether the cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the different Vedânta-texts, are separate cognitions or not.
But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature like a lump of salt; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot be maintained that the Vedânta-texts aim at establishing a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of works (inculcated by the karmakânda of the Veda). Nor can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it may be the object of divers cognitions; for any difference in nature between the cognition and the object known points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand, it should be assumed that the different Vedânta-texts aim at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would follow that only one cognition can be the right one while all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general distrust of all Vedânta.--Hence the question whether each individual Vedânta-text teaches a separate cognition of Brahman or not cannot even be raised.--Nor, supposing that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sûtra attempts) on the ground that all Vedânta-texts are equally injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at
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length (I, 1, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is produced by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining anything.--Why then begin at all this discussion about the difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman?
To all this we reply that no objection can be raised against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its object only the qualified Brahman and prâna and the like. For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover teaches that, like acts, they have various results; some of them have visible results, others unseen results, and others again--as conducive to the springing up of perfect knowledge--have for their result release by successive steps. With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise the question whether the individual Vedânta-texts teach different cognitions of Brahman or not.
The arguments which may here be set forth by the pûrvapakshin are as follows. In the first place it is known that difference may be proved by names, as e.g. in the case of the sacrificial performance called 'light' (gyotis) 1. And the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the different Vedânta-texts are connected with different names such as the Taittirîyaka, the Vâgasaneyaka, the Kauthumaka, the Kaushîtaka, the Sâtyâyanaka, &c.--In the second place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference of form (characteristics; rûpa). So e.g. with reference to the passage, 'the milk is for the Visvedevas, the water for the vâgins.' 2
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Now similar differences of form are met with in the Vedânta-texts; the followers of one Sâkhâ, e.g. mention, in the chapter called 'the knowledge of the five fires,' a sixth fire, while other Sâkhâs mention five only; and in the colloquy of the prânas some texts mention a lesser, others a greater number of organs and powers of the body.--In the third place differences in qualifying particulars (dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts; only in the Mundaka-Upanishad. e.g. it is said that the science of Brahman must be imparted to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10).--In the same way the other reasons which are admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repetition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to the different Vedânta-texts also.--We therefore maintain that each separate Vedânta-text teaches a different cognition of Brahman.
To this argumentation of the pûrvapakshin we make the following reply.--The cognitions enjoined by all the Vedânta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference of injunction and so on. The 'and so on' refers to the other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are enumerated in the Siddhânta-sûtra of the adhikarana treating of the different Sâkhâs (Pû. Mî. II, 4, 9, '(the act) is one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form, of injunction, and of name'). Thus, as the agnihotra though described in different Sâkhâs is yet one, the same kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of the words, 'He is to offer;' so the injunction met with in the text of the Vâgasaneyins (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 1), 'He who knows the oldest and the best,' &c., is the same as that which occurs in the text of the Khandogas, 'He who knows the first and the best' (Kh. Up. V, 1, 1). The connexion of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the same in both texts, 'He becomes the first and best among his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge is the true nature of the prâna which is characterised by
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certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name, viz. the knowledge of the prâna.--For these reasons we declare that the different Vedânta-texts enjoin identical cognitions.--A similar line of reasoning applies to other cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedânta-text, so e.g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the knowledge of Vaisvânara, the knowledge of Sândilya. and so on.--Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the pûrvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the Pûrvâ Mîmâmsâ-sûtras II, 4, 10 ff.
The next Sûtra disposes of a doubt which may remain even after the preceding discussion.
Footnotes
185:1 See the samgñâkritakarmabhedâdhikarana, Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 22, where the decision is that the word gyotis (in 'athaisha gyotir' &c.) denotes not the gyotishtoma but a separate sacrificial performance.185:2 See Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 23. The offering of water made to the divinities called vâgin is separate from the offering of milk to the Visvedevas; for the material offered as well as the divinity to which the offering is made (i.e. the two rûpa of the sacrifice) differs in the two cases.
In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedânta-texts, because we meet with differences in secondary matters (guna). Thus the Vâgasaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the five fires a sixth fire ('And then the fire is indeed fire,' Bri. Up. VI, 2, 14), while the Khandogas mention no sixth fire but conclude their text of the pañkâgnividyâ with the express mention of five fires ('But he who thus knows the five fires,' Kh. Up. V, 10, 10).
Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those who admit that particular qualification (i.e. the sixth fire) and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vidyâ of the Khandogas; for that would contradict the number 'five' expressly stated by them.--In the colloquy of the prânas
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again the Khandogas mention, in addition to the most important prâna, four other prânas, viz. speech, the eye, the ear, and the mind; while the Vâgasaneyins mention a fifth one also, 'Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that becomes rich in offspring and cattle' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 6).--Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and omission effects a difference in the object known, and the latter again effects a difference in the vidyâ, just as a difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes one sacrifice from another.
To this we make the following reply.--Your objection is without force, since such differences of qualification as are met with in the above instances are possible even in one and the same vidyâ. In the Khândogya-text a sixth fire is indeed not included; yet, as five fires, beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot effect a split of the vidyâ; not any more than the âtirâtra-sacrifice is differentiated by the shodasin-rite being either used or not-used. Moreover, the Khândogya-text also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage, V, 9, 2, 'When he has departed, his friends carry him, as appointed, to the fire'. The Vâgasaneyins, on the other hand, mention their sixth fire ('and then the fire is indeed fire, the fuel fuel,' &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which runs through the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified. Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but) is merely a remark about something already established (known) 1. And even if we assume that the statement about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be inserted in the vidyâ of the Khandogas without any fear of its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there;
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for that number is not an essential part of the injunction 1, but merely makes an additional statement regarding something known already from the text, viz. the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are identified 2. Similarly nothing stands in the way of some additional qualification being included in the vidyâ concerning the colloquy of the prânas and so on. The addition or omission of some particular qualification is unable to introduce difference into the object of knowledge and thereby into the knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same time the knowing person are understood to be the same. Hence the vidyâ also remains the same.
With reference to the pûrvapakshin's averment that the rite of carrying fire on the head is connected with the vidyâ of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any other vidyâ, and that thereby the vidyâ of the Âtharvanikas is separated from all other vidyâs, the following remarks have to be made.--The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute not of the vidyâ, but merely of the study of the Veda on the part of the Âtharvanikas. This we infer from the circumstance that the Âtharvanikas, in the book called 'Samâkâra' which treats of Vedic observances, record the above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, 'A
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man who has not performed the rites does not read this;' here we conclude from the word 'this' which refers to the subject previously treated, and from the fact of 'reading' being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of the Upanishad of the Âtharvanikas (but has nothing to do with the Upanishad itself).--But what about the immediately preceding passage, 'Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head has been performed according to rule?' Here the rite in question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite has to be connected with all science of Brahman!--Not so, we reply; for in the above passage also the word 'this' refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a particular book (viz. the Mundaka-Upanishad); hence the rite also is connected with that particular book only.--The Sutra adds another illustrative instance in the words 'and as in the case of the libations there is limitation of that.' As the seven libations--from the saurya libation up to the sataudana libation--since they are not connected with the triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the one fire which is taught in the Atharvan, are thereby enjoined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvan; so the rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements connect it.--The doctrine of the unity of the vidyâs thus remains unshaken.
The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyâs; for all Vedânta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one; cp. e.g. Kâ. Up. I, 2, 15, 'That word which all the Vedas record;' Ait. Âr. Ill, 2,3,12, 'Him only the Bahvrikas consider in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Khandogas in the Mahâvrata ceremony.'--To quote some other instances proving the unity of the vidyâs: Kâ. Up. I, 6, 2, mentions as one of the Lord's qualities that he
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causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobation of those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which is, 'For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him who knows (a difference) and does not know (the oneness).'--Similarly the Vaisvânara, who in the Vâgasaneyaka is imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in the Khândogya as something well known, 'But he who worships that Vaisvânara Self which is a span long,' &c. (Kh. Up. V, 18, 1).
And as, on the ground of all Vedânta-texts intimating the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in one place are employed in other places (where they are not expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it follows that all Vedânta-texts intimate also (identical) devout meditations.
[This Sûtra states the practical outcome of the discussion carried on in the first four Sûtras.] It having been determined that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedânta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in one text are to be introduced into other texts also where they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these determinations subserves some particular cognition in one place, it subserves it in another place also, since in both places we have to do with one and the same cognition. The case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to some sacrificial performance, as, e g. the agnihotra. The agnihotra also is one performance, and therefore its subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in different texts, have to be combined into one whole.--If the
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cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in different texts could not be combined; for they would be confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to each other in that relation in which the typical form of a sacrifice stands to its modifications 1. But as the cognitions are one, things lie differently--The above Sûtra will be explained and applied at length further on, in Sûtra 10 ff.
We read in the Vâgasaneyaka I, 3, 1, 'The Devas said, well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgîtha. They said to speech: Do thou sing out for us.--Yes, said speech,' &c. The text thereupon relates how speech and the other prânas were pierced by the Asuras with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the chief vital air, 'Then they said to the breath in the mouth: Do thou sing for us.--Yes, said the breath, and sang.'--A similar story is met with in the Khândogya I, 2. There we read at first that 'the devas took the udgîtha, thinking they would vanquish the Asuras with it;' the text then relates how the other prânas were pierced with evil and thus foiled by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse to the chief vital air, 'Then comes this chief vital air; on that they meditated as udgîtha.'--As both these passages glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are injunctions of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, however, arises whether the two vidyâs are separate vidyâs or one vidyâ only.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that for the reasons specified in the first adhikarana of the present pâda the two
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vidyâs have to be considered as one.--But, an objection is raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts the assumption of unity. The Vâgasaneyins represent the chief vital air as the producer of the udgîtha ('Do thou sing out for us'), while the Khandogas speak of it as itself being the udgîtha ('on that they meditated as udgîtha'). How can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the unity of the vidyâs?--The difference pointed out, the pûrvapakshin replies, is not important enough to bring about a separation of the two vidyâs, since we observe that the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting; both at first glorify speech and the other prânas in their relation to the udgîtha, and thereupon, finding fault with them, pass on to the chief vital air; both tell how through the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone. And, moreover, the text of the Vâgasaneyaka also coordinates the chief vital air and the udgîtha in the clause, 'He is udgîtha' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 23). We therefore have to assume that in the Khândogya also the chief prâna has secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgîtha.--The two texts thus constitute one vidyâ only.
Setting aside the view maintained by the pûrvapakshin, we have rather to say that, owing to the difference "of subject-matter, the two vidyâs are separate.--In the Khândogya the introductory sentence (I, 1, 1), 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgîtha,' represents as the object of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the udgîtha; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its qualities such as being the inmost essence of all ('The full account, however, of Om is this,' &c.); and later on tells, with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of the udgîtha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which there occurs the statement,' They meditated on the udgîtha
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as that breath 1.' If now we should assume 2 that the term 'udgîtha' denotes here the whole act of worship (not only the syllable Om which is a part of the udgîtha), and that (in the passage, 'they meditated on the udgîtha as that breath') the performer of that worship, i.e. the Udgâtri-priest, is said to be meditated upon as breath; our interpretation would be open to two objections: in the first place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence (which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object of devotion); and in the second place it would oblige us to take the word udgîtha (in 'they meditated on the udgîtha'), not in its direct sense, but as denoting by implication the udgâtri. But the rule is that in one and the same connected passage the interpretation of later passages has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that the syllable Om which is a part of the udgîtha is to be meditated upon as prâna.--In the Vâgasaneyaka on the other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgîtha to denote a part of the udgîtha only, and we therefore must interpret it to denote the whole; and in the passage, 'Do thou sing out for us,' the performer of the worship, i.e. the Udgâtri-priest, is described as prâna. In reply to the pûrvapakshin's remark that in the Vâgasaneyaka also the udgîtha and the prâna occur in co-ordination (in the passage, 'He is udgîtha'), we point out that that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all is that prâna which the text wishes to represent as udgâtri. The statement, therefore, docs not imply the unity of the two vidyâs. Moreover, there also the term udgîtha denotes the whole act of worship (while in the Khândogya it denotes the omkâra only). Nor must it be said that the prâna can
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impossibly be an udgâtri, and that on that account our interpretation of the Brihad-âranyaka passage is erroneous; for with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent the prâna as udgâtri as well as udgîtha. And, moreover, the Udgâtri actually performs his work by the strength of his breath; hence the prâna may be called udgâtri. In accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24). 'He sang it indeed as speech and breath.'--And if we understand that the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities of expression that only one matter is intended to be expressed. To quote an analogous instance from the karma-kânda: In the section relative to the unexpected rising of the moon during the darsa-sacrifice, as well as in the section about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the following one, 'He is to divide, the grains into three portions, and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,' &c.; nevertheless it follows from the difference of the introductory passages of the two sections that the offerings to be made on account of the moon's rising are indeed not connected with the divinities of the darsa-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new sacrifice separate from the darsa), while the section about him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial performance 1.--Analogously a difference in the nature of the introductory clauses effects a difference of the vidyâs, 'As in the case of that which is greater than great.' That means: Just as the meditation on the udgîtha enjoined in the passage, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest; he is indeed the udgîtha, greater than great, he is without end' (Kh. Up. I, 9, 1), and the other meditation on the udgîtha as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye and the sun, &c. (Kh. Up. I, 6), are separate meditations, although in both the udgîtha is identified with the highest Self; so it is with vidyâs in general. The special features of different vidyâs are not to be combined even when the
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vidyâs belong to one and the same Sâkhâ; much less then when they belong to different Sâkhâs.
Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two vidyâs discussed must be admitted, since they are called by one and the same name, viz. 'the science of the udgîtha.'--But this argument is of no avail against what has been said under the preceding Sûtra. The decision there advocated has the advantage of following the letter of the revealed text; the name 'udgîtha-vidyâ' on the other hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the vidyâs for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason that the word 'udgîtha' is met with in the text.--Moreover, we observe that admittedly separate meditations such as the two mentioned under the last Sûtra have one and the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial performances, such as the agnihotra, the darsapûrnamâsa, and so on, are all comprised under the one name Kâthaka, merely because they are recorded in the one book called Kâthaka.--Where, on the other hand, there is no special reason for assuming the difference of vidyâs, their unity may be declared on the ground of identity of name; as, e.g. in the case of the Samvargavidyâs.
In the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgîtha,' the two words 'omkâra' and 'udgîtha' are placed in co-ordination. 1 The question then arises
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whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these two words stand to each other is the relation of super-imposition (adhyâsa) or sublation (apavâda) or unity (ekatva) or specification (viseshana); for primâ facie each of these relations may present itself to the mind.--Adhyâsa takes place when the idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is superimposed on that of the first thing; so that together with the superimposed idea the former idea remains attached to the thing on which the second idea is superimposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the superimposition of the idea of the god Vishnu on a statue of Vishnu. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea of the udgîtha may be superimposed on the omkâra or the idea of the omkâra on the udgîtha.--We, in the second place, have apavâda when an idea previously attached to some object is recognised as false and driven out by the true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later--and expressed by judgments such as 'Thou art that'--that the idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgîtha may drive out the idea of the omkâra or vice versâ.--The relation would, in the third place, be that of 'unity' if the terms 'omkâra' and 'udgîtha' were co-extensive in meaning; just as the terms, 'the Best of the Twice-born,' 'the Brâhmana,' 'the god among men,' all denote an individual of the noblest caste.--The relation will, finally, be that of specification if, there being a possibility of our understanding the omkâra in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas, the term 'udgîtha' calls up the idea of the sphere of action of the udgâtri. The passage would then mean, 'Let a man meditate on that omkâra which is the udgîtha,' and would
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be analogous to an injunction such as 'Let him bring that lotus-flower which is blue.'
All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the question must remain an unsettled one.
To this pûrvapaksha-view the Sûtra replies, 'And on account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.'
The word 'and' stands here in place of 'but,' and is meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable; the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be adopted.--The objections lying against the first three alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyâsa we should have to admit that the word which expresses the idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense, but in an implied sense 1; and we should moreover have to imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind. 2 Nor can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires' (I, 1, 7); for this passage indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the udgîtha on the omkâra, but of the meditation in which the omkâra is viewed as the fulfilment of desires.--Against the hypothesis of an apavâda there likewise lies the objection that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong knowledge can certainly not be alleged as such; for we see no reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkâra is udgîtha and not omkâra or vice versâ should be beneficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other is moreover not even possible in our case; for to the omkâra the idea of the omkâra remains always attached, and so to the udgîtha the idea of the udgîtha. The passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true
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nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a certain kind.--The hypothesis of unity again is precluded by the consideration that as in that case one term would suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term 'udgîtha' is never used to denote the omkâra in its connexion with the Rig-veda and Yagur-veda; nor is the word 'omkâra' used to denote that entire second subdivision of a sâman which is denoted by the word 'udgîtha.' Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different words only denoting one and the same thing.--There thus remains the fourth alternative, 'On account of its comprising all the Vedas.' That means: In order that the omkâra may not be understood here as that one which comprises all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word 'udgîtha,' in order that that omkâra which constitutes a part of the udgîtha may be apprehended.--But does not this interpretation also involve the admission of implication, as according to it the word 'udgîtha' denotes not the whole udgîtha but only a part of it, viz. the omkâra?--True, but we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case, we embrace the alternative of adhyâsa, we have to assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the alternative of specification, the implication connected therewith is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense denotes the whole being understood to denote the part. And that words denoting the whole do duty for words denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence; the words 'cloth,' 'village,' and many others are used in this fashion 1.--For all these reasons we declare that the appropriate view of the Khândogya-passage is to take the word 'udgîtha' as specialising the term 'omkâra 2.'
Footnotes
196:1 Sâmânâdhikaranya, i.e. literally, 'the relation of abiding in a common substratum.'--The two words are shown to stand in that relation by their being exhibited in the same case.198:1 i.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word udgîtha means, by implication, the omkâra.--Recourse may be had to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly impossible.
198:2 For a special adhyâsa-meditation must be attended with a special result.
199:1 We say, e.g. 'the cloth is burned,' even if only a part of the cloth is burned.
199:2 We therefore, according to, Saṅkara, have to render the passage p. 200 under discussion as follows, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om which is (i.e. which is a part of) the udgîtha.'
In the colloquy of the prânas recorded by the Vâgasaneyins and the Khandogas the prâna, endowed with various qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed to the prâna also, 'If I am the richest thou art the richest,' &c. Now in other Sâkhâs also, as e.g. that of the Kaushîtakins, the former set of qualities such as being the best and so on is ascribed to the prâna (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, 'Now follows the Nihsreyasâdâna,' &c.), but at the same time the latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is not mentioned.--The question then is whether those qualities which are mentioned in some places only are, for the purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where nothing is said about them.
They are not so to be inserted, the pûrvapakshin maintains, on account of the employment of the word 'thus.' In the Kaushîtakin-text we meet with the clause, 'He who knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in prâna.' Now the word 'thus' which here indicates the object of knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off, and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in other Sâkhâs only. We therefore maintain that each of the colloquies of the prânas must be considered complete with the qualities stated in itself.
To this we make the following reply. The qualities mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other corresponding texts also, 'Since on the whole they are non-different,' i.e. because the prâna-vidyâs are recognised to be the same in all essential points. And if they are the same,
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why should the qualities stated in one not be inserted in the others also?--But how about the objection founded by the pûrvapakshin on the employment of the word 'thus?'--Although it is true, we reply, that the word 'thus' in the Kaushtîakin-brâhmana does not denote the set of qualities mentioned in the Vâgasaneyin-brâhmana, yet that set of qualities is denoted by the 'thus' met within the Vâgasaneyin-brâhmana, while the vidyâ is, as proved by us, one and the same; hence no difference has to be made between qualities mentioned in one's own Sâkhâ and qualities mentioned in another Sâkhâ, as long as the vidyâ is one and the same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted by the text. The qualities declared in one Sâkhâ are valid for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them. And through better acquaintance his qualities will become manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly the qualities stated in one Sâkhâ may, through special application, be inserted in another Sâkhâ.--Hence the attributes belonging to one and the same subject have to be combined wherever that subject is referred to, although they may be expressly stated in one place only.
Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand only those qualities which actually are mentioned there, or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman mentioned anywhere.
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The pûrvapakshin maintains that only the attributes actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each particular scriptural text.--But this view the Sûtrakâra discards by declaring that delight and all the other qualities which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclusion is the one given in Sûtra 10. In all the passages treating of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is one, non-different; hence, as explained at length under the preceding Sûtra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is spoken of.
But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its head. &c., would have to be ascribed to Brahman everywhere; for we read in the Taittirîyaka with reference to the Self consisting of Bliss, 'Joy is its head, satisfaction is its right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk, Brahman is its tail, its support' (II, 5).
To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on, which are recorded in the Taittirîyaka, are not to be viewed as having force with regard to other passages treating of Brahman, because the successive terms, 'Joy,' 'Satisfaction,' 'Great Satisfaction,' 'Bliss,' indicate qualities possessing lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is room only where there is plurality; and Brahman is without all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages ('One only, without a Second').--Moreover, we have already demonstrated under I, 1, 12, that having joy for one's head and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of fixing one's mind on it, not as themselves being objects of
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contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are not valid everywhere 1.--That the Âkârya refers to them, in the Sûtra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are attributes of the ânandamaya kosa) is merely done for the purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended to all attributes of Brahman--also the undoubted ones--which are stated with a view to a special form of meditation only; such as the quality of being that towards which all blessings go (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 2), or he whose desires are true (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). For those passages may all indeed have to do with the one Brahman as the object of meditation, but as owing to the different nature of the opening sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella; there also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of ministration themselves are distinct and have each their own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having true desires and the like which are mentioned in some particular place only have no validity for other meditations on Brahman.
Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages referring to Brahman; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman
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whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation.
We read in the Kâthaka (I, 3, 10), 'Higher than the senses are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind, &c. &c.; higher than the person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road.'--Here the doubt arises whether the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding one, or only that the person is higher than all of them.
The pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects and so on.
The objection that the assumption of the passage intending to represent many things as successively superior to their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sentences may represent many things as superior to their antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority of something to other things.
To this we reply as follows.
We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimating only that the person is higher than everything. Any information as to the relative superiority of the preceding members of the series would be devoid of all purpose; for of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the knowledge, on the other hand, of the person being higher than the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And so scripture also says, 'He who has perceived that is freed
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from the jaws of death' (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated only to the end of giving information about the person.--'For the purpose of pious meditation,' i.e. for the purpose of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its antecedent. For the passage under consideration does not teach pious meditation by itself.
The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance that the person under discussion is called the Self in I, 3, 12, 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.' From this we conclude that the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp minds only.--Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 'A wise man should keep down speech and mind,' enjoins pious meditation as a means of the knowledge of the highest person, as we have explained under I, 4, 1.--It thus follows that scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enumerated.--The passage, moreover, 'He reaches the end of his journey and that is the highest place of Vishnu,' suggests the question as to who is the end of the journey and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumeration of the senses, objects, &c., has merely the purpose of teaching the highest place of Vishnu (not of teaching anything about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on).
We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, i), 'Verily, in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
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else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters, the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.'--Here the doubt presents itself whether the term 'Self' denotes the highest Self or some other being.
The pûrvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected sense of the whole passage.--But, an objection is raised, an examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that the highest Self is meant; for the passage says that before the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was preceded by thought.--No such conclusion is possible, the pûrvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements, of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That the worlds are meant by the terms 'water,' &c., appears from the subsequent clause (4), 'That water is above the heaven,' &c.--Now Sruti and Smriti teach that the creation of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord different from--and superintended by--the highest Self; cp. e.g. Bri. Up. I, 4, 1, 'In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person,' and the Smriti-passage, 'He is the first embodied soul, he is called the person; he the prime creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from Brahman.' And the Aitareyins themselves record in a previous prakarana (II, 1, 3, 1, 'Next follows the origin of seed. The seed of Pragâpati are the Devas ') that this manifold creation was accomplished by Pragâpati. That to the latter being the word 'Self' is sometimes applied appears from the passage quoted above from the--Bri. Up. And Pragâpati also may be spoken of as being before the creation one only, if we consider that then his products did not yet exist; and thought also may be ascribed to him as he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the passages, 'He led a cow towards them; he led a horse towards them; he led man towards them; then they said,' &c. (II, 4, 2, 2), which are in agreement with what is known about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs belonging
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to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka also some such qualified Self is meant.
To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aitareyaka 'as in other places.' As in other accounts of the creation ('From that Self ether was produced,' Taitt. Up. II, 1, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other cases where the term 'Self' is applied to particular Selfs, the 'Self within' (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in the first place; so it is here also.--In those passages, on the other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attribute, such as 'having the shape of a person,' we must understand that some particular Self is meant.--In the Aitareyaka, however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds.'--Hence we maintain that the highest Self is meant.
We now have to refute the objection, made above by the pûrvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant 'on account of the connected meaning of the passage.'--The Sûtrakâra remarks, 'It is so, on account of the assertion.' That means: It is appropriate to understand the passage as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently to the elements; just as we showed above (II, 4, 1) that the passage, 'It sent forth fire,' must be understood to say that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether
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and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if only the chief subject of the passages is the same.--The details about the activity of the Self referred to by the pûrvapakshin have likewise to be understood in such a way as to agree with the general matter about which the text desires to make assertions. For we must by no means assume that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of the story on their own account; the knowledge of them would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different worlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so on, were created; explains thereupon the origination of the organs and the body, their abode; and shows how the creator having thought, 'How can all this be without me?' (II, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, 'Opening the suture of the skull he got in by that door' (7). Then again the text relates how the Self after having considered the activities of all the organs ('if speech names,' &c.; 6) asked himself the question, 'What am I?' and thereupon 'saw this person as the widely spread Brahman' (10). The aim of all which is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. II, 6, 1, 5; 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggregate of individual existences together with the elements, and then continues, 'All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the highest Self); it rests on knowledge. The world is led by knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman."--For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman is meant in the Aitareyaka is not open to any objections.
The two preceding Sûtras may also be explained with reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the Vâgasaneyaka (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7), 'Who is that Self?--He who is within the heart, surrounded by the prânas, consisting of knowledge, the person of light.' Of the Self here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman
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for its Self, the concluding statement being, 'This great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (IV, 4, 25).--In the Khândogya again we have a chapter in which the introductory statement does not use the term 'Self ('Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'), while at the conclusion the term 'Self' is used in the declaration of identity ('That is the Self. Thou art that').--A doubt here arises whether these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not.
They do not, the pûrvapakshin maintains, since they are not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain equality of sense where the texts differ. In the Vâgasaneyaka the initial statement about the Self shows that the whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of the Self. In the Khândogya, on the other hand, the initial clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature from that of the Vâgasaneyaka.--But has it not been said that the Khândogya-passage also teaches in the end the doctrine of universal identity with the Self?--That has been said indeed (but wrongly); for as the concluding passage must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter does not say anything about the identity of the Self and Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely enjoins an imaginative combination (sampatti) of the Self and Brahman.
To this we reply that also the passage, 'Being only this was in the beginning,' has to be understood as referring to the Self; 'as other places,' i.e. in the same way as the passage quoted from the Vâgasaneyaka. For what reason?--'On account of the subsequent (statement),' viz. the statement as to identity. And if it be said that 'on account of the connected meaning' of the initial passage in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply 'that it may be so understood on account of the assertion' made in the passage about that 'by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not
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known.' For this passage asserts that through the knowledge of one thing all things become known, and to make good this assertion the text later on declares that 'Being only this was,' &c. Now this knowledge of all things through one thing is possible only if we understand the passage last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal Self were not known, how could all things be known? Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul by means of the word 'Self,' and the statement that in deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the repeated inquiries on the part of Svetaketu, and the repeated assertions, 'Thou art that,'--all this is appropriate only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything.--Nor must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account teach anything about the Self); for the introductory passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a statement regarding what is in general), and such an altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with any particular statement made in a supplementary passage, but rather is in want of some such particular statement whereby to define itself 1.--And moreover (to view the matter from a different point of view), the word 'Being' if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the principal Self, since we have proved, under II, 1, 14, the unreality of the whole aggregate of being different from the Self.--Nor, finally, does a difference of expression necessarily imply a difference of sense; not any more than in ordinary language the to phrases, 'Bring that vessel
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over there,' and, 'That vessel over there, bring it,' have different meanings.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in texts such as discussed above, the matter of instruction is the same, however much the mode may vary in which the instruction is conveyed.
The Khandogas as well as the Vâgasaneyins record, in the colloquy of the prânas, that the food of Breath comprizes everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water is its dress. To this the Khandogas add, 'Therefore when going to eat food they surround it before and after with water' (Kh. Up. V, 2, 2). And the Vâgasaneyins add (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 14), 'Srotriyas who know this rinse the mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going to eat and after having eaten; he thereby makes that breath dressed.'--These texts intimate two things, rinsing of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed. The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the meditation on breath as dressed.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the text enjoins both, since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text, and since both matters not being settled by any other means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the Veda.--Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form ('he is to rinse'). In this latter case the mention made in the text of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing.
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To this we make the following reply.--The rinsing of the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted passages 'since they merely contain references to an act,' i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from and settled by Smriti.--But are not the very Sruti-passages under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts on which the Smriti-injunctions regarding the rinsing of the mouth are based?--This is not possible, we reply, since the Sruti and Smriti-passages refer to different matters. All the Smriti-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth only in so far as it purifies man; while the quoted Sruti texts which occur in prâna-vidyâs, if enjoining the rinsing of the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge of prâna. And a Sruti-passage cannot constitute the basis of a Smriti-passage referring to an altogether different matter. Nor can it be maintained that the Sruti-passage enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected with the prâna-vidyâ, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned in Sruti as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the sake of purification.--The preceding argumentation already precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined, which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sentence.--We therefore conclude that the text--with reference to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is enjoined by Smriti-enjoins (by means of the passage, 'thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed') a new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for clothing the prâna. The statement about the clothing of the prâna cannot (as suggested by the pûrvapakshin) be taken as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth; for in the first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vedic passage 1, and in the second place we apprehend that the passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental
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resolve to provide clothing for the prâna. Nor must the objection be raised that in that case two purposes are admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the prâna with clothing. For we have actually to do not with one action, but with two separate actions. For one action is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the prâna. Similarly the preceding passage, 'Whatever there is, even unto dogs, &c., that is thy food,' does not enjoin the promiscuous use of food of all kinds--for that would be contrary to scripture and impossible in itself--but merely enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the prâna. We therefore conclude that also the passage, 'Water is thy dress," which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as constituting the dress of the prâna.
Moreover the mere present-form, 'they rinse the mouth with water,' has no enjoining force.--But also in the passage, 'They think that thereby they make the breath dressed,' we have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction)!--True; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined 1, we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation on water being the dress of prâna; for this is something 'new,' i.e. not established by other means of knowledge 2. The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is already established by other means (i.e. Smriti), and therefore need not be enjoined again.--The argument founded
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by the pûrvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the Bri. Up., the verb 'to rinse' is found in the injunctive form ('therefore a man, &c., is to rinse'), is already refuted by our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction).
For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoining the rinsing of the mouth, the Kânvas (in their recension of the Bri. Up.) conclude the chapter with the clause, 'They think,' &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the Mâdhyandinas, 'Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Mâdhyandinas also is 'the knowledge of that,' i.e. the knowledge of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned prâna.--Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place (i.e. the Madhyandina-sâkha) the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water as the dress of prâna; for the introductory passage, 'Water is the dress,' is the same everywhere.--We are therefore entitled to conclude that what is enjoined in all Sâkhâs is the cognition of water being the dress of the prâna.
Footnotes
212:1 A glorifying arthavâda-passage would be in its place only if it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions concerning those acts.213:1 Because otherwise we should have only arthavâdas. But arthavâdas have a meaning only in so far as connected with an injunction.
213:2 The above argumentation avails itself of the Sûtra, putting a new construction on it.--Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ity âsaṅkyânu-vâdamâtrasyâऽkiñkitkaratvâd anyataravidher âvasyakatve samkalpanam eva vidheyam iti vidhântarena sûtram yogayati. Ân. Gi.
In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Vâgasaneyi-sâkhâ there is a vidyâ called the Sândilya-vidyâ, in which we meet with the following statement of particulars, 'Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the prâna for its body and light for its form,' &c.--In the Brihad-âranyaka again, which belongs to the same Sâkhâ, we read (V, 10,6), 'That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all--he rules all this whatsoever exists.'--A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidyâ in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyâs whose particulars cannot be combined. For
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otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do with texts belonging to different Sâkhâs we can rebut the charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the texts are read and known by separate classes of men; we can then ascertain the unity of the vidyâs and combine the particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned in the others; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prânas. On the other hand, texts belonging to one and the same Sâkhâ cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same persons study and know them, and passages occurring in different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidyâ. Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one text to enjoin the vidyâ and that of the other to enjoin the particulars of the vidyâ. For in that case each of the two passages would mention only such particulars as are not mentioned in the other one; while as a matter of fact particulars common to both as well as not common to both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the one passage are not to be combined with those of the other.
To this we make the following reply. Just as passages met with in different Sâkhâs form one vidyâ in which the different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages under discussion also, although belonging to one and the same Sâkhâ, constitute one vidyâ only, since the object of meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes the character of a meditation; as long as there is no difference of character we cannot determine difference of vidyâ; and if there is no difference of vidyâ the particulars mentioned in different places cannot be held apart.--But has it not been demonstrated above that the vidyâs have to be held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise?--Tautology does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them enjoining the vidyâ, and the other the particulars of the vidyâ.--But in that case the Brihad-âranyaka ought to
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mention only those points which are not mentioned in the Agnirahasya, as e.g. 'he is the Lord of all;' while it ought not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agnirahasya, as e.g. the Selfs consisting of mind!--Not so, we reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is already mentioned in the other passage enables us to recognise the vidyâ. The Brihad-âranyaka-passage, by mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to recognise the Sândilya-vidyâ, and then teaches certain particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise should we know that the Bri.--passage is meant to enjoin particulars for the Sândilya-vidyâ? Moreover, as in a passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it teaches something not yet established, a reference to something already established is justified on the ground of its being a (so-called) nityânuvâda, we cannot overlook the recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one) which is rendered possible through that anuvâda. Hence, although the two passages belong to one and the same Sâkhâ, they yet constitute one vidyâ only, and their particulars have to be combined into one whole.
We read in the Brihad-âranyaka (V, 5), 'The true is Brahman,' and, further on, 'Now what is the true, that is the Âditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' Having thus declared the different abodes of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified its body with the sacred syllables (bhûh, &c.), the text teaches its two secret names (upanishad), 'Its secret name is ahar' with reference to the gods; and 'its secret name is aham' with reference to the body.--A doubt here arises whether these two secret names are both to be applied to the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode, or only one name to each.
The above Sûtra maintains the pûrvapaksha view. Just as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet
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to be combined with the Sândilya-vidyâ, so we have to proceed in other cases also, as e.g. the one under discussion, because the particulars mentioned are all connected with one vidyâ. The vidyâ of the True with its double reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we infer from the fact of its having one exordium only ('The true is Brahman'), and from the way in which the text interconnects Âditya and the person in the eye. Why then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter not belong to the other also? For, to quote an analogous case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher--as e.g. having a following of pupils--remain equally valid whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For these reasons both secret names equally belong to the Âditya as well as to the person within the eye. This view the next Sûtra refutes.
The two secret names do not apply quite equally to the two persons mentioned, because they are connected with different places in the vidyâ. For the clause, 'Its secret name is ahar,' the text exhibits in connexion with the person in the solar orb, while the clause, 'Its secret name is aham,' occurs in connexion with the person in the eye. Now the pronoun 'its' always refers to something mentioned close by; we therefore conclude that the text teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for both?--But, an objection is raised, the person within the orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only; for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one true Brahman!--True, we reply; but as each secret name is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as conditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always remains the teacher; yet those kinds of services which the pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be
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done when he stands; and vice versa.--The comparison, on the other hand, instituted by the pûrvapakshin is ill chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher depend on the latter's character as teacher, and that is not changed by his being either in the village or the forest.--Hence the two secret names have to be held apart.
Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We read, Kh. Up. I, 8, 5, 'The form of that person is the same as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of the other.'--But how does this passage convey the desired intimation?--By expressly transferring the attributes of the person within the sun to the person within the eye; for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon the attributes of the two as separated by the difference of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially enjoined to be so combined).--The conclusion therefore is that the two secret names are to be held apart.
In the khilas (supplementary writings) of the Rânâyanîyas we meet with a passage, 'Held together are the powers among which Brahman is the best; the best Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky 1,' which mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding together its powers, entering into the sky, &c. And in the
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Upanishad of the same (i.e. the Rânâyanîyas) we meet with vidyâs of Brahman among which the Sândilya-vidyâ is the first.--The question then arises whether the energies of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those Brahma-vidyâs or not. To the pûrvapaksha view that they are to be so inserted because they are connected with Brahman, the Sûtrakâra replies that the holding together and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the Sândilya-vidyâ and other vidyâs, for the same reason, i.e. on account of their being connected with different abodes. In the Sândilya-vidyâ, Brahman is said to have its abode in the heart, 'He is the Self within the heart' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the dahara-vidyâ, 'There is the palace, the small lotus (of the heart), and in it that small ether' (VIII, 1, 1). In the Upakosala-vidyâ again, Brahman is said to reside within the eye, 'That person that is seen in the eye' (IV, 15, 1). In all these vidyâs Brahman is described as residing within the body; it is therefore impossible to insert into them the energies of Brahman which the khila of the Rânâyanîyas mentions, and which are connected with the Devas (i.e. external nature).--But the vidyâs of the Khândogya likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected with the Devas; cp. e.g. III, 14, 3, 'He is greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds;' IV, 15, 4, 'He is also Bhâmanî, for he shines in all worlds;' VIII, 1, 3, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' And again there are other vidyâs of Brahman, such as the one which represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which not any special abode is mentioned.--True; but there is a special reason why the attributes stated in the Rânâyanîya-khila cannot be introduced into the other vidyâs. Particulars mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in vidyâs met with in another place if the latter are suggested to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing particulars; the qualities of holding together, however, on one side and those mentioned in the Sândilya-vidyâ, &c., on the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each
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other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other. The mere circumstance of all the particulars being connected with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyâs occurring in other places; for even in vidyâs which are avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman, although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers, meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under Sûtra 7.--The conclusion therefore is that the attributes of holding together its powers and so on are not to be inserted in the Sândilya. and similar vidyâs.
Footnotes
218:1 Vîryâ vîryâni parâkramabhedâh, anye hi purushâh sahâyân apekshya vikramân bibhrati tena tatparâkramânâm na ta eva niyat-apûrvatvarûpakâranatvena gyeshthâ bhavanti kim tu tatsahakârino ऽpi, brahmavîryânâm tu brahmaiva gyeshtham brahma gyeshtham yeshâm tâni tathâ brahma khalv ananyâpeksham gagagganmâdi karoti. Kim kânyeshâm parâkramânâm balavadbhir madhye bhaṅgah sambhavati tena te svavîryâni na bibhrati, brahmavîryâni tu brahmanâ sambhritâni avighnena sambhritâny ity arthah. Ân. Gi.In the Rahasya-brâhmana of the Tândins and the Paiṅgins (the Khândogya) there is a vidyâ treating of man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice, the three periods of his life with the three libations, his hunger and so on, with the dîkshâ, &c. And other particulars also are mentioned there, such as formulas of prayer, use of mantras and so on.--A similar fanciful assimilation of the sacrifice and man the Taittirîyakas exhibit, 'For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer,' and so on (Taitt. Âr. X, 64).--The doubt here arises whether the particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the Khândogya are to be inserted in the Taittirîyaka or not.
Against the view of the pûrvapakshin that they are so to be inserted because in both places we have a purusha-yagña, we maintain that they are not to be inserted because the characteristics of the purusha-yagña of the Khandogas are not recognised in the Taittirîya-text. This the Sûtra-kâra expresses by saying, 'As (the record of the followers of some Sâkhâs, viz. the Tândins and Paiṅgins, is) in the purusha-vidyâ, not such is the record of others,' viz. the Taittirîyakas. For the latter exhibit an identification of man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the
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[paragraph continues] Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter, the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c., are mentioned in succession; none of which particulars are mentioned in the Khândogya. The use also to which the Taittirîyaka turns the three libations is different from the Khândogya, And the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the identification of the Avabritha-ceremony with death, lose their significance side by side with the greater number of dissimilarities, and are therefore not able to effect the recognition of the vidyâ.--Moreover the Taittirîyaka does not represent man as the sacrifice (as the Khândogya does); for the two genitives ('of him who thus knows' and 'of the sacrifice') are not co-ordinate, and the passage therefore cannot be construed to mean, 'The knowing one who is the sacrifice, of him the Self is,' &c. For it cannot be said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the word. 1 The two genitives are rather to be taken in that way, that one qualifies the other, 'The sacrifice of him who thus knows, of that sacrifice,' &c. For the connexion of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the genitive, 'the sacrifice of him') is really and literally true; and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary metaphorical meaning. 2 Moreover the words next following in the Taittirîyaka-passage, 'the Self is the sacrificer,' declare that man (man's Self) is the sacrificer, and this again shows that man's relation to the sacrifice is not that of co-ordination. 3 Moreover as the section beginning with 'Of him who thus knows' forms an anuvâda of something previously established (and as such forms one vâkya to which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not bring about 'a split of the sentence' by interpreting it as
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teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and in the second place that the Self and the other beings enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see that the passage, 'Of him who thus knows,' &c., follows upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self coupled with samnyâsa, we apprehend that the Taittirîyaka-chapter is not an independent vidyâ but merely supplementary to the instruction previously given. In agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Taittirîyaka promises only one result for both chapters, viz. the one stated in the passage, 'He obtains the greatness of Brahman.'--On the other hand the text embodying the purusha-vidyâ in the Khândogya is an independent text; for we see that an independent result is attached to it, viz. an increase of length of life, 'He who knows this lives on to a hundred and sixteen years.'--Hence the particulars mentioned in the purusha-vidyâ of another Sâkhâ, such as formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be combined with the Taittirîya-text of the vidyâ.
Footnotes
221:1 And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken.221:2 Which latter would be the case if we should take the two genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative identification of the man and the sacrifice.
221:3 If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the sacrifice; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice.
At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Âtharvanikas the following mantra is recorded, 'Pierce him (the enemy) whole, pierce his heart: crush his veins, crush his head; thrice crushed,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Tândins we have the mantra, 'O God Savitar, produce the sacrifice.' At the beginning of that of the Sâtyâyanins, 'Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass,' &c.; at the beginning of that of the Kathas and the Taittirîyakas, 'May Mitra be propitious to us and Varuna,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Vâgasaneyins we have a Brâhmana-passage about the pravargya-ceremony, 'The gods indeed sat down to a sattra;' and at the beginning of that of the Kaushîtakins there is a Brâhmana-passage about the agnishtoma, 'Brahman indeed is the Agnishtoma, Brahman is that day; through Brahman they pass into
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[paragraph continues] Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.'--The point to be inquired into with reference to all these mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brâhmana-passages is whether they are to be combined with the vidyâs (contained in the Upanishads) or not.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that they are so to be combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to the Upanishad-portions of the Brâhmanas whose chief contents are formed by the vidyâs.--But we do not observe those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as subordinate members of the vidyâs!--True, but in spite of this we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected with the vidyâs. For we have no right to set aside the fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can be established on it.--But we are unable to see that the mantras have anything to do with the vidyâs, and how can it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the pravargya which scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices, and so on, stand in any relation to the vidyâs!--Never mind, the pûrvapakshin replies. In the case of mantras we can always imagine some meaning which connects them with the vidyâs; the first mantra quoted, e.g. may be viewed as glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the body are often represented, in the vidyâs, as abodes of meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c., may appropriately form subordinate members of those vidyâs. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be enjoined with reference to vidyâs, so, e.g. the mantra, 'I turn to Bhûh with such and such' (Kh. Up. III, 15, 3). Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion with other occasions; yet there is no reason why they should not also be applied to the vidyâs, just as the offering called Brihaspatisava is a subordinate part of the Vâgapeya-sacrifice 1.
To this we make the following reply. The mantras and
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ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion with the vidyâs, 'because their matter, such as piercing the heart, &c., is different (from the matter of the vidyâs),' and therefore cannot be connected with the latter.--But has it not been said above that the mantras may be connected with the meditations enjoined in the vidyâs, on the ground of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c.?--The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like; but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted, e.g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is therefore to be connected, not with the vidyâs of the Upanishads, but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The mantra of the Tândins again, 'O God Savitar, produce the sacrifice,' indicates by its very words that it is connected with some sacrifice; with what particular sacrifice it is connected has to be established by other means of proof. Similarly other mantras also--which, either by 'indication' (liṅga), or 'syntactical connexion' (vâkya), or some other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to certain sacrificial actions--cannot, because they occur in the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyâs on the ground of mere proximity. For that 'proximity,' as a means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enunciation (Sruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former science (i.e. in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ) under III, 3, 14. Of sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are primarily enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyâs with which they have nothing in common. The case of the Brihaspatisava, quoted by the pûrvapakshin, is of an altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member of the Vâgapeya, viz. 'Having offered the Vâgapeya he offers the Brihaspatisava.' And, moreover, if the one pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume
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it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the means of proof were not apprehended; but in our case this latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength and weakness of the various means of proof is fully apprehended (on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).--For these reasons the mentioned mantras and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collocation, to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyâs of the Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual collocation with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c. as well as the vidyâs have to be studied, &c. in the woods.
In the text of the Tândins we meet with the following passage: 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Râhu, I obtain self made and satisfied the uncreated world of Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 13). Again, in the text of the Âtharvanikas, we read, 'Then knowing, shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness, free from passion' (Mu. Up. III. 1, 3). The Sâtyâyanins read, 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.' And the Kaushîtakins, 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done' (Kau. Up. I, 4).--Of these texts two state that the man who has reached true knowledge rids himself of his good and evil deeds; one, that his friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respectively; and one finally declares that both things take place.
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This latter text calls for no remark; nor again that one which refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good and evil deeds; for in order that they may obtain those he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a man's shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by his friends and enemies, or not. Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied in the two passages mentioned--firstly because the text does not state it; secondly because what other Sâkhâs say about it falls within the sphere of a different vidyâ; and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good deeds is something done by the man himself, while the obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no right to supply the latter on the basis of the former.
To this we make the following reply. Although the text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added, because the statement concerning the latter is merely supplementary to the statement about the former, as appears from the text of the Kaushîtakins.--In reply to the arguments brought forward by the pûrvapakshin we offer the following remarks.
The separation of the different passages would indeed have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce an injunction about something to be done, which is contained in one text only, into some other text also. But in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of--and the act of obtaining--the good and evil deeds are not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely as implying a glorification of knowledge; the intended sense being, 'Glorious indeed is that knowledge through whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the samsâra, are shaken off by him who knows, and are transferred to his friends and enemies.' The passage thus being glorificatory only, the teacher is of opinion that,
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to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies--which in some passages is represented as the consequence of their being shaken off by the man who knows--must be supplied in those passages also which mention only the shaking off. That one arthavâda-passage often depends on another arthavâda-passage is a well-known fact; the following passage, e.g. 'The twenty-first indeed from this world is that sun,' would be unintelligible if no regard were paid to the other passage, 'Twelve are the months, five the seasons, three these worlds; that sun is the twenty-first.' Similarly the passage, 'The two Trishtubh verses are for strengthening,' necessarily requires to be taken in connexion with the other passage, 'Strength of the senses indeed is Trishtubh.' And as the statement about the obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own account), we need not insist too much on the question how the results of actions done by one man can be obtained by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is connected with their being got rid of by the man who knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge, the Sûtrakâra moreover indicates by making use of the expression, 'because the statement about obtaining is supplementary to,' &c.; for if he wished to intimate that the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man's good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyâs where it is not mentioned he would say, 'because the fact of obtaining.' &c. The Sûtra therefore, availing itself of the opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting.
The remaining part of the Sutra, 'Like the kusâs the metres, the praise and the singing, 'introduces some analogous instances.--The case under discussion is analogous to the case of the kusâs 1. Those, a mantra of the Bhâllavins
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[paragraph continues] ('You kusâs are the children of the tree, do you protect me!') represents as coming from trees in general, without any specification. The corresponding mantra of the Sâtyâyanins on the other hand is, 'You kusâs are the children of the Udumbara-tree;' a particularizing statement which must be considered as valid for the kusâs in general.--Another analogous case is that of the metres. In some places no special statement is made about their order of succession; but the text of the Paiṅgins, 'The metres of the Devas come first,' determines the general priority of the metres of the Devas to those of the Asuras 1.--Similarly the time of the stotra accompanying the performance of the Shodasin-rite which in some texts is left undefined is settled by the text of the Rig-vedins (ârkâh), 'when the Sun has half risen.'--And similarly a particularizing text of the Bhâllavins defines what priests have to join in the singing; a point left unsettled in other Srutis 2.--As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to define a general text by another more particular one, we should be driven to assume optional procedure (vikalpa), and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a well-known principle. This is stated in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras X, 8, 15.
The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as giving rise to a different discussion also, and the Sûtra can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The question can be raised whether the 'shaking' means the getting rid of one's good and evil deeds or something else.--The pûrvapaksha will in that case have to be established in the following manner. Shaking (dhû) here does not mean 'getting rid of,' since the root 'dhû' according to grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or trembling; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for
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instance, 'the flags are shaking' (dodhûyante). We therefore take the word in the same sense in the passages under discussion and understand by the 'trembling' of the good and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain time, with their results.
To this pûrvapaksha we make the following reply. The word 'shaking' has to be taken in the sense of 'getting rid of,' because it is supplemented by the statement of others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of.' And although only in some passages the statement about the obtaining is actually found in proximity to the statement about the shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason of decision (viz. that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of). Against the pûrvapakshin's view we further remark that good and evil deeds cannot be said to 'tremble' in the literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since they are not of substantial nature.--(Nor must it be said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking, the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it casts anything off, for) the horse when shaking itself shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking (which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly compares the shaking (off) of evil.--Nor do we when assigning different meanings to one and the same root enter thereby into conflict with Smriti (grammar). The clause 'this has been stated' we have already explained.
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The Kaushîtakins record in the paryaṅka-vidyâ how the man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way from his good and evil deeds, 'He having reached the path of the gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3), and later on (I, 4), 'He comes to the river Vigarâ and crosses it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil deeds.'--The question here arises whether in strict agreement with the text we have to understand that the deceased man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he departs from his body.
The letter of the text favouring the former alternative, the Sûtrakâra rebuts it by declaring 'at the going,' i.e. at the time of departing from the body the man frees himself, through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the words, 'On account of the absence of anything to be reached.' For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the way through his good and evil works, and we therefore have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced during a certain number of moments. We rather have to conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by the power of the latter; and that hence the moment of their destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the fruit of his knowledge (i.e. the world of Brahman).--The conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in the text of the Kaushîtakins.--Thus other Sâkhâs also, as that of the Tândins and Sâtyâyanins, declare that he frees himself from his deeds at an earlier stage; cp. the passages, 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,' and 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.'
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there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man's making an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually freeing himself) according to his liking.
Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way--after having departed from the body and having entered on the path of the gods--we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities; for after the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish, according to his liking, that effort which consists in self-restraint and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and consequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made--and its result takes place--at an earlier moment, viz. in the state in which man is able to effect it, and that in consequence thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds.
Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption moreover agrees with the statements of the Tândins and Sâtyâyanins.
In some scriptural texts the (dead man's) going on the path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing himself from good and evil; in other texts it is not mentioned. The doubt then arises whether the two things go together in all cases or only in certain cases.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the two are to be connected in all cases, just as the man's freeing himself from his good and evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his friends and enemies.
To this we make the following reply. That a man's going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only. His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men,
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in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'Shaking off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest unity,' refers to actual going through which another place is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason. For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not to be reached by a man transporting himself to another locality.
Our view of the matter, viz. that a man's proceeding on the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not in others, is justified by the following consideration. In meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the paryaṅka-vidyâ we see a reason for the man's proceeding on the path of the gods; for the text mentions certain results which can be reached only by the man going to different places, such as his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the path of the gods has anything to do with perfect knowledge. For those who have risen to the intuition of the Self's unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below, have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the body; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the gods would be purposeless.--The distinction is analogous to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach some village we have to proceed on a path leading there; but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain freedom from sickness.--The distinction made here will be established more carefully in the fourth adhyâya.
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(of the general subject-matter), according to scripture and inference (i.e. Smriti).
We have shown that the going on the path of the gods is valid only for the vidyâs of the qualified Brahman, not for the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of all qualities.--Now we observe that the going on the path of the gods is mentioned only in some of the qualified vidyâs such as the paryaṅka-vidyâ, the pañkâgni-vidyâ, the upakosala-vidyâ, the dahara-vidyâ; while it is not mentioned in others, such as the madhu-vidyâ, the sândilya-vidyâ, the shodasakala-vidyâ, the vaisvânara-vidyâ.--The doubt then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to be connected with those vidyâs only in which it is actually mentioned or generally with all vidyâs of that kind.
The pûrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of each particular section compels us to connect the going on the path of the gods with those vidyâs only which actually mention it. If we transferred it to other vidyâs also, the authoritativeness of scripture would suffer; for then anything might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the details about the path of the gods beginning with light and so on are given equally in the upakosala-vidyâ and the pañkâgni-vidyâ, which would be a useless repetition if as a matter of course the going on the path of the gods were connected with all vidyâs.
To this we make the following reply. The going on the path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected equally with all those qualified vidyâs which have exaltation (abhyudaya) for their result. The objection above raised by the pûrvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and Smriti. Scripture in the first place declares that not only those 'who know this,' i.e. the pañkâgni-vidyâ (Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who understand other vidyâs, 'and also those who in the forest follow faith and austerities.'--But how do we know that the latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other
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vidyâs? The text certainly speaks of those only who are intent on faith and austerities!--Not by faith and austerities alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be attained; for another scriptural passage says, 'Through knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge' (Sat. Brâ. X,5, 4,16). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities denote at the same time other vidyâs.--The Vâgasaneyins again read in the Pañkâgni-vidyâ, 'Those who thus know this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.' The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean, 'Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e. Brahman;' the term 'the True' being often employed to denote Brahman. And as those who know the pañkâgni-vidyâ are in the above passage referred to as 'those who thus know this,' we must understand the clause, 'and those who in the forest,' &c., as referring to men in the possession of other vidyâs. And, moreover, also the passage, 'Those, however, who know neither of these two paths become worms, birds, and creeping things' (VI, 2, 16), which teaches that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards, intimates that those who possess other vidyâs have to proceed either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers, and as their vidyâs are as such not different from the pañkâgni-vidyâ, we conclude that they proceed on the path of the gods (not on that of the fathers) 1
In the second place Smriti also confirms the same doctrine, 'These two, the white and the black path, are known as the eternal paths of the world; on the one man goes not to return, on the other he again returns' (Bha. Gî. VIII, 26).
With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details about the path of the gods are given in the Upakosala-vidyâ
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as well as the Pañkâgni-vidyâ, we remark that the repetition is meant to assist reflection.
For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods is not limited to those vidyâs in which it is actually mentioned.
The question here is whether for him who has reached true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted with the old one or not.--But an objection is here raised at the outset there is really no occasion for inquiring whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self from all bodies or not; not any more than there is room for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after the process of cooking has reached its due termination; or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or not. Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the inquiry proposed, as we know from itihâsa and purâna that some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new bodies. Tradition informs us, e.g. that Apântaratamas, an ancient rishi and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the order of Vishnu, born on this earth as Krishna Dvaipâyana at the time when the Dvâparayuga was succeeded by the Kaliyuga. Similarly Vasishtha, the son of Brahman's mind, having parted from his former body in consequence of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again procreated by Mitra and Varuna. Smriti further relates that Bhrigu and other sons of Brahman's mind were again born at the sacrifice of Varuna. Sanatkumâra also, who likewise was a son of Brahman's mind, was, in consequence of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda. And there are similar tales about Daksha, Nârada, and others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies. Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and arthavâdas of Sruti. Of some of the persons mentioned it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body had perished; of others that they assumed, through their
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supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old body remained intact all the while. And all of them are known to have completely mastered the contents of the Vedas.
On the ground of all this the pûrvapakshin maintains that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the cause of final release.
This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of the bodily existence of Aparantamas and others--who are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and the like--depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises nor sets, according to Kh. Up. III, 11, 1, 'When from thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He is alone, standing in the centre;' and as the present knowers of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment of those results of action, which have begun to operate, has come to an end, according to Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, 'For him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from the body;' so Aparântamas and other Lords to whom the highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last--although they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release--as long as their office lasts, their works not yet being exhausted, and obtain release only when their office comes to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to enable them to discharge their offices; passing according to their free will from one body into another, as if from one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties of their offices; preserving all the time the memory of their identity; they create for themselves through their power over the material of the body and the sense organs new bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession. Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they remember only the fact of their former existence (not their individuality); for it is known that they preserve the sense
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of their individuality 1. Smriti tells us, e.g. that Sulabhâ, a woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with Ganaka, left her own body, entered into that of Ganaka, carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of which are already in operation, other works manifested themselves, constituting the cause of further embodiments, the result would be that in the same way further works also, whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would take place, and then it might be suspected that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible since it is known from Sruti and Smriti that knowledge completely destroys the potentiality of action. For Sruti says, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); and, 'When the memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened' (Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2). And Smriti similarly says, 'As a fire well kindled, O Arguna, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes;' and, 'As seeds burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned.' Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignorance and the like are burned, the aggregate of works which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned, but partly keep the power of again springing up; not any more than the seed of the Sâli, when burned, preserves the power of sprouting again with some part. The aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once begun to develop themselves comes to rest through effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to the gradual cessation of its impetus; this in agreement with Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, 'For him there is only delay,' &c. We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is
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entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that nevertheless there is absolutely only one result of true knowledge.--In accordance with this, scripture declares that the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is equally final release, cp. 'So whatever Deva was awakened he indeed became that, and the same with Rishis and men' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover 1 it may be the case that (some) great rishis had attached their minds to other cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and that later on only when they became aware of the transitory nature of those results they turned from them and fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they obtained final release. As Smriti says, 'When the mahâpralaya has arrived and the highest (i.e. Hiranyagarbha) himself comes to an end, then they all, with well-prepared minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.'--Another reason precluding the suspicion that true knowledge may be destitute of its result is that that result is the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such results of action as the heavenly world and the like which are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a doubt; but not so in the case of the fruit of true knowledge, with regard to which scripture says. 'The Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 1), and which in the passage, 'That art thou,' is referred to as something already accomplished. This latter passage cannot be interpreted to mean, 'Thou wilt be that after thou hast died;' for another Vedic passage declares that the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete knowledge is attained, 'The Rishi Vâmadeva saw and understood it, singing, "I was Manu, I was the sun."
For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess true knowledge reach in all cases final release.
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akshara are to be comprehended (in all meditations on the akshara), on account of the equality and of the object being the same, as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained (in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).
We read in the Vâgasaneyaka, 'O Gârgî, the Brâhmanas call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor short, nor long,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). Similarly the Âtharvana says, 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste,' &c. (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6). In other places also the highest Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as that of which all qualities are to be denied. Now in some places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether the mental conception of these particular denials is to form part of all those passages or not.
To the assertion of the pûrvapakshin that each denial is valid only for that passage in which the text actually exhibits it, we make the following reply.--The conceptions of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all those passages, 'on account of the equality and on account of the same object being referred to.' The equality consists therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all attributes; and we recognise in all of them the same object of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be valid for all others also? To the present case the same argumentation applies which had been made use of under III, 3, 11. There positive attributes were discussed; here we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and negative attributes in one adhikarana) is due to the wish of explaining the differences in detail. The clause, 'as in the case of the upasads,' introduces a parallel case. For
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the Gâmadagnya-ahîna-sacrifice 1 the text enjoins that the upasad offerings are to consist of purodâsas. Now although the mantras accompanying the offering of the purodâsas are originally enjoined in the Veda of the Udgâtris (Tândya Brâ. XXI, 10, 11, 'Agni, promote the hotra,' &c.), yet they are to be enounced by the adhvaryu; for the offering of the purodâsas is the work of the adhvaryu, and subordinate matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the principal matter (i.e. the offering of the purodâsa). Similarly, in the case under discussion, the attributes of the akshara have, because they are subordinate to the akshara itself, to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever places the text may originally state them.--The principle of decision employed is explained in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras III, 3, 9.
The Âtharvanikas exhibit, with reference to the Self, the following mantra, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, i). The same mantra is found in the text of the Svetâsvataras (IV, 6). The Kathas again read, 'There are the two drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinakiketa-sacrifice.'--The doubt here arises whether the two sections introduced by these mantras constitute one vidyâ or two vidyâs. Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyâs, because the texts exhibit certain differences. For the mantra of the Mundaka and Svetâsvatara Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the other as not enjoying; while in the mantra of the Kathas
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both are said to enjoy.--As thus the objects of knowledge differ in character, the vidyâs themselves must be looked upon as separate.
To this we make the following reply. The vidyâ is one only because both mantras exhibit the character of the objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined by the number two.--But has not the pûrvapakshin shown that there exists a certain difference of character?--By no means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In the Mundaka-text the clause, 'The other looks on without eating,' intimates the highest Self which is raised above all desire; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the complementary passage, 'But when he sees the other Lord contented.' And the Katha-text intimates the same highest Self which is raised above all desire; only, as it is mentioned together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself metaphorically spoken of as enjoying; just as we speak of the 'men with the umbrella,' although only one out of several carries an umbrella. For that in the Katha-text also the highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to conclude from the preceding passage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that' (I, 2, 14), and from the complementary passage referring to the same Self, 'Which is a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable Brahman' (I, 3, 2). All this has been explained at length under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of knowledge only, the vidyâ also is one.--Moreover, if we carefully examine the context of the three mantras quoted, we observe that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness or separateness of vidyâs cannot be even raised, we have already shown above. The present Sûtra therefore merely aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical outcome of which is that any particulars stated in one of the texts only have to be supplied in the others also.
The Vâgasaneyins record, in the questions asked by Ushasta and by Kahola, the same passage twice in succession, 'Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden; the Self who is within all' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 1; 5, 1).--The question here presents itself whether the two sections introduced by the questions constitute one vidyâ only or two separate vidyâs.
Two separate vidyâs, the pûrvapakshin maintains; owing to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added nothing to--or took nothing away from--the contents of the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless. We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the separateness of the two vidyâs, just as in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be separate.
To this we make the following reply. As both texts equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting one vidyâ only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body there cannot be two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the element of fire within the element of water; but each of these elements is 'within all' in a relative sense only, not in the literal sense of the phrase.--Or else the 'like the aggregate of the elements (or beings)' of the Sûtra has to be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. Sve. Up. VI, 11, 'He is the one god, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra records that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings,
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the same holds good with regard to the two Brâhmana-passages. And the object of knowledge being one, the vidyâ also is one only.
The Vâgasaneyins record, in the questions asked by Ushasta and by Kahola, the same passage twice in succession, 'Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden; the Self who is within all' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 1; 5, 1).--The question here presents itself whether the two sections introduced by the questions constitute one vidyâ only or two separate vidyâs.
Two separate vidyâs, the pûrvapakshin maintains; owing to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added nothing to--or took nothing away from--the contents of the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless. We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the separateness of the two vidyâs, just as in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be separate.
To this we make the following reply. As both texts equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting one vidyâ only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body there cannot be two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the element of fire within the element of water; but each of these elements is 'within all' in a relative sense only, not in the literal sense of the phrase.--Or else the 'like the aggregate of the elements (or beings)' of the Sûtra has to be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. Sve. Up. VI, 11, 'He is the one god, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra records that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings,
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the same holds good with regard to the two Brâhmana-passages. And the object of knowledge being one, the vidyâ also is one only.
We yet have to refute the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyâs be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. In the sixth prapâthaka of the upanishad of the Tândins the instruction conveyed in the words, 'That is the Self, thou art that, O Svetaketu,' is repeated nine times, and yet the one vidyâ is not thereby split into many. Similarly in our case.--But how do you know that the vidyâ remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repetition?--Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding clauses show that all those passages have the same sense. For the repeated request on the part of Svetaketu, 'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two introductory questions and the equality of the concluding clauses, 'Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections refer to one and the same matter.--Moreover, in the second question the text adds the word: 'just' (eva), 'Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., which shows that the second question refers to the same matter as the first one. That the matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish by pointing out that the former section declares the existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the attributes of the Samsâra state, such as hunger, thirst, and so on.--The two sections, therefore, form one vidyâ only.
We yet have to refute the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyâs be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. In the sixth prapâthaka of the upanishad of the Tândins the instruction conveyed in the words, 'That is the Self, thou art that, O Svetaketu,' is repeated nine times, and yet the one vidyâ is not thereby split into many. Similarly in our case.--But how do you know that the vidyâ remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repetition?--Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding clauses show that all those passages have the same sense. For the repeated request on the part of Svetaketu, 'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two introductory questions and the equality of the concluding clauses, 'Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections refer to one and the same matter.--Moreover, in the second question the text adds the word: 'just' (eva), 'Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., which shows that the second question refers to the same matter as the first one. That the matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish by pointing out that the former section declares the existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the attributes of the Samsâra state, such as hunger, thirst, and so on.--The two sections, therefore, form one vidyâ only.
The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in the sun, 'What I am, that is he; what he is, that am I' (Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6). And the Gâbâlas say, 'I am thou indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.'--The doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this text is to be a double one 'by means of exchange' (i.e. whether the soul is to be meditated upon as âditya and âditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being meditated upon as âditya).
The pûrvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says, the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul's being the Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord's being the Self of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness of the Self.
To this we make the following reply. 'Exchange' is expressly recorded in the text for the purposes of meditation, just as other qualities (of the Self), such as its being the Self of all, &c., are recorded for the same purpose. For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation, 'I am thou,' and 'Thou art I.' Now this double enunciation has a sense only if a twofold meditation is to be based upon it; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning, since one statement would be all that is required.--But has not the pûrvapakshin urged above that this your explanation involves a lowering of the Lord, who is thereby represented as having the transmigrating soul for his Self?--Never mind, we reply; even in that way only the unity of the Self is meditated upon.--But does your explanation
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then not come to that of the pûrvapakshin, viz. that the double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness of the Self?--We do not, our reply is, deny that the text confirms the oneness of the Self; we only want to prove that, on the ground of the text as it stands, a twofold meditation has to be admitted, not a simple one. That this virtually confirms the unity of the Self we admit; just as the instruction about (the Lord's) possessing such qualities as having only true wishes, and so on--which instruction is given for the purpose of meditation--at the same time proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities.--Hence the double relation enounced in the text has to be meditated upon, and is to be transferred to other vidyâs also which treat of the same subject.
The text of the Vâgasaneyaka, after having enjoined the knowledge of the True, together with a meditation on the syllables of its name ('Whosoever knows this great glorious first-born as the true Brahman,' &c., Bri. Up. V, 4, 1), continues, 'Now what is the True, that is the Âditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye' (V, 5, 2).--The doubt here arises whether the text enjoins two vidyâs of the True or one only.
Two, the pûrvapakshin maintains. For the text declares two different results, one in the earlier passage, 'He conquers these worlds' (V, 4, 1); the other one later on. 'He destroys evil and leaves it' (V, 5, 3). And what our opponent may call a reference to the subject-matter under discussion, 1 is merely due to the circumstance of the object of meditation being the same (in the two vidyâs).
To this we make the following reply.--There is only one vidyâ of the True, because the clause, 'That which is the True,' &c., refers back to that True which is treated
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of in V, 4.--But has not the pûrvapakshin shown that the clause alluded to can be accounted for even on the supposition of there being two vidyâs?--The reasoning of the pûrvapakshin, we reply, would be admissible only if the separateness of the two vidyâs were established by some other clear and undoubted reason; in our ease, however, there is a general possibility of both (viz. of the vidyâs being separate or not), and the very circumstance that the mentioned clause contains a back reference to the True spoken of in V, 4, determines us to conclude that there is only one vidyâ of the True.--To the remark that there must be two vidyâs because the text states two different results, we reply that the statement of a second result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new instruction given about the True, viz. that its secret names are ahar and aham. Moreover, as in the case under discussion, the fruit of the vidyâ has really to be supplied from its arthavâda part 1, and as there is unity of vidyâ, all those fruits which the text states in connexion with the single parts of the vidyâ are to be combined and put in connexion with the vidyâ taken as a whole.--The conclusion therefore is that the text records only one vidyâ of the True, distinguished by such and such details, and that hence all the qualities mentioned, such as Truth and so on, are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.
Some commentators are of opinion that the above Sûtra refers (not to the question whether Bri. Up. V, 4 and V, 5 constitute one vidyâ but) to the question whether the Vâgasaneyaka-passage about the persons in the sun and in the eye, and the similar Khândogya-passage (I, 6, 6, 'Now that golden person who is seen within the sun,' &c.) form one vidyâ or not. They conclude that they do so, and that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in
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the Vâgasaneyaka are to be combined with the Khândogya-text also.--But this interpretation of the Sûtra appears objectionable. For the Khândogya-vidyâ refers to the udgîtha and is thus connected with sacrificial acts, marks of which connexion are exhibited in the beginning, the middle, and the end of the vidyâ. Thus we read at the beginning, 'The Rik is the earth, the Sâman is fire;' in the middle, 'Rik and Sâman are his joints and therefore he is udgîtha;' and in the end, 'He who knowing this sings a Sâman' (Kh. Up. I, 6, 1; 8; I, 7, 7). In the Vâgasaneyaka, on the other hand, there is nothing to connect the vidyâ with sacrificial acts. As therefore the subject-matter is different, the vidyâs are separate and the details of the two are to be held apart.
Footnotes
245:1 Viz. the clause in V, 5, 2, 'That which is the true,' which apparently--or really--connects the vidyâ of V, 5 with that of V, 4.246:1 For the vidyâ contains no explicit statement that a man desirous of such and such a fruit is to meditate on the True in such and such a way.--That in cases where the fruit is not stated in a vidhi-passage it must be supplied from the arthavâda-passages, is taught in the Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3, eighth adhikarana.
In the chapter of the Khândogya which begins with the passage, 'There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether' (VIII, 1, 1), we read, 'That is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose imaginations are true.' A similar passage is found in the text of the Vâgasaneyins, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the Prânas, the ether within the heart. In it there reposes the ruler of all' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).
A doubt here arises whether these two passages constitute one vidyâ, and whether the particulars stated in one text are to be comprehended within the other text also.
There is oneness of vidyâ 1.--Here (the Sûtrakâra) says, 'Wishes and so on' i.e. 'The quality of having true wishes and so on' (the word kâma standing for satyakâma, just
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as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhâmâ for Satyabhâmâ). This quality and the other qualities, which the Khândogya attributes to the ether within the heart, have to be combined with the Vâgasaneyaka-passage, and vice versâ the qualities stated in the Vâgasaneyaka, such as being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self free from sin, proclaimed in the Khândogya. The reason for this is that the two passages display a number of common features. Common to both is the heart viewed as abode, common again is the Lord as object of knowledge, common also is the Lord being viewed as a bank preventing these worlds from being confounded; and several other points.--But, an objection is raised, there are also differences. In the Khândogya the qualities are attributed to the ether within the heart, while in the Vâgasaneyaka they are ascribed to Brahman abiding in that ether.--This objection, we reply, is unfounded, for we have shown under I, 3, 14 that the term 'ether' in the Khândogya designates Brahman.
There is, however, the following difference between the two passages. The Khândogya-vidyâ has for its object the qualified Brahman, as we see from the passage VIII, 1, 6, 'But those who depart from hence after having discovered the Self and those true desires,' in which certain desires are represented as objects of knowledge equally as the Self. In the Vâgasaneyaka, on the other hand, the highest Brahman devoid of all qualities forms the object of instruction, as we conclude from the consideration of the request made by Ganaka, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' and the reply given by Yâgñavalkya, 'For that person is not attached to anything' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 15). That the text ascribes to the Self such qualities as being the Lord of all and the like is (not for the purpose of teaching that the Self really possesses those qualities, but is) merely meant to glorify the Self. Later on also (IV, 5, 15) the chapter winds up with a passage clearly referring to the Self devoid of all qualities, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' But as the qualified Brahman is (fundamentally) one (with the unqualified Brahman), we
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must conclude that the Sûtra teaches the combination of the qualities to the end of setting forth the glory of Brahman, not for the purpose of devout meditation.
We read in the Khândogya under the heading of the Vaisvânara-vidyâ, 'Therefore the first food which comes is in the place of Homa. And he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Prâna, saying Svâhâ' (Kh., Up. V, 19, i). The text thereupon enjoins five oblations, and later on applies to them the term 'Agnihotra;' 'He who thus knowing this offers the agnihotra,' and 'As hungry children here on earth sit round their mother, so do all beings sit round the agnihotra' (V, 24, 2; 4).
Here the doubt arises whether the agnihotra offered to the prânas is to be omitted when the eating itself is omitted or not.--As, according to the clause, 'The first food which comes,' &c., the oblation is connected with the coming of food, and as the coming of food subserves the eating, the agnihotra offered to the prânas is omitted when the eating is omitted.--Against this conclusion the Sûtra (embodying the pûrvapaksha) declares, 'It is not omitted.--Why?--'On account of the respect.' This means: In their version of the Vaisvânara-vidyâ the Gâbâlas read as follows: 'He (i.e. the host) is to eat before his guests; for (if he would make them eat first) it would be as if he without having himself offered the agnihotra offered that of another person.' This passage, which objects to the priority of the eating on the part of the guests and establishes priority on the part of the host, thereby intimates respect for the agnihotra offered to the prânas. For as it does not allow the omission of priority it will allow all the less the omission of that which is characterised by priority, viz. the agnihotra offered to the prânas.--But (as mentioned above) the connexion--established by the Khândogya-passage--of the oblation with the coining of food--which subserves the eating--establishes the omission of the oblation
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in the case of the eating being omitted!--Not so, the pûrvapakshin replies. The purpose of that passage is to enjoin some particular material (to be offered). For the fundamental agnihotra certain materials, such as milk and so on, are exclusively prescribed. Now, as through the term 'agnihotra' (which the text applies to the offering to the prânas) all the particulars belonging to the fundamental agnihotra are already established for the secondary agnihotra also (viz. the oblation made to the prânas), just as in the case of the ayana of the Kundapâyins 1; the clause, 'the first food which comes,' &c., is meant to enjoin, for the prânâgnihotra, some particular secondary matter, viz. the circumstance of food constituting the material of the oblation 2. Hence, considering the Mîmâmsâ principle that the omission of a secondary matter does not involve the omission of the principal matter, we conclude that even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the prânas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the Mîmâmsâ principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted.
To this pûrvapaksha the next Sûtra replies.
When eating is actually taking place, 'from that,' i.e. with that material of food which first presents itself, the agnihotra offered to the prânas is to be effected.--On what
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ground?--' On the ground of the passage declaring this.' For the clause, 'The first food which a man may take is in the place of a homa,' enjoins the circumstance of the oblations to the prânas being effected by means of a material (primarily) subserving another purpose (viz. eating), as appears from its referring to the presentation of food as something accomplished (i.e. accomplished independently of the oblations; not tending to accomplish the oblations). How then should these oblations--which are characterised as not having any motive power with regard to the employment of the food--be capable of causing us to substitute, in the absence of eating, some other material (than food)?--Nor is it true that there are already established, for the prânâgnihotra, all the details belonging to the fundamental agnihotra. In the case of the ayana of the Kundapâyins, the term 'agnihotra' forms part of the injunctive passage, 'They offer the agnihotra during a month,' and therefore may have the force of enjoining a general character of the sacrifice identical with that of the fundamental agnihotra; and it is therefore appropriate to consider the details of the latter as valid for the agnihotra of the Kundapâyins also. In the case of the so-called prânâgnihotra, on the other hand, the term 'agnihotra' occurs in an arthavâda-passage only, and does not therefore possess an analogous injunctive force. If, again, we admitted that the details of the fundamental agnihotra are valid for the prânâgnihotra also, such details as the transference of the fire (from the gârhapatya fire to the two other fires) would be likewise valid. But this is impossible, as the transference of the fire is made for the purpose of establishing a fireplace in which the oblations are made; in our case, on the other hand, the oblations are not made in the fire at all--because that would interfere with their being used as food, and because they are connected with a material procured for the purpose of eating,--but are made in the mouth (of the eater). Thus the text of the Gâbâlas also, 'He is to eat before the guests,' shows that the accomplishment of the oblation has the mouth for its abode. For the same reason (i.e. because the details of the fundamental agnihotra are
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not valid for the prânâgnihotra) the text declares the subordinate members of the agnihotra to be present here (i.e. in the prânâgnihotra) in the way of fanciful combination only, 'the chest is the vedi, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the Gârhapatya fire, the mind the Anvâhâryapakana fire, the mouth the Âhavanîya fire.' By the vedi mentioned in this passage we have to understand a levelled spot, as in the fundamental agnihotra there is no vedi, and as the intention of the passage is to effect a fanciful combination of the members of the fundamental agnihotra (with members of the prânâgnihotra).--And as the prânâgnihotra is connected with eating which has its definite times, it is also not possible that it should be restricted to the time enjoined for the fundamental agnihotra. In the same way other particulars also of the fundamental agnihotra, such as the so-called upasthâna, cannot be reconciled with the requirements of the prânâgnihotra. From all this it follows that the five oblations, as connected with their respective mantras, materials, and divinities, have to be performed only in the case of food being eaten.--With reference to the passage showing 'respect,' we remark that it is meant to intimate priority (of the host), in the case of food being actually eaten. But the passage has no power to declare that the offering of the prânâgnihotra is of permanent obligation.--It therefore is a settled conclusion that the prânâgnihotra is omitted when the eating of food is omitted.
We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain vidyâs which are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To this class belongs, e.g. the first vidyâ of the Khândogya Upanishad, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgîtha.'--We now enter on an inquiry whether those
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vidyâs are permanently connected with the acts in the same way as the circumstance of being made of parna-wood is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the guhû (the sacrificial ladle) is used; or if they are non-permanent like the vessel called godohana 1. The pûrvapakshin maintains that the meditations are permanently connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning performances. For they also do not stand under some special heading 2, and as they are connected with the sacrifice through the udgîtha and so on, they combine themselves, like other subordinate members, with the scriptural statements as to the performance of the sacrifice.
If against the doctrine of the meditations forming permanent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be urged, that in the chapters containing them special results are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations into independent acts), as e.g. in the passage, 'he indeed becomes a fulfiller of desires' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 7); we reply that those statements of results being given in the text in the present form only (not in an injunctional form), are mere
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arthavâda-passages--like the statement about him whose guhû is made of parna-wood hearing no evil sound--and thus do not aim at enjoining certain results.--Hence, just as the statement about being made of parna-wood--which does not occur under a definite prakarana--connects itself, by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice; so the meditations on the udgîtha, &c., also form permanent parts of the sacrifices.
To this we make the following reply. 'There is non-restriction of the assertions concerning them.' That means: the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as the udgîtha and so on--as e.g. that the udgîtha is the best of all essences (Kh. Up. I, 1, 3), the fulfiller of desires (I, 1, 7), a gratifier of desires (I, 1, 8),,the chief prâna (I, 2, 7), Âditya (I, 3, 1)--cannot be permanently connected with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent members are, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because scripture shows that they are not so permanently connected. For scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions (cp. the passage I, 1, 10, 'Therefore both he who knows this, and he who does not, perform the sacrifice'), and declares that even those priests, Prastotri and so on, who are devoid of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastâva and the like, do perform the sacrifices 'Prastotri, if you without knowing the deity which belongs to the prastâva are going to sing it,' &c. (I, 10, 9 and ff.).--The sacred text moreover declares that the vidyâs, founded on certain elements of sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those acts, viz. 'non-obstruction' in the accomplishment of the fruit of the sacrifice, i.e. a certain additional success of the sacrifice, cp. the passage I, 1, 10, 'Therefore he who knows this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful.' The declaration made in this passage
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that the performances of him who knows and of him who does not know are separate, and the employment of the comparative form ('more powerful') show that even the sacrifice destitute of the vidyâ is powerful. But how would that be possible if the vidyâ formed a permanent necessary part of the sacrifice? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid of that vidyâ could never be admitted to be powerful; for it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in the section treating of the meditation on the Sâman as the worlds and others: 'The worlds in an ascending and in a descending line belong to him,' &c. (Kh. Up. II, 2, 3).--Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be mere arthavâdas; for in that case they would have to be taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if understood to teach certain results they may be taken in their principal (i.e. direct, literal) sense 1. The case of the results which scripture declares to be connected with the prayâgas e.g. is of a different nature. For the prayâgas. are enjoined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the darsapûrnamâsa) which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as the offering of the prayâgas and the like), and hence subserve that sacrifice; so that the passage stating a fruit for the prayâgas has to be considered as a mere arthavâda-passage 2. In the case again of the quality of consisting of parna-wood--which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under a definite heading--no special result can be assumed; for as a quality is not an act, it cannot be connected with any result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of
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result, for it does possess such an abode--viz. the act of water being carried (in it)--with reference to which it is enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood; for this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case of the quality of consisting of parna-wood there is no such established abode under the heading of which that quality is enjoined; and if we assumed that the sentence ('He whose guhû is made of parna-wood hears no evil sound ') after intimating that the quality of consisting of parna-wood resides in the guhû is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof, we should impute to the text the imperfection called 'split of the sentence.'--The meditations on the other hand are themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunction; hence there is no reason why a special result should not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the meditations on the udgîtha, &c., although based on sacrifices, are yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel. For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sûtras have not represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial performances.
Footnotes
253:1 The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are permanently connected with the latter, i.e. are to be undertaken whenever the sacrificial act is performed, or not.--In the former case they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the parnamayîtva, i.e. the quality of being made of parna-wood, does. Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the guhû--the sacrificial ladle,--so the meditation on the syllable Om, e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable.--In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the sacrifice on certain occasions only, the upâsana is analogous to the godohana-vessel which is used in the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice instead of the usual kamasa, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for cattle.--See Pû. Mî. Sû. III, 6, 1; IV, 1, 2.253:2 Like the statement about the parnamayîtva of the guhû which the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular prakarana, but ex abrupto as it were; on which account it is to be connected with the sacrifice in general.
255:1 The statement as to the result of an action is a 'statement of a principal matter' if it is really meant to inform us that a certain result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a 'secondary matter' if it is only meant to glorify the action.
255:2 Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the prayâgas; for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the darsapûrnamâsa and have no special result of their own.
The section of the Vâgasaneyaka which begins, 'Voice held, I shall speak' (Bri. Up. I. 5, 21). determines Prâna to be the best among the organs of the body, viz. speech and so on, and Vâyu to be the best among the Devas, viz. Agni and so on.--Similarly in the Khândogya, Vâyu is affirmed to be the general absorber of the Devas, 'Vâyu indeed is the absorber' (IV, 3, 1), while Prâna is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body, 'Breath indeed is the absorber' (IV, 3, 3).--The doubt here arises whether Vâyu and Prâna are to be conceived as separate or not.
As non-separate, the pûrvapakshin maintains; because in
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their true nature they do not differ. And as their true nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon separately. Another scriptural passage also declares that the organs of the body and the divinities are non-different in their true nature, 'Agni having become speech entered the mouth,' &c. (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4). Moreover, the passage Bri. Up. I, 5, 13, 'These are all alike, all endless,' declares that the powers of the Devas constitute the Self of the organs of the body. And various other passages also testify to the fundamental non-difference of the two. In some places we have even a direct identification of the two, 'What Prâna is, that is Vâyu.' And in the sloka concluding the Vâgasaneyaka-chapter to which the passage under discussion belongs, the text refers to prâna only ('He verily rises from the breath and sets in the breath'), and thus shows the breath to be one with the previously mentioned Vâyu. This conclusion is moreover confirmed by the fact that the observance enjoined in the end refers to prâna only, 'Therefore let a man perform one observance only, let him breathe up and let him breathe down' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 23). Similarly, the Khândogya-passage, IV, 3, 6, 'One god swallowed the four great ones,' intimates that there is one absorber only, and does not say that one god is the absorber of the one set of four, and another the absorber of the other set of four.--From all this it follows that Vâyu and Prâna are to be conceived as one.
To this we make the following reply. Vâyu and Prâna are to be conceived separately, because the text teaches them in separation. The separate instruction given by the text with reference to the organs and the Devas for the purposes of meditation would be meaningless if the meditations were not held apart.--But the pûrvapakshin maintains that owing to the essential non-difference of Vâyu and Prâna the meditations are not to be separated!--Although, we reply, there may be non-difference of true nature, yet there may be difference of condition giving rise to difference of instruction, and, through the latter, to difference of meditation. And although the introduction of the concluding sloka. may be accounted for on the ground of its
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showing the fundamental non-difference of the two, it yet has no power to sublate the previously declared difference of the objects of meditation. Moreover, the text institutes a comparison between Vâyu and Prâna, which again shows that the two are different, 'And as it was with the central breath among the breaths, so it was with Vâyu, the wind among those deities' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 22).--This explains also the mention made of the observance (I, 5, 23). The word 'only' (in 'Let a man perform one observance only') has the purpose of establishing the observance with regard to Prâna, by sublating the observances with regard to speech and so on, regarding which the text had remarked previously that they were disturbed by Death ('Death having become weariness took them'), and does not by any means aim at sublating the observance with regard to Vâyu; for the section beginning 'Next follows the consideration of the observances' distinctly asserts that the observances of Vâyu and Prâna were equally unbroken.--Moreover, the text, after having said, 'Let a man perform one observance only,' declares in the end that the fruit of that observance is the obtaining of (union with) Vâyu ('Then he obtains through it union and oneness with that deity'), and thus shows that the observance with regard to Vâyu is not to be considered as sublated. That by that 'deity' we have to understand Vâyu, we conclude from the circumstance that what the worshipper wishes to obtain is non-limitation of his Self 1, and that previously the term 'deity' had been applied to Vâyu, 'Vâyu is the deity that never sets.'--Analogously in the Khândogya-passage the text represents Vâyu and Prâna as different, 'These are the two absorbers, Vâyu among the Devas, Prâna among the prânas,' and in the concluding paragraph also (IV, 3,8) refers to them as distinct, 'These five and the other five make ten, and that is the Krita.'--For these reasons Vâyu and Prâna are to be conceived as different.
The Sûtra compares the case under discussion to a
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parallel one from the karmakânda, by means of the clause, 'as in the case of the offerings.' With regard to the ishti comprising three sacrificial cakes, which is enjoined in the passage, Taitt. Samh. II, 3, 6, 'A purodâsa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the over-ruler, to Indra the self-ruler,' it might be supposed that the three cakes are to be offered together because they are offered to one and the same Indra, and because the concluding sentence says, 'conveying to all (gods) he cuts off to preclude purposelessness.' But as the attributes (viz. 'ruler' and so on) differ, and as scripture enjoins that the yâgyâ and anuvâkyâmantras are to exchange places with regard to the different cakes 1, the divinity is each time a different one according to the address, and from this it follows that the three offerings also are separate.--Thus, in the case under discussion, Vâyu and Prâna, although fundamentally non-different, are to be held apart as objects of meditation, and we have therefore to do with two separate meditations.--This is explained in the Saṅkarsha-kânda, 'The divinities are separate on account of their being cognized thus.'
But while in the case of the three purodâsas the difference of material and divinity involves a difference on the part of the oblations, we have in the case under discussion to do with one vidyâ only; for that the text enjoins one vidyâ only we conclude from the introductory and concluding statements. There is contained, however, in this one vidyâ a double meditative activity with regard to the bodily organs and the divinities, just as the agnihotra which is offered in the morning as well as in the evening requires a double activity. In this sense the Sûtra says, 'as in the case of the offerings.'
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mark) is stronger (than the general subject-matter); this also (has been explained in the Pû. Mî. Sûtras).
In the Agnirahasya of the Vâgasaneyins, in the Brâhmana beginning 'for in the beginning indeed this was not existent,' we read with reference to mind (manas),' It saw thirty-six thousand shining fire-altars, belonging to itself, made of mind, built of mind.' And, further on, the text makes similar statements about other fanciful fire-altars built of speech, built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of work, built of fire.--A doubt here arises whether these fire-altars built of mind and so on are connected with the act (i.e. the construction of the fire-altar made of bricks), arid supplementary to it, or whether they are independent, constituting a mere vidyâ.
Against the prima facie view that those agnis are connected with the sacrificial act under whose heading the text records them, the Sûtra maintains their independence, 'on account of the majority of indicatory marks.' For we meet in that Brâhmana with a number of indicatory marks confirming that those agnis constitute a mere vidyâ; cp, e.g. the following passages: 'Whatever these beings conceive in their minds, that is a means for those fire-altars,' and 'All beings always pile up those fire-altars for him who thus knows, even when he sleeps,' and so on 1.--And that indicatory marks (liṅga) are of greater force than the leading subject-matter (prakarana) has been explained in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ (III, 3, 14).
Your supposition, the pûrvapakshin objects, as to those fire-altars being not supplementary to the sacrificial act,
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but altogether independent of it, is untenable. The influence of the leading subject-matter rather compels us to conclude that the instruction given by the text about the agni made of mind and so on, enjoins some particular mode of the same agni which the preceding sections describe as the outcome of a real act 1.--But are not indicatory marks stronger than the leading subject-matter?--True in general; but indicatory marks such as those contained in the passages quoted above are by no means stronger than the general subject-matter. For as those passages are of the nature of glorifications of the fanciful fire-altars, the liṅgas (have no proving power in themselves but) merely illustrate some other matter (viz. the injunction to which those passages are arthavâdas); and as they are of that nature they may, there being no other proof, be taken as mere gunavâdas, and as such are not able to sublate the influence of the prakarana. On the ground of the latter, therefore, all those fanciful agnis must be viewed as forming parts of the sacrificial action.
The case is analogous to that of the 'mental' (cup). On the tenth day of the Soma sacrifices occupying twelve days--which day is termed avivâkya--a soma cup is offered mentally, the earth being viewed as the cup, the sea as the Soma and Pragâpati as the divinity to which the offering is made. All rites connected with that cup, viz. taking it up, putting it down in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking up the remaining liquid, the priests inviting one another to drink the remainder, and the drinking, all these rites the text declares to be mental only, i.e. to be done in thought only 2. Yet this mental quasi-cup, as standing under the heading of a sacrificial act, forms part of that act.--The same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made of mind and so on.
That those agnis enter into the sacrificial action follows
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moreover from the fact that the text extends to them (the injunctions given about the agni made of bricks). Compare the passage, 'Thirty-six thousand shining Agnis; each one of them is as large as the previously mentioned Agni.' Such extension of injunctions is possible only where there is general equality. The text therefore by extending the determinations relative to the previous agni, i.e. the agni built of bricks, which forms a constituent element of the sacrificial action, to the fanciful agnis, intimates thereby that they also form part of the sacrificial performance.
The word 'but' sets aside the pûrvapaksha.--The agnis built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as complementary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and constituting a vidyâ of their own. For the text expressly asserts that 'they are built of knowledge (vidyâ) only,' and that 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.'
The word 'but' sets aside the pûrvapaksha.--The agnis built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as complementary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and constituting a vidyâ of their own. For the text expressly asserts that 'they are built of knowledge (vidyâ) only,' and that 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.'
And that there are to be observed indicatory marks leading to the same conclusion, has already been declared in Sûtra 44.--But, under Sûtra 45, it was shown that indicatory marks unaided by other reasons cannot be admitted as proving anything, and it was consequently determined that, owing to the influence of the leading subject-matter, the Agnis form part of the sacrificial action!--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
Our opponent has no right to determine, on the ground of prakarana, that the agnis are subordinate to the sacrificial action, and so to set aside our view according to which they are independent. For we know from the Pûrvâ Mîmâmsâ that direct enunciation (Sruti), indicatory mark
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[paragraph continues] (liṅga), and syntactical connexion (vâkya) are of greater force than leading subject-matter (prakarana), and all those three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the agnis being independent. In the first place we have the direct enunciation, 'These agnis are indeed knowledge-piled only.' In the second place we have the indicatory mark supplied by the passage, 'All beings ever pile for him sleeping,' &c. And in the third place we have the sentence, 'By knowledge indeed those (agnis) are piled for him who thus knows.'
In the first of these passages the emphatical expression, 'built by knowledge only,' would be contradicted if we admitted that the agnis form part of the sacrificial action.--But may this emphatical phrase not merely have the purpose of indicating that those agnis are not to be accomplished by external means?--No, we reply, for if that were intended, it would be sufficient to glorify the fact of knowledge constituting the character of the agnis by means of the word 'knowledge-piled,' and the emphatical assertion (implied in the addition of the word 'only') would be useless. For it is the nature of such agnis to be accomplished without any external means. But, although the agnis are clearly to be accomplished without external means, yet it might be supposed that, like the mental cup, they form part of the sacrificial action, and the object of the emphatical assertion implied in 'only' is to discard that suspicion.--So likewise (to pass over to liṅga) the continuity of action implied in the passage, 'For him who thus knows whether sleeping or waking all beings always pile these agnis,' is possible only on the supposition of those agnis being independent. The case is analogous to that of the imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and breath, with reference to which the text says at first, 'He offers his breath in his speech, he offers his speech in his breath,' and then adds, 'These two endless and immortal oblations he offers always whether waking or sleeping' (Kau. Up. II, 6).--If, on the other hand, the imaginary agnis were parts of the sacrificial action it would be impossible for them to be accomplished continually, since
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the accomplishment of the sacrificial action itself occupies only a short time.--Nor may we suppose the passage (which contains the liṅga) to be a mere arthavâda-passage (in which case, as the pûrvapakshin avers, the liṅga would be unable to refute prakarana). For in those cases where we meet with an unmistakeable injunctory passage--marked out as such by the use of the optative or imperative form--there indeed we may assume a glorificatory passage (met with in connexion with that injunctory passage) to be an arthavâda. In the present case, however, we observe no clear injunctory passage, and should therefore be obliged to construct one enjoining the knowledge of the various fanciful agnis, merely on the basis of the arthavâda-passage. But in that case the injunction can be framed only in accordance with the arthavâda, and as the arthavâda speaks of the continual building of the agnis, the latter item would have to appear in the injunction also. But, if so, it follows (as shown above) that the mental construction of those agnis constitutes an independent vidyâ (and does not form part of the actual agnikayana).--The same argumentation applies to the second liṅga-passage quoted above, 'Whatever those beings conceive in their minds,' &c.--And the sentence finally shows, by means of the clause, 'For him who thus knows,' that those agnis are connected with a special class of men (viz. those who thus know), and are therefore not to be connected with the sacrificial action.--For all these reasons the view of those agnis constituting an independent vidyâ is preferable.
Independence has, against the general subject-matter, to be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, for that reason also that the text connects the constituent
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members of the sacrificial action with activities of the mind, &c.; viz. in the passage, 'With mind only they are established, with mind only they are piled, with mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgâtris praised, with mind the hotris recited; whatever work is done at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work, was done as consisting of mind, by mind only, at those fire-altars made of mind, piled by mind,' &c. For that connexion has for its result an imaginative combination (of certain mental energies with the parts of the sacrifice), and the obtainment of the parts of the sacrifice which are objects of actual perception cannot be made dependent on such imaginative combination 1. Nor must it be supposed that, because here also, as in the case of the meditation on the udgîtha, the vidyâ is connected with members of the sacrificial action, it enters into that action as a constituent part; for the statements of the text differ in the two cases. For in our case scripture does not say that we are to take some member of a sacrificial action and then to superimpose upon it such and such a name; but rather takes six and thirty thousand different energies of the mind and identifies them with the fire-altars, the cups, and so on, just as in some other place it teaches a meditation on man viewed as the sacrifice. The number given by the text is originally observed as belonging to the days of a man's life, and is then transferred to the mental energies connected therewith.--From the connexion (referred to in the Sûtra) it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.--The clause 'and so on' (met with in the Sûtra) must be explained as comprehending 'transference' and the like as far as possible. For if the text says, 'Each of those Agnis is as great as that prior one,' it transfers the glory of the fire-altar consisting of the work (i.e. the real altar piled of bricks) to the altars consisting of knowledge and so on, and thereby
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expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacrificial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of bricks (as was asserted by the pûrvapakshin in Sûtra 45). For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial action by means of those energies with which the original agni assists it, viz. by bearing the âhavanîya fire and so on.--The assertion, again, made by the pûrvapakshin (Sûtra 46) that 'transference' strengthens his view in so far as transference is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted by the remark that also on our view transference is possible, since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so far as both are fire-altars.--And that direct enunciation and so on favour our conclusion has been shown.--From connexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.--'As in the case of the separateness of other cognitions.' As other cognitions, such as e.g. the Sândilya-vidyâ, which have each their own particular connexion, separate themselves from works and other cognitions and are independent; so it is in our case also.--Moreover 'there is seen' an analogous case of independence from the leading subject-matter. The offering called aveshti which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of the râgasûya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the râgasûya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras).
51. Not also on account of its resembling (the mânasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an action); for it is observed (on the ground of Sruti, &c., that they are independent); as in the case of death; for the world does not become (a fire) (because it resembles a fire in some points).
Against the allegation made by the pûrvapakshin that the present case is analogous to that of the mânasa cup, we
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remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they may resemble the mânasa cup, since on the ground of direct enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action). Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or other; but in spite of that there remains the individual dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case is analogous to that of death. In the passages, 'The man in that orb is death indeed' (Sat. Brâ. X, 5, 2, 3), and 'Agni indeed is death' (Taitt. Samh. V, i, 10, 3), the term 'death' is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun; all the same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if the text says in another place, 'This world is a fire indeed, O Gotama; the sun is its fuel,' &c. (Kh. Up. V, 4, i), it does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.
With regard to a subsequent Brâhmana also, viz. the one beginning, 'That piled agni is this world indeed,' we apprehend that what is the purpose of the text is 'being of that kind,' i.e. injunction of a mere vidyâ, not injunction of the member of a mere action. For we meet there with the following sloka,' By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there, nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.' This verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former Brâhmana also, viz. the one beginning, 'What that orb leads' (Sat. Brâ. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of the fruit of knowledge ('Immortal becomes he whose Self is death'), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief thing.--The text connects the vidyâ (of the agnis built of
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mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those agnis are members of the act of building the real agni, but because many of the elements of the real agni are imaginatively combined with the vidyâ.
All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidyâ.
At present we will prove the existence of a Self different from the body in order to establish thereby the qualification (of the Self) for bondage and release. For if there were no Self different from the body, there would be no room for injunctions that have the other world for their result; nor could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self.--But, an objection is raised, already in the first pâda which stands at the head of this Sâstra (i.e. the first pâda of the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras) there has been declared the existence of a Self which is different from the body and hence capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the Sâstra.--True, this has been declared there by the author of the bhâshya, but there is in that place no Sûtra about the existence of the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sûtrakâra himself establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed of a preliminary objection. And from hence the teacher Sabara Svâmin has taken the matter for his discussion of the point in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge. For the same reason the reverend Upavarsha remarks in the first tantra--where an opportunity offers itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self--'We will discuss this in the Sârîraka,' and allows the matter to rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into the pious meditations which are matter of injunction, a discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order to show that the whole Sâstra depends thereon.
Moreover, in the preceding adhikarana we have shown that passages may be exempted from the influence of the leading subject-matter, and that for that reason the fire-altars
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built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man (not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof there naturally arises the question who that man is whose purposes the different fire-altars subserve, and in reply to it the existence of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed.--The first Sûtra embodies an objection against that doctrine; according to the principle that a final refutation of objections stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at.
Here now some materialists (lokâyatika), who see the Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate from the body does not exist; assume that consciousness (kaitanya), although not observed in earth and the other external elements--either single or combined--may yet appear in them when transformed into the shape of a body, so that consciousness springs from them; and thus maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no Self separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly world or obtaining release, through which consciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the reason stated in the Sûtra, 'On account of its existence where a body is.' For wherever something exists if some other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere quality of the latter; light and heat, e.g. we determine to be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, remembrance and so on--which by the upholders of an independent Self are considered qualities of that Self--are observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body only. The Self therefore is not different from the body.--To this conclusion the next Sûtra replies.
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body) because its existence does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not (non-separation); as in the case of perceptive consciousness.
The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body cannot be maintained. The Self rather must be something separate from the body, 'because the existence (of the Self) does not depend on the existence of that (i.e. the body).' For if from the circumstance that they are where the body is you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the body, you also must conclude from the fact that they are not where the body is that they are not qualities of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be different in character from the qualities of the body. Now the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may be viewed as existing as long as the body exists; life, movement, &c., on the other hand, do not exist even when the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by others; not so the qualities of the Self, such as consciousness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain their non-existence when the body does not exist; for it is possible that even after this body has died the qualities of the Self should continue to exist by passing over into another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis.--We further must question our opponent as to the nature of that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the elements; for the materialists do not admit the existence of anything but the four elements. Should he say that consciousness is the perception of the elements and what springs from the elements, we remark that in that case the elements and their products are objects of consciousness and that hence the latter cannot be a quality of them, as it is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well
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trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders. As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of the elements and their products, render them objects of itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not make their own colour or the colour of something else their objects; the elements and their products, on the other hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the organism) are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence in the same way as we admit the existence of that perceptive consciousness which has the material elements and their products for its objects, we also must admit the separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character (and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is permanent also; as also follows) from the fact that the Self, although connected with a different state, recognises itself as the conscious agent--a recognition expressed in judgments such as 'I saw this,'--and from the fact of remembrance and so on being possible 1.
The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive consciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where those are absent, without its following therefrom that perception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously
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the fact that perception takes place where there is a body, and does not take place where there is none, does not imply that it is an attribute of the body; for like lamps and so on the body may be used (by the Self) as a mere auxiliary. Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception; for in the state of dream we have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless.--The view of the Self being something separate from the body is therefore free from all objections.
Footnotes
271:1 The 'nityatvam ka' of the text might perhaps be connected directly with 'âtmano.' Ânanda Giri on the entire passage: Bhavatu tarhi bhûtebhyoऽtiriktâ svâtantryopalabdhis tathâpi katham âtmasiddhis tatrâha upalabdhîti, kshanikatvât tasyâ nityâtmarûpatvam ayuktam ity âsaṅkyâgânatas tadbhedâbhâvâd vishayoparâgât tadbhânâd asâv eva nityopalabdhir ity âha nityatvam keti, kim ka sthûladehâbhimânahînasya svapne pratyabhigñânâd atiriktâtmasiddhir ity âha aham iti, svapne sthûladehântarasyaivopalabdhritvam ity âsaṅkyâha smrityâditi, upalabdhrismartror bhede saty anyopalabdheऽnyasya smritir ikkhâdayas ka neti na tayor anyatety arthah.The above occasional discussion being terminated, we return to the discussion of the matter in hand.--We meet in the different Sâkhâs of each Veda with injunctions of vidyâs connected with certain members of sacrificial acts, such as the udgîtha and the like. Cp. e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgîtha' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold Sâman as the five worlds' (Kh. Up. II, 2, I); 'People say: "Hymns, hymns!" the hymn is truly this earth' (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 2, 1); 'The piled up fire-altar truly is this world' (Sat. Brâ. X, 5, 4, 1). A doubt here arises whether the vidyâs are enjoined with reference to the udgîtha and so on as belonging to a certain Sâkhâ only or as belonging to all Sâkhâs. The doubt is raised on the supposition that the udgîtha and so on differ in the different Sâkhâs because the accents, &c. differ.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the vidyâs are enjoined only with reference to the udgîtha and so on which belong to the particular Sâkhâ (to which the vidyâ belongs).--Why?--On account of proximity. For as such general injunctions as 'Let a man meditate on the udgîtha' are in need of a specification, and as this need is satisfied by the specifications given in the same Sâkhâ which stand in immediate proximity, there is no reason for passing over that Sâkhâ and having recourse to specifications enjoined
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in other Sâkhâs. Hence the vidyâs are to be held apart, according to the Sâkhâs to which they belong.
To this the Sûtra replies 'but those connected with members,' &c.--The word 'but' discards the primâ facie view. The meditations are not restricted to their own Sâkhâs according to the Veda to which they belong, but are valid for all Sâkhâs.--Why?--Because the direct statements of the texts about the udgîtha and so on enounce no specification. For to such general injunctions as 'Let a man meditate on the udgîtha'--which say nothing about specifications--violence would be done, if on the ground of proximity we restricted them to something special belonging to its own Sâkhâ, and that would be objectionable because direct statement has greater weight than proximity. There is, on the other hand, no reason why the vidyâ should not be of general reference. We therefore conclude that, although the Sâkhâs differ as to accents and the like, the vidyâs mentioned refer to the udgîtha and so on belonging to all Sâkhâs, because the text speaks only of the udgîtha and so on in general.
Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare certain vidyâs enjoined in one Sâkhâ to be valid for the udgîtha and so on belonging to other Sâkhâs also; for there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of acts which are enjoined in one Sâkhâ are taken over by other Sâkhâs also. So e.g. the members of certain Yagur-veda Sâkhâs do not exhibit in their text the mantra, 'Thou art the kutaru 1', which accompanies the taking of the stone (with which the rice-grains are ground); all the same we meet in their text with the following injunction of application, 'Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the stone; or else with the mantra, Thou art the kutaru.'
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Again, the text of some Sâkhâ does not contain a direct injunction of the five offerings called prayâgas which are made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction of secondary matters connected with the prayâgas, viz. in the passage, 'the seasons indeed are the prayâgas; they are to be offered in one and the same spot 1.'--Again, the text of some Sâkhâ does not contain an injunction as to the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agnîshomau--such as would be 'a he-goat is sacrificed to Agnîshomau 2;'--but in the same Sâkhâ we meet with a mantra which contains the required specification, 'Hotri', recite the anuvâkyâ, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat 3.' Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as 'O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice,' are seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the hymn, 'He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent,' &c. (Rik. Samh. II, 12), which although read in the text of the Bahvrikas is employed in the Taittirîya Veda also, according to Taitt. Samh. VII, 5, 5, 2, 'The Saganîya hymn is to be recited.'--Just as, therefore, the members of sacrificial actions on which certain vidyâs rest are valid everywhere, so the vidyâs themselves also which rest on those members are valid for all Sâkhâs and Vedas.
Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare certain vidyâs enjoined in one Sâkhâ to be valid for the udgîtha and so on belonging to other Sâkhâs also; for there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of acts which are enjoined in one Sâkhâ are taken over by other Sâkhâs also. So e.g. the members of certain Yagur-veda Sâkhâs do not exhibit in their text the mantra, 'Thou art the kutaru 1', which accompanies the taking of the stone (with which the rice-grains are ground); all the same we meet in their text with the following injunction of application, 'Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the stone; or else with the mantra, Thou art the kutaru.'
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Again, the text of some Sâkhâ does not contain a direct injunction of the five offerings called prayâgas which are made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction of secondary matters connected with the prayâgas, viz. in the passage, 'the seasons indeed are the prayâgas; they are to be offered in one and the same spot 1.'--Again, the text of some Sâkhâ does not contain an injunction as to the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agnîshomau--such as would be 'a he-goat is sacrificed to Agnîshomau 2;'--but in the same Sâkhâ we meet with a mantra which contains the required specification, 'Hotri', recite the anuvâkyâ, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat 3.' Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as 'O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice,' are seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the hymn, 'He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent,' &c. (Rik. Samh. II, 12), which although read in the text of the Bahvrikas is employed in the Taittirîya Veda also, according to Taitt. Samh. VII, 5, 5, 2, 'The Saganîya hymn is to be recited.'--Just as, therefore, the members of sacrificial actions on which certain vidyâs rest are valid everywhere, so the vidyâs themselves also which rest on those members are valid for all Sâkhâs and Vedas.
In the legend beginning 'Prâkînasâla Aupamanyava,' the text speaks of meditations on Vaisvânara in his distributed
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as well as his aggregate condition. References to him in his distributed state are made in the passage, 'Aupamanyava, whom do you meditate on as the Self? He replied: Heaven only, venerable king. He said: The Self which you meditate on is the Vaisvânara Self called Sutegas;' and in the following passages (Kh. Up. V, 12-17). A meditation on him in his aggregate state, on the other hand, is referred to in the passage (V, 18), 'Of that Vaisvânara Self the head is Sutegas, the eye Visvarûpa, the breath Prithagvartman, the trunk Bahula, the bladder Rayi, the feet the earth' &c.--A doubt here arises whether the text intimates a meditation on Vaisvânara in both his forms or only in his aggregate form.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that we have to do with meditations on Vaisvânara in his distributed form, firstly because the text exhibits a special verb, viz. 'you meditate on,' with reference to each of the limbs, Sutegas and so on; and secondly because the text states special fruits (connected with each special meditation) in the passage, 'Therefore every kind of Soma libation is seen in your house,' and the later similar passages.
To this we make the following reply. We must suppose that the entire section aims at intimating 'the pre-eminence,' i.e. at intimating as its pre-eminent subject, a meditation on 'plenitude,' i.e. on Vaisvânara in his aggregate state, who comprises within himself a plurality of things; not a number of special meditations on the limbs of Vaisvânara. 'As in the case of sacrifices.' In the same way as the Vedic texts referring to sacrifices such as the darsapûrnamâsa aim at enjoining the performance of the entire sacrifice only, i.e. of the chief sacrificial action together with its members--and not in addition the performance of single subordinate members such as the prayâgas, nor again the performance of the chief action together with some of its subordinate members; so it is here also.--But whence do you know that 'plenitude' is the preeminent topic of the passage?--It is shown by scripture, we reply, since we apprehend that the entire section forms a connected whole. For on examining the connexion of
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the parts we find that the entire section has for its subject the knowledge of Vaisvânara. The text at first informs us that six Rishis--Prâkînasâla, &c., up to Uddâlaka--being unable to reach a firm foundation in the knowledge of Vaisvânara, went to the king Asvapati Kaikeya; goes on to mention the object of each Rishi's meditation, viz. the sky and so on; determines that the sky and so on are only the head and so on of Vaisvânara--in the passage 'he said: that is but the head of the Self,' and the later similar passages;--and thereupon rejects all meditations on Vaisvânara in his distributed form, in the passage, 'Your head would have fallen if you had not come to me,' and so on. Finally having discarded all distributed meditation it turns to the meditation on the aggregate Vaisvânara and declares that all results rest on him only, 'he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs.'--That the text mentions special fruits for the special meditations on Sutegas and so on we have, in accordance with our view, to explain as meaning that the results of the subordinate meditations are to be connected in their aggregate with the principal meditation. And that the text exhibits a special verb--'you do meditate'--in connexion with each member is not meant to enjoin special meditations on those members, but merely to make additional remarks about something which has another purpose (i.e. about the meditation on the aggregate Vaisvânara).--For all these reasons the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation on the aggregate Vaisvânara only is preferable.
Some commentators here establish the conclusion that the meditation on the aggregate Vaisvânara is the preferable alternative, but assume, on the ground of the Sûtra employing the term 'pre-eminence' only, that the Sûtrakâra allows also the alternative of distributed meditation. But this is inadmissible, since it is improper to assume a 'split of the sentence' (i.e. to ascribe to a passage a double meaning), as long as the passage may be understood as having one meaning only. Their interpretation, moreover, contradicts those passages which expressly blame distributed meditations; such as 'Thy head would have
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fallen,' And as the conclusion of the section clearly intimates a meditation on the aggregate Vaisvânara, the negation of such meditation could not be maintained as pûrvapaksha 1. The term 'pre-eminence' which the Sûtra employs may moreover be explained as meaning (not mere preferability, but exclusive) authoritativeness.
Footnotes
274:1 As this passage states the number of the prayâgas (viz. five, which is the number of the seasons) and other secondary points, we conclude that the injunction of the offering of the prayâgas, which is given in other Sâkhâs, is valid also for the Sâkhâ referred to in the text (the Maitrâyanîyas, according to the commentators).274:2 But only says 'they offer an animal to Agnîshomau.'
274:3 Wherefrom we infer that not any animal may be offered to Agnîshomau, but only a he-goat.
277:1 Yadobhayatropâstisiddhântas tadâ vyastopâstir evâtra samastopâstir eva vâ pûrvapakshah syân nâdya ity âha, spashte keti, dvitîyas ka tatrâyukto vâkyopakramasthavyastopâstidhivirodhât, Ân. Gi.
In the preceding adhikarana we have arrived at the conclusion that a meditation on Vaisvânara as a whole is the pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results are stated for meditations on Sutegas and so on. On the ground of this it may be presumed that other meditations also which are enjoined by separate scriptural texts have to be combined into more general meditations. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of vidyâs (acts of cognition; meditations) as long as the object of cognition is the same; for the object constitutes the character of a cognition in the same way as the material offered and the divinity to which the offering is made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we understand that the Lord forms the only object of cognition in a number of scriptural passages, although the latter are separate in enunciation; cp. e.g. 'He consisting of mind, whose body is prâna' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 2); 'Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha' (Kh. Up. IV, 10, 5); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 3). Analogously one and the same Prâna is referred to in different texts; cp. 'Prâna indeed is the end of all' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3); 'Prâna indeed is the oldest and the best' (Kh. Up. V, 1, 1); 'Prâna is father, Prâna is mother' (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And from the unity of the object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor
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can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one pradhâna which is their common subject). Hence the different qualities which are enjoined in one's own and in other Sâkhâs, and which all belong to one object of knowledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition may be effected.
To this conclusion we reply, 'Separate,' &c. Although the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be considered as separate 'on account of the difference of words and the like.'--For the text exhibits a difference of words such as 'he knows,' 'let him meditate,' 'let him form the idea' (cp. Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). And difference of terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, according to Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras II, 2, 1.--The clause 'and the like' in the Sûtra intimates that also qualities and so on may be employed, according to circumstances, as reasons for the separateness of acts.--But, an objection is raised, from passages such as 'he knows' and so on we indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such clauses as 'he sacrifices' and the like (yagate, guhoti, dadâti). For all these words (viz. veda, upâsîta, &c.) denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind, and another meaning is not possible in their case 1. How then does difference of vidyâ follow from difference of words?--This objection is without force, we reply; for although all those words equally denote a certain activity of the mind only, yet a difference of vidyâ may result from a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord; and similarly, although one and the same Prâna is the object of meditation in the other series
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of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connexion there thus follows difference of injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separateness of the vidyâs. Nor can it be maintained (as the pûrvapakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction of the vidyâ itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities; for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidyâvidhi and which the gunavidhis), and as in each passage more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a vidyâ established elsewhere 1. Nor should, in the case of the pûrvapakshin's view being the true one, the qualities which are common to several passages, such as 'having true wishes,' be repeated more than once. Nor can the different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, because in each one a certain kind of meditation is enjoined on those who have a certain wish, whence we understand that the passage is complete in itself 2. Nor is there in the present case an additional injunction of a meditation on something whole--such as there is in the case of the cognition of the Vaisvânara--owing to the force of which the meditations on the single parts which are contained in each section would combine themselves into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cognition being one we should admit unity of vidyâ without any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether impossible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads). The Sûtra therefore rightly declares the separateness of the vidyâs.--The present adhikarana being thus settled, the first Sûtra of the pâda has now to be considered 3.
Footnotes
278:1 Vedopâsîtetyâdisabdânam kvakig gñânam kvakid dhyânam ity arthabhedam âsaṅkya gñânasyâvidheyatvâd vidhîyamânam upâsanam evety âha arthântareti. Ân. Gi.279:1 For to enjoin in one passage several qualities--none of which is established already--would involve an objectionable vâkyabheda.
279:2 A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but evince an âkaṅkshâ, a desire of complementation.
279:3 I.e. the present adhikarana ought in reality to head the entire pâda.
The difference of the vidyâs having been determined, we now enter on an inquiry whether, according to one's liking, there should be cumulation of the different vidyâs or option between them; or else restriction to an optional proceeding (to the exclusion of cumulation). For restriction to cumulation (which might be mentioned as a third alternative) there is no reason, because the separation of the vidyâs has been established.--But we observe that in the case of the sacrifices, agnihotra, darsapûrnamâsa and so on, there is restriction to cumulation (i.e. that those sacrifices have all of them to be performed, not optionally one or the Other) although they are different from each other.--True; but the reason for the obligatory cumulation of those sacrifices lies therein that scripture teaches them to be of absolute obligation. No scriptural passage, on the other hand, teaches the absolute obligatoriness of the vidyâs, and it cannot therefore be a rule that they must be cumulated.--Nor can it be a rule that there must be option between them, because a person entitled to one vidyâ cannot be excluded from another vidyâ. It therefore only remains to conclude that one may proceed as one likes.--But--an objection is raised--we must rather conclude that option between them is the rule, because their fruits are non-different. For vidyâs such as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prâna;' 'Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha;' 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true,' have all of them equally the obtaining of the Lord for their fruit.--This does not affect our conclusion; for we see that it is allowed to proceed as one likes also with regard to certain sacrificial acts which are the means of obtaining the heavenly world, and thus have all of them the same result. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in the case of vidyâs one may proceed as one likes.
To this we reply as follows. There must be option between the vidyâs, not cumulation, because they have the
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same fruit. For the fruit of all of them is the intuition of the object meditated upon, and when this object, e.g. the Lord, has once been intuited through one meditation a second meditation would be purposeless. It would, moreover, be impossible even to effect an intuition through the cumulation of several meditations, since that would cause distraction of attention. And that the fruit of a vidyâ is to be effected through intuition various scriptural passages declare; cp. Kh. Up. III, 14, 4, 'He who has this faith and no doubt;' Bri. Up. IV, i, 3, 'Having become a god he goes to the gods,' and others. Also Smriti-passages such as Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 6, and others.--One therefore has to select one of those vidyâs the fruit of which is the same, and to remain intent on it until, through the intuition of the object to be meditated upon, the fruit of the vidyâ is obtained.
The above Sûtra supplies a counter-instance to the preceding Sûtra.--We have, on the other hand, vidyâs connected with definite wishes; as e.g. Kh. Up. III, 15, 2, 'He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions never weeps for his sons;' Kh. Up. VII, 1, 5, 'He who meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as name reaches.' In these vidyâs which, like actions, effect their own special results by means of their 'unseen' Self, there is no reference to any intuition, and one therefore may, according to one's liking, either cumulate them or not cumulate them; 'on account of the absence of the former reason,' i.e. because there is not the reason for option which was stated in the preceding Sûtra.
Are those meditations--enjoined in the three Vedas--which rest on members of sacrificial actions such as the
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udgîtha to be superadded to each other, or may we proceed with regard to them as we like?--To this doubt the Sûtra replies, 'it is according to the abodes.' As the abiding-places of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on, are combined (for the performance of the sacrifice), so those meditations also. For a meditation is subject to what it rests on.
62. And on account of the teaching.
As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in the three Vedas, so also the meditations resting on them. The meaning of this remark is that also as far as the mode of information is concerned there is no difference between the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations referring to them.
The passage, 'From the seat of the Hotri he sets right any mistake committed in the udgîtha' (Kh. Up. I, 5, 5), declares that, owing to the might of the meditation on the unity of pranava and udgîtha, the Hotri sets right any mistake he may commit in his work, by means of the work of the Hotri.
Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is connected (with what is mentioned in another Veda) in the same way as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations on members of sacrificial acts--in whatever Veda they may be mentioned--have to be combined 1.
The text states that the syllable Om which is a quality,
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i.e. the abode of a meditation, is common to the three Vedas, 'By that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hotri recites, with Om the Udgâtri sings.' This suggests that, as the abode of the vidyâ (viz. the Omkâra) is common, the vidyâs which abide in it are common also.--Or else the Sûtra may be explained as follows. If the udgîtha and so on, which are matters qualifying the sacrificial action, were not all of them common to all sacrificial performances, the vidyâs resting on them would not go together. But the scriptural passages which teach the sacrificial performances and extend over all subordinate matters, state that the udgîtha and so on are common to all performances. As thus the abodes of the vidyâs go together, the vidyâs abiding in them go together likewise.
The words 'rather not' discard the pûrvapaksha. The meditations resting on members of actions are not to be treated like what they rest on, because scripture does not state their going together. Scripture actually states the going together of the Stotras and other subordinate members of sacrificial action which are enjoined in the three Vedas; cp. passages such as 'After the taking of the graha or the raising of the kamasa he performs the Stotra;' 'After the Stotra he recites;' 'Prastotri sing the Sâman;' 'Hotri recite the Yâgyâ for this; 'and so on. But, on the other hand, there are no analogous texts expressly teaching the going together of the meditations.--But the going together of the meditations is established by those texts which intimate the successive performance of the different constituent members of a sacrifice!--By no means, we reply. The meditations subserve the end of man, while the texts referred to by you establish only the going together of the udgîtha and the like which subserve the purpose of the sacrifice. That the meditations on the udgîtha and so on--although resting on
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members of sacrificial acts--yet subserve the end of man only in the same way as the godohana vessel does, we have already explained under III, 3, 42.--And this very difference between members of sacrificial action and the meditations resting on them, viz. that the former subserve the purpose of the sacrifice while the latter subserve the end of man, is founded on the express teaching of scripture 1.--And the further two indicatory marks (pointed out by the pûrvapakshin in Sûtras 63 and 64) supply no reason for the going together of the meditations, because no direct scriptural statement may be constructed from them. Nor 2 does the fact that in each sacrificial performance all foundations of meditations are comprised, enable us to conclude that the meditations founded on them are to be combined also; for the meditations are not caused by what they rest on. The meditations, as resting on their foundations, would, it may be admitted, not exist if those foundations did not exist. But therefrom it does not follow that the going together of the foundations implies a necessary going together of the meditations; for as to this we have no direct scriptural statement.--From all this it results that the meditations may be performed according to one's liking.
Scripture moreover shows that the meditations do not go together, viz. in the following passage, 'A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the priests' (Kh. Up. IV, 17, 10). For if all meditations were to be combined, all priests would know them all, and the text could not specially announce that the Brahman priest possessing a certain knowledge thereby saves the others.--The meditations may therefore, according to one's liking, be either combined or optionally employed.
(My humble salutations to Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
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