VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE
COMMENTARY BY SANKARÂKÂRYA.
(Brahma Sutras)
Translated by George Thibaut
Third Adhyâya. Fourth Pâda.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. The purpose of man (is effected) thence (i.e. through the mere knowledge of Brahman), thus Bâdarâyana opines.
The Sûtrakâra at present enters on an inquiry whether the knowledge of the Self which is derived from the Upanishads, is connected with works through him who is entitled to perform the works 1, or is an independent means to accomplish the purpose of man. He begins by stating the final view in the above Sûtra, 'Thence' &c. The teacher Bâdarâyana is of opinion that thence, i.e. through the independent knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the Vedânta-texts, the purpose of man is effected.--Whence is this known?--'From scripture,' which exhibits passages such as the following: 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief' (Kh. Up. III, 4, 1); 'He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'For him who has a teacher there is delay only so long as he is not delivered; then he will be perfect'(Kh. Up. VI. 14, 2); 'He who has searched out and understands the Self which is free from sin, &c. &c., obtains all worlds and all desires'(Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'The Self is to be seen' &c. up to 'Thus far goes immortality' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6-15). These and similar texts declare that mere knowledge effects the purpose of man.--Against this the opponent raises his voice as follows.
2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supplementary relation (to action), (the statements as to
the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are arthavâdas, as in other cases, thus Gaimini opines.
As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the Self also is connected with action through the mediation of its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the rice-grains with water; hence as the purpose of the knowledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere arthavâdas. Such is the opinion of the teacher Gaimini 1. The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, samskâras and works; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavâdas. Cp. the passage, 'He whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna-wood hears no evil sound;' 'By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy;' 'By making the prayâga and anuyâga-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he overcomes his enemies 2.'--But how can it be supposed that
the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of the means of proof--general subject-matter and so on--which determine such subordinate relation?--The pûrvapakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, on the ground of the means of proof called vâkya (sentence; syntactical unity) 1. But this we deny because in the present case 'sentence' has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacrifices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of 'sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application 2; but the agent is an intermediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on. the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice.--Your objection is not valid, the pûrvapakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible
were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there.--But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to the Self, such as 'free from sin,' and the like, it appears that the doctrine of the Upanishads refers to that Self which stands outside the samsâra and cannot therefore be subordinate to activity.--This objection too is without force; for what the Upanishads teach as the object of cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly referred to in such terms as 'dear' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand, may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of that Self.--But in more than one place Brahman, the cause of the world, which is additional to the transmigrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration has been established, and the Upanishads teach that this very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the transmigrating Self!--True, that has been established; but in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their refutation are again set forth with reference to the question as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self).
Footnotes
286:1 The contention of the pûrvapakshin--Gaimini--is that the knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This relation is mediated by the Self--the object of knowledge--which is the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modification (or purification, samskâra) they become fit to be used in the sacrifice.--As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and consequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as 'injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavâdas, making some additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary.
286:2 The material, i.e. the ladle made of parna-wood, is auxiliary to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz. hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of p. 287 the entire sacrifice. Analogously in the case of the samskâra--the anointing--which fits the sacrificer for performing the sacrifice, and in the case of the prayâgas and anuyâgas which are merely subordinate members of the darsapûrnamâsa.
287:1 The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole, in which the agent is the same.
287:2 Thus the quality of being made of parna-wood is connected with the sacrifices on the ground of the vâkya implied in 'yasya parnamayî guhûr bhavati,' because here we have as an intermediate link the guhû, i.e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices only, and therefore is not of too wide an application.
3. On account of scripture showing (certain lines of) conduct.
'Ganaka the king of the Videhas sacrificed with a sacrifice at which many presents were given to the priests' (Bri. Up. III, 1, 1); 'Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice' (Kh. Up. V, 11, 5); these and similar passages--which occur in sections that have another purport--show that those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial action also. And similarly we apprehend from the fact that according to scripture Uddâlaka and others taught their sons and so on, that they were connected with the condition of life of householders. If mere knowledge could effect the purpose of man, why should the persons mentioned have perforated works troublesome in many respects? 'If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should he go to the forest?'
4. Because scripture directly states that.
'What a man does with knowledge, faith and the Upanishad is more powerful' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 10): this passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to work 1, and from this it follows that mere knowledge cannot effect the purpose of man.
5. On account of the taking hold together.
'Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2); as this passage shows that knowledge and work begin together to manifest their fruits, it follows that knowledge is not independent.
6. And because scripture enjoins (works) for such (only as understand the purport of the Veda).
'He who has learnt (lit. "read") the Veda from a family of teachers, according to the sacred injunction, in the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the Guru; who after having received his discharge has settled in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred spot' (Kh. Up. VIII, 15); such passages also show that those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified for sacrificial action, and that hence knowledge does not independently bring about a result.--But the expression 'who has read' directly states only that the Veda is read, not that its purport is understood!--Not so, we reply. The reading of the Veda extends up to the comprehension of its purport, as thus the reading has a visible purpose 2.
7. And on account of definite rules.
'Performing works here (i.e. in this life) let a man wish to live a hundred years; thus work will not cling to thee, man; there is no other way than that' (Îsa. Up. 2); 'The
[paragraph continues] Agnihotra is a sattra lasting up to old age and death; for through old age one is freed from it or through death' (Sat. Brâ. XII, 4, 1, 1); from such definite rules also it follows that knowledge is merely supplementary to works.
Against all these objections the Sûtrakâra upholds his view in the following Sûtra.
8. But on account of (scripture teaching) the additional one (i.e. the Lord), (the view) of Bâdarâyana (is valid); as that is seen thus (in scriptural passages).
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.--The assertion made in Sûtra 2 cannot be maintained 'on account of the text teaching the additional one.' If the Vedânta-texts taught that the transmigrating embodied Self which is an agent and enjoyer is something different from the mere body, the statements as to the fruit of the knowledge of the Self would, for the reasons indicated above, be mere arthavâdas. But what the Vedânta-texts really teach as the object of knowledge is something different from the embodied Self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is free from all attributes of transmigratory existence such as agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin and so on, the highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self does not only not promote action but rather cuts all action short, as will be declared in Sûtra 16. Hence the view of the reverend Bâdarâyana which was stated in Sûtra 1 remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning about the subordination of knowledge to action and the like. That the Lord who is superior to the embodied Self is the Self many scriptural texts declare; compare 'He who perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'It is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2); 'By the command of that imperishable one, O Gârgî' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3). There are indeed passages in
which the transmigrating Self--hinted at by such terms as 'dear'--is referred to as the object of knowledge, such as 'But for the love of the Self everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He who breathes in the up-breathing he is thy Self and within all' (Bri. Up. III, 4, i); 'The person that is seen in the eye that is thy Self,' up to 'But I shall explain him further to you' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7 ff). But as there are at the same time complementary passages connected with the passages quoted above--viz. 'There has been breathed forth from this great Being the Rig-veda., Yagur-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 10); 'He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow, passion, old age and death' (Bri. Up. III, 5, i); 'Having approached the highest light he appears in his own form. That is the highest person' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3)--which aim at giving instruction about the superior Self; it follows that the two sets of passages do not mean to teach an absolute difference of the two Selfs and that thus contradiction is avoided. For the Self of the highest Lord is the real nature of the embodied Self, while the state of being embodied is due to the limiting adjuncts, as appears from scriptural passages such as 'Thou art that;' 'There is no other seer but he.' All which has been demonstrated by us at length in the earlier parts of this commentary in more than one place.
9. But the declarations (of scripture) are equal (on the other side).
In reply to the averment made in Sûtra 3, we point out that there are declarations of scripture, of equal weight, in favour of the view that knowledge is not complementary to action. For there are scriptural passages such as, 'Knowing this the rishis descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the Ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra;' and 'When Brâhmanas know that Self and have risen above the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as mendicants' (Bri. Up. III, 5). Scripture moreover shows that
[paragraph continues] Yâgñavalkya and others who knew Brahman did not take their stand on works. 'Thus far goes immortality. Having said so Yâgñavalkya went away into the forest' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). With reference to the indicatory sign (as to the dependence of knowledge to work) which is implied in the passage, 'Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice,' we remark that it belongs to a section which treats of Vaisvânara. Now, the text may declare that a vidyâ of Brahman as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works; but all the same the vidyâ does not stand in a subordinate relation to works since 'leading subject-matter' and the other means of proof are absent.
We now reply to the averment made in Sûtra 4.
10. (The direct statement is) non-comprehensive.
The direct scriptural statement implied in 'What a man does with knowledge' &c. does not refer to all knowledge, as it is connected with the knowledge forming the subject-matter of the section. And the latter is the knowledge of the udgîtha only, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgîtha.'
11. There is distribution (of the work and knowledge) as in the case of the hundred.
In reply to the averment (Sûtra 5) that the passage, 'Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him,' indicates the non-independence of knowledge, we point out that the passage must be understood in a distributed sense, knowledge taking hold of one man and work of another. The case is analogous to that of the 'hundred.' When it is said, 'Let a hundred be given to these two men,' the hundred are divided in that way that fifty are given to one man and fifty to the other.--Moreover what the text says about the laying hold does not refer to him who is about to obtain final release; for the concluding passage, 'So much for the man who desires,' indicates that the whole section refers to the soul implicated in the samsâra, and a new beginning is made for him who is about to be released, in the clause. 'But as to the man who does not
desire.' The clause about the laying hold thus comprises all knowledge which falls within the sphere of the transmigrating soul whether it be enjoined or prohibited 1, since there is no reason for distinction, and to all action whether enjoined or prohibited, the clause embodying a reference to knowledge and work as established elsewhere. And on this interpretation there is room for the clause even without our having recourse to the distribution of knowledge and work.
The next Sûtra replies to the averment made in Sûtra 6.
12. Of him who has merely read the Veda (there is qualification for works).
As the clause, 'Having learnt (read) the Veda from a family of teachers,' speaks only of the reading, we determine that acts are there enjoined for him who has only read the Veda.--But from this it would follow that on account of being destitute of knowledge such a person would not be qualified for works!--Never mind; we do not mean to deny that the understanding of sacrificial acts which springs from the reading of the texts is the cause of qualification for their performance; we only wish to establish that the knowledge of the Self derived from the Upanishads is seen to have an independent purpose of its own and therefore does not supply a reason of qualification for acts. Analogously a person who is qualified for one act does not require the knowledge of another act.
Against the reasoning of Sûtra 7 we make the following remark.
13. There being no specification (the rule does) not (specially apply to him who knows).
In passages such as 'Performing works here let a man live' &c., which state definite rules, there is no specification
of him who knows, since the definite rule is enjoined without any such specification.
14. Or else the permission (of works) is for the glorification (of knowledge).
The passage 'Performing works here' may be treated in another way also. Even if, owing to the influence of the general subject-matter, only he who knows is to be viewed as he who performs works, yet the permission to perform works must be viewed as aiming at the glorification of knowledge; as appears from the subsequent clause, 'no work clings to the man.' The meaning of the entire passage thus is: To a man who knows no work will cling, should he perform works during his whole life even, owing to the power of knowledge. And this clearly glorifies knowledge.
15. Some also by proceeding according to their liking (evince their disregard of anything but knowledge).
Moreover some who know, having obtained the intuition of the fruit of knowledge, express, in reliance thereon, the purposelessness of the means of all other results, viz. by proceeding according to their liking (and abandoning those means). A scriptural text of the Vâgasaneyins runs as follows: 'Knowing this the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this Self and this world' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). And that the fruit of knowledge, being present to intuition, does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits of actions do, we have explained more than once. From this also it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to action, and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense.
16. And (scripture teaches) the destruction (of the qualification for works, by knowledge).
Moreover scripture teaches that this whole apparent world-which springs from Nescience, is characterised by
actions, agents and results of actions and is the cause of all qualification for works--is essentially destroyed by the power of knowledge. Compare such passages as 'But when all has become the Self of him, wherewith should he see another, wherewith should he smell another?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). For him now who should teach that the qualification for works has for its necessary antecedent the knowledge of the Self which the Vedânta-texts teach, it would follow that the qualification for works is cut short altogether. From this also it follows that knowledge is independent.
17. And (knowledge belongs) to those who are bound to chastity; for in scripture (that condition of life is mentioned).
Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for those stages of life for which chastity is prescribed. Now in their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work because work is absent; for the works prescribed by the Veda such as the Agnihotra are no longer performed by men who have reached those stages.--But, an objection is raised, those stages of life are not even mentioned in the Veda!--This is not so, we reply. Certain Vedic passages clearly intimate them; so e.g. 'There are three branches of the law' (Kh. Up. II, 23, 1); 'Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 1); 'Those who practise penance and faith in the forest' (Mu. Up. I, 10, 11); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'Let him wander forth at once from the state of studentship.'--That the stages requiring chastity are open to men whether they have reached householdership or not, and whether they have paid the debts (of procreating a son, &c.) or not, is known from scripture and Smriti. Herefrom also follows the independence of knowledge.
18. Gaimini (considers that scriptural passages mentioning those stages of life in which chastity is obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages);
they are not injunctions; for (other scriptural passages) forbid (those stages).
The Vedic texts which have been quoted to the end of showing the existence of the stages of life on which chastity is binding-such as 'There are three branches of the law' and so on--have no power to establish those stages. For the teacher Gaimini is of opinion that those passages contain only a reference to the other stages of life, not an injunction (of them).--Why?--Because they contain no words expressive of injunction such as imperative verbal forms, and because each of them is seen to have some other purport. In the passage, 'There are three' &c., the text at first refers to three stages of life ('Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first' &c. &c.), thereupon declares them not to have unbounded results ('All these obtain the world of the blessed'), and finally glorifies 'the state of being grounded on Brahman' as having unbounded results ('the Brahmasamstha obtains immortality').--But is not a mere reference even sufficient to intimate the existence of those stages of life?--True; but they are established (enjoined) not by direct scriptural statements, but only by Smriti and custom, and therefore when contradicted by direct scriptural statement 1 are either to be disregarded or else to be viewed as concerning those who (for some reason or other) are disqualified (for active worship, sacrifices and the like).--But together with the stages demanding chastity the text refers to the condition of the householder also 2. ('Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first.')--True; but the existence of the state of the householder is established (not by that passage but) by other scriptural passages, viz. those which enjoin on the householder certain works such as the Agnihotra. Hence the reference in the passage under discussion aims at glorification only, not at injunction.
[paragraph continues] Moreover, direct scriptural enunciations forbid other stages of life; cp. 'A murderer of the gods is he who removes the fire;' 'After having brought to thy teacher his proper reward do not cut off the line of children' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 1); 'To him who is without a son the world does not belong; all beasts even know that.'--Similarly the passages, 'Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), and the analogous passage (from the Mundaka), contain instruction not about the other stages of life but about the going on the path of the gods. And of clauses such as 'austerity is the second' it is doubtful whether they speak of a stage of life at all. And a passage like 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth,' does not enjoin the wandering forth but merely glorifies that world. But there is at any rate one scriptural text which directly and unambiguously enjoins the condition of life of the wandering mendicant, viz. the one of the Gâbâlas, 'Let him wander forth at once from the state of studentship.'--True, but our discussion is carried on without reference to that passage.
19. (The other stage of life) is to be accomplished, (according to) Bâdarâyana; on account of the scriptural statement of equality.
The teacher Bâdarâyana is of opinion that that other stage of life is something to be accomplished. The view that there is a contradiction because the other stage of life is stated in the Veda and, on the other hand, works such as the Agnihotra must necessarily be performed, and that, in order to remove this contradiction, that other stage of life must be entered upon by those only who are not qualified for active worship, he rejects; being of opinion that that other stage is to be entered upon, in the same way as the state of the householder, even by him who does not wish to do so.--On what ground?--'On account of the scriptural statement of equality.' For we have a passage (viz. 'There are three branches of the law,' &c.) which refers equally to that other stage as to the state of the householder. As the state of the householder which
is enjoined in other passages only is here referred to, so also that other stage of life. The case is analogous to the reference made to the wearing of the sacrificial thread round the neck or on the right shoulder--which two modes are established in other scriptural passages--in a passage the purpose of which it is to enjoin the wearing of the thread on the left shoulder. The other stage must therefore be entered upon in the same way as the state of the householder.--Analogously in the passage, 'Wishing for that world only mendicants leave their homes,' the last stage of life is mentioned together with the study of the Veda, sacrifice and so on, and in the passage, 'Those who in the forest,' &c., with the knowledge of the five fires.--The remark, made above by the pûrvapakshin, that in such passages as 'austerity is the second' there is unambiguous reference to a further stage of life, is without force, since there is a reason enabling us to determine what is meant. The text proclaims in the beginning that there are three subdivisions ('There are three branches of the law'). Now the sacrifice and the other duties (which the text enumerates subsequently to the introductory clause) can, because they are more than three, and rest on separate originative injunctions, be comprised within the three branches only if they are connected with one of the stages of life. Now the terms 'sacrifice' and so on indicate that the stage of householdership constitutes one branch of the law, and the term 'Brahmakârin' clearly denotes another stage; what then remains but to assume that the term 'austerity' also denotes a stage of life, viz. the one in which austerity is the chief thing? Analogously the reference to the forest--in the passage, 'Those who in the forest,'--indicates that by the austerity and faith mentioned there we have to understand that stage of life in which austerity and faith are the chief thing.--From all this it follows that the further stage of life has to be gone through, even if the passage under discussion should do nothing but refer to it.
20. Or (the passage rather is) an injunction, as in the case of the carrying (of the firewood).
Or the passage is rather to be understood as containing an injunction, not a mere reference.--But, an objection is raised, if we assume it to be an injunction we thereby oppose the conception of the entire passage as a coherent whole, while yet the passage has clearly to be conceived as constituting such a whole, viz. as meaning that while the three branches of the law have for their result the world of the blessed, the condition of being grounded in Brahman has immortality for its result.--True, but all the same we must set aside the conception of the passage as a whole--well founded as it is--and assume it to be an injunction. For it is a new injunction because no other injunction is observed, and as the conception of the other stage of life clearly arises from the passage it is impossible to interpret it as a coherent whole by means of the assumption that it is a mere gunavâda 1.
The case is analogous to that of the 'carrying.' There is a scriptural text (relating to the Agnihotra which forms part of the mahâpitriyagña), 'Let him approach carrying the firewood below (the ladle holding the offering); for above he carries it for the gods.' Now this passage may be conceived as an unbroken whole if we view it as referring to the carrying below only; nevertheless we determine that it enjoins the carrying above because that
is not enjoined anywhere else 1. This is explained in the chapter treating of 'complement,' in the Sûtra, 'But it is an injunction,' &c. (Pû. Mîm. Sû.). In the same way we assume that our passage referring to the different âsramas is an injunctory passage only.
Even if (to state an alternative conclusion) the passage contains references only to the other âsramas, it must be viewed as enjoining at any rate the condition of being grounded in Brahman, owing to the glorification of that condition. The question here arises whether that state belongs to any one comprised within the four âsramas, or only to the wandering mendicant. If now a reference to the mendicant also is contained within the references to the âsramas up to the Brahmakârin (i.e. the three âsramas the text refers to before the passage about the brahmasamstha); then, as all four âsramas are referred to equally and as somebody not belonging to any âsrama could not possibly be called brahmasamstha, it follows that the term 'brahmasamstha' denotes any one standing within one of the four âsramas. If, on the other hand, the mendicant is not comprised within the references to the three âsramas, he alone remains, and this establishes the conclusion that the brahmasamstha is the mendicant only. (We therefore have to inquire which of the two alternatives stated has to be adopted.)--Here some maintain that the term 'austerity' which denotes the hermit in the woods implies a reference to the mendicant also. But this is wrong. For as long as any other explanation is possible, we must not assume that a term which expresses a distinctive attribute of the hermits living in the forest comprises the wandering mendicants also. Both the Brahmakârin and the householder are
referred to by distinctive terms applying to them only, and we therefore expect that the mendicant and the hermit also should be referred to by analogous terms. Now 'austerity' is a distinctive attribute of the hermits living in the woods; for the principal conventional meaning of the word 'austerity' is mortification of the body. The distinctive attribute of the mendicant, on the other hand, viz. restraint of the senses and so on, cannot be denoted by the term 'austerity.' Moreover it would be an illegitimate assumption that the âsramas which are known to be four should here be referred to as three. And further the text notifies a distinction, viz. by saying that those three reach the world of the blessed, while one enjoys immortality. Now there is room for such a distinction if the hermits and the mendicants are separate; for we do not say 'Devadatta and Yagñadatta are stupid, but one of them is clever,' but we say 'Devadatta and Yagñadatta are stupid, but Vishnumitra is clever.' The passage therefore has to be understood in that sense, that those belonging to the three former âsramas obtain the world of the blessed, while the remaining one, i.e. the wandering mendicant, enjoys immortality.--But how can the term 'brahmasamstha,' which according to its etymological meaning may be applied to members of all âsramas, be restricted to the mendicant? and, if we agree to take it in its conventional meaning, it follows that immortality may be reached by merely belonging to an âsrama, and hence that knowledge is useless!--To these objections we make the following reply. The term 'brahmasamstha' denotes fulfilment in Brahman, a state of being grounded in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activity. Now such a state is impossible for persons belonging to the three former âsramas, as scripture declares that they suffer loss through the non-performance of the works enjoined on their âsrama. The mendicant, on the other hand, who has discarded all works can suffer no loss owing to non-performance. Such duties as are incumbent on him, viz. restraint of the senses and the like, arc not opposed to the state of being grounded in Brahman, but rather helpful
to it. For the only work enjoined on him by his âsrama. is the state of being firmly grounded in Brahman, wherein he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on--just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other âsramas--and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work. In agreement herewith texts from scripture and Smriti declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman there are no works. Compare 'Renunciation is Brahman; for Brahman is the highest; for the highest is Brahman; above those lower penances, indeed, there rises renunciation;' 'Those anchorites who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta and have purified their nature by the Yoga of renunciation' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6); and similar scriptural passages. And Smriti-texts to the same effect, such as 'They whose minds are fixed on him, who have their Self in him, their stand on him, their end in him' (Bha. Gîtâ V, 17). All these passages teach that for him who is founded on Brahman there are no works. From this there also follows the non-validity of the second objection raised above, viz. that the mendicant's reaching immortality through the mere stage of life in which he stands would imply the uselessness of knowledge.--In this way we understand that, although there is a reference to the other stages of life, that which is indicated by the quality of being grounded in Brahman is the state of the wandering mendicant.
This whole discussion has been carried on by the teacher without taking into account the text of the Gâbâlas, which enjoins the other stage of life. But there exists that text which directly enjoins the other stage, 'Having completed his studentship he is to become a householder; having been a householder he is to become a dweller in the forest; having been a dweller in the forest he is to wander forth; or else he may wander forth from the student's state; or from the house; or from the forest.' Nor can this text be interpreted as referring to those who are not qualified for works; for it states no difference, and there is a separate injunction (of the pârivrâgya-state) for those who are not qualified, viz. in the passage, 'May he have
taken vows upon himself or not, may he be a snâtaka or not, may he be one whose fire has gone out or one who has no fire,' &c. That the text does not refer to such only as are not qualified for works, further follows from the fact that the state of the mendicant is meant to subserve the development of the knowledge of Brahman 1, as scripture declares, 'The wandering mendicant, with colourless dress, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on alms, qualifies himself for the intuition of Brahman.'--From all this it follows that the stages of life for which chastity is obligatory are established by scripture, and that knowledge--because enjoined on persons who have entered on those stages--is independent of works.
Footnotes
299:1 In the clause 'vidhyantarâdarsarnât' I can see nothing more than an explanation of--or reason for--the 'apûrvatvât.' If we viewed the passage as glorifying the brahmasamsthatâ compared to the three branches of the law through the statement of its super-sensuous results (so that it would constitute an arthavâda of the kind called gunavâda), we should indeed preserve the unity of the passage--which is destroyed if we view it as enjoining the different stages of life. But all the same the latter explanation is the true one; for a glorificatory passage presupposes an injunctive one, and as no such injunctive passage is met with elsewhere, it is simpler to assume that the present passage is itself injunctive than to construe (on the basis of it if viewed as a gunavâda) another injunctive passage. (In Ânanda Giri's gloss on this passage--Biblioth. Indica edition--read 'vihitatvopagamaprasaktyâ' and 'stutilakshanayaika°.')
300:1 The ekavâkyatâ is preserved if we take the clause from 'above' as an arthavâda meant to give the reason why in sacrifices offered to the Fathers the firewood has to be carried below. Nevertheless the clause must be taken as a vidhi enjoining the carrying above in all sacrifices offered to the gods, because this particular is not enjoined elsewhere.
303:1 Which has to be acquired in the regular proscribed way of Brahmanical studentship.
21. If it be said that (texts such as the one about the udgîtha are) mere glorification, on account of their reference (to parts of sacrifices); we deny that, on account of the newness (of what they teach, if viewed as injunctions).
'That udgîtha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the highest place, the eighth' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 3); 'This earth is the Rik, the fire is Sâman' (Kh. Up. I, 6, 1); 'This world in truth is that piled-up fire-altar' (Sat. Brâ. X, I, 2, 2); 'That hymn is truly that earth' (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 2, 1); with reference to these and other similar passages a doubt arises whether they are meant to glorify the udgîtha and so on, or to enjoin devout meditations.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that their aim is glorification, because the text exhibits them with reference to subordinate members of sacrificial actions, such as the udgîtha and so on. They are, he says, analogous to passages such as 'This earth is the ladle;' 'the sun is the tortoise;' 'the heavenly world is the Âhavanîya,' whose
aim it is to glorify the ladle and so on. To this the Sûtrakâra replies as follows. We have no right to consider the purpose of those passages to be mere glorification, on account of the newness. If they aim at injunction, a new matter is enjoined by them; if, on the other hand, they aimed at glorification they would be devoid of meaning. For, as explained in the Pû. Mîm. Sû., glorificatory passages are of use in so far as entering into a complementary relation to injunctive passages; but the passages under discussion are incapable of entering into such a relation to the udgîtha and so on which are enjoined in altogether different places of the Veda, and would therefore be purposeless as far as glorification is concerned. Passages such as 'This earth is the ladle' are not analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive passages.--Therefore texts such as those under discussion have an injunctive purpose.
22. And on account of the words expressive of becoming.
Moreover the text exhibits words of clearly injunctive meaning, in connexion with the passages quoted above, viz. 'Let him meditate on the udgîtha' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let him meditate on the Sâman' (Kh. Up. II, 2, 1); 'Let him think: I am the hymn' (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 6). Now these injunctive forms would be rendered futile by the assumption of the texts under discussion aiming at glorification only. Compare the following saying of those who know Nyâya, 'Let him do, let it be done, it is to be done, let it become, let it be; these forms are in all Vedas the settled signs of injunction.' What they mean thereby is that injunction is the sense of all potential, imperative, &c., verbal forms.--Moreover in each of the sections to which the passages under discussion belong the text states special fruits, 'He becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 7); 'He is able to obtain wishes through his song' (Kh. Up. I, 7, 9); 'The worlds in an ascending and a descending line belong to him' (Kh. Up. II, 2, 3). For this reason also the texts
about the udgîtha and so on are meant to enjoin devout meditations.
23. (The stories told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of the pâriplava; we deny this on account of (certain stories only) being specified.
'Yâgñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyî and Kâtyâyani' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 1); 'Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodâsa came to the beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1); 'There lived once upon a time Gânasruti Pautrâyana, who was a pious giver, giving much and keeping open house' (Kh. Up. IV, 1, 1); with regard to these and similar stories met with in the Vedânta portions of scripture there arises a doubt whether they are meant to subserve the performance of the pâriplava 1, or to introduce the vidyâs standing in proximity to them.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that those scriptural stories subserve the pâriplava because they are stories like others, and because the telling of stories is enjoined for the pâriplava. And from this it follows that the Vedânta-texts do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like mantras they stand in a complementary relation to sacrificial performances.
This conclusion we deny 'on account of the specification.' Under the heading 'he is to recite the pâriplava,' scripture specifies certain definite stories such as that of 'Manu Vivasvat's son the king.' If, now, for the reason that all tales as such are alike, all tales were admitted for the pâriplava, the mentioned specification would be devoid of meaning. We therefore conclude that those scriptural stories are not meant to be told at the pâriplava.
24. This follows also from the connexion (of the stories with the vidyâs) in one coherent whole.
And as thus the stories do not subserve the pâriplava it
is appropriate to assume that they are meant to bring nearer to our understanding the approximate vidyâs with which they are seen to form connected wholes; for they serve to render the latter more acceptable and facilitate their comprehension.
In the Maitreyî-brâhmana we see that the story forms a whole with the vidyâ beginning, 'The Self indeed is to be seen,' &c.; in the account of Pratardana with the vidyâ, 'I am prâna, the conscious Self;' in the legend of Gânasruti with the vidyâ, 'Air indeed is the end of all.' The case of all these stories is analogous to that of stories met with in scriptural texts referring to works, whose purpose is the glorification of injunctions standing in proximity; as e.g. 'He cut out his own omentum.'--The stories under discussion therefore do not subserve the pâriplava.
25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.
The expression 'For this very same reason' must be viewed as taking up Sutra III, 4, 1, because thus a satisfactory sense is established. For this very same reason, i.e. because knowledge subserves the purpose of man, the lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are enjoined on the different âsramas are not to be observed, since man's purpose is effected through knowledge.
The Sûtrakâra thus sums up the result of the first adhikarana, intending to make some further remarks.
26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like; as in the case of the horse.
We now consider whether knowledge has absolutely no need of the works enjoined on the different âsramas, or whether it has some need of them. Under the preceding Sutra we have arrived at the conclusion that as knowledge effects its own end the works enjoined on the âsramas are absolutely not required. With reference to this point the present Sutra now remarks that knowledge has regard
for all works enjoined on the âsramas, and that there is not absolute non-regard.--But do not the two Sûtras thus contradict each other?--By no means, we reply. Knowledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of something else with a view to its own origination.--Why so?--On account of the scriptural statements of sacrifices and so on. For the passage, 'Him Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), declares that sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the text connects them with the 'seeking to know,' we conclude that they are, more especially, means of the origination of knowledge. Similarly the passage, 'What people call sacrifice that is really brahmakarya' (Kh. Up. VIII, 5, i). by connecting sacrifices and so on with brahmakarya which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices &c. also are means of knowledge. Again the passage, 'That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students, that word I tell thee briefly, it is Om' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 15), likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the âsramas are means of knowledge. Similarly Smriti says, 'Works are the washing away of uncleanliness, but knowledge is the highest way. When the impurity has been removed, then knowledge begins to act.'
The phrase, 'as in the case of the horse,' supplies an illustration on the ground of suitability. As the horse, owing to its specific suitability, is not employed for dragging ploughs but is harnessed to chariots; so the works enjoined on the âsramas are not required by knowledge for bringing about its results, but with a view to its own origination.
27. But all the same he (who is desirous of knowledge) must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those (states) are enjoined as auxiliaries to that (viz. knowledge), and must (on that account) necessarily be accomplished.
Perhaps somebody might think that we have no right to look upon sacrifices and the like as means of knowledge because there is no injunction to that effect. For a passage like 'By sacrifice they seek to know' is of the nature of an anuvâda, and therefore does not aim at enjoining sacrifices but rather at glorifying knowledge,' so glorious is knowledge that they seek to obtain it through sacrifices and the like.'
But even should this be so the seeker for knowledge must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses and so on; for all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge in the following scriptural passage, 'Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, sees self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). And what is enjoined must necessarily be carried out.--But in the above passage also we observe only a statement as to something actually going on--'Having become calm, &c,, he sees,' not an injunction!--Not so, we reply. The introductory word 'therefore' which expresses praise of the subject under discussion makes us understand that the passage has an injunctive character 1.
Moreover the text of the Mâdhyandinas directly reads 'let him see' (not 'he sees'). Hence calmness of mind and so on are required even if sacrifices, &c., should not be required.--Sacrifices and so on, however, are required likewise, because (as said in Sûtra 26) scripture teaches them.--But it has been said that in the passage,' Him they seek to know by sacrifices,' no injunction is observed!--True; but nevertheless we must assume the passage to be an injunction, because the connexion of the search for knowledge with sacrifices and so on is something new; i.e. is not established by another text, and therefore the
passage under discussion cannot be an anuvâda referring to it. The case is analogous to that of passages such as 'therefore Pûshan 1 receives a well-crushed share of food, for he is toothless.' There also no injunction is directly stated; but as the matter of the passage is new we assume an injunction and understand that the grains for Pûshan are to be crushed at all vikritis of the darsapûrnamâsa; as was explained in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ.
An analogous conclusion was arrived at under Sûtra 20.--Smritis also such as the Bhagavadgîtâ explain that sacrifices and the like if undertaken without a view to their special results become for him who is desirous of final release a means of knowledge. Hence sacrifices and the like, on the one hand, and calmness of mind and so on, on the other hand, according to the âsramas, i.e. all works enjoined on the âsramas must be had regard to with a view to the springing up of knowledge. Calmness of mind, &c., are, on account of the expression 'he who knows this' connecting them with knowledge, to be viewed as approximate--direct--means of knowledge, while sacrifices and so on which scripture connects with the search of knowledge are to be looked upon as remote--indirect--means.
Footnotes
308:1 For if there were no injunction, the praise would be without meaning. The 'therefore' connects the passage with the preceding clause, 'he is not sullied by any evil deed.' The sense then is, 'Because he who knows the Self as described before is not sullied by any evil deed, therefore let him, after having become calm, &c., see the Self, and so on.'
28. And there is permission of all food, (only) in the case of danger of life; on account of this being shown (by scripture).
In the colloquy of the prânas the Khandogas record, 'To him who knows this there is nothing which is not food' (Kh. Up. V, 1, 2); and the Vâgasaneyins,' By him nothing is eaten that is not food, nothing is received that is not food' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 14). The sense of the two passages is that anything may be eaten by him.--A doubt here arises whether the texts enjoin the permission of eating anything
as an auxiliary to knowledge--as calmness of mind, &c., are--or mention them for the purpose of glorification.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passages are injunctions because thus we gain an instruction which causes a special kind of activity. What, therefore, the text teaches is the non-operation of a definite rule, in so far as auxiliary to the knowledge of the prânas in proximity to which it is taught. But this interpretation implies the sublation of the scriptural rules as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful food!--Such sublation, we reply, is possible, because the present case is one of general rule and special exception. The prohibition of doing harm to any living creature is sublated by the injunction of the killing of the sacrificial animal; the general rule which distinguishes between such women as may be approached and such as may not, is sublated by the text prescribing, with reference to the knowledge of the Vâmadevya, that no woman is to be avoided ('Let him avoid no woman, that is the vow,' Kh. Up. II, 13, 2); analogously the passage which enjoins, with reference to the knowledge of the prânas, the eating of all food may sublate the general rule as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful food.
To this we reply as follows. The permission to eat any food whatever is not enjoined, since the passages do not contain any word of injunctive power; for the clause, 'To him who knows this there is nothing,' &c., expresses only something actually going on. And where the conception of an injunction does not naturally arise we may not assume one from the mere wish of something causing a special line of activity. Moreover the text says that 'for him who knows this there is nothing that is not food,' only after having said that everything even unto dogs and the like is food for the Prâna. Now food such as dogs and the like cannot be enjoyed by the human body; but all this can be thought of as food of the Prâna. From this it follows that the passage is an arthavâda meant to glorify the knowledge of the food of the Prâna, not an injunction of the permission of all food.--This the Sûtra indicates in the words, 'and there is permission of all food
in danger of life.' That means: Only in danger of life, in cases of highest need, food of any kind is permitted to be eaten. 'On account of scripture showing this.' For scripture shows that the rishi Kâkrâyana when in evil plight proceeded to eat unlawful food. In the brâhmana beginning, 'when the Kurus had been destroyed by hailstones,' it is told how the rishi Kâkrâyana having fallen into great wretchedness ate the beans half eaten by a chief, but refused to drink what had been offered on the ground of its being a mere leaving; and explained his proceeding as follows: 'I should not have lived if I had not eaten them; but water I can drink wherever I like.' And again on the following day he ate the stale beans left by himself and another person. Scripture, in thus showing how the stale leaving of a leaving was eaten, intimates as its principle that in order to preserve one's life when in danger one may eat even unlawful food. That, on the other hand, in normal circumstances not even a man possessing knowledge must do this, appears from Kâkrâyana refusing to drink. From this it follows that the passage, 'For to him who knows this,' &c., is an arthavâda.
Footnotes
309:1 The passage quoted occurs in the Veda under the heading of the darsapûrnamâsa. But as Pûshan has no share in the fundamental form of that sacrifice, we conclude that the injunction implied in the passage is valid for those vikritis of the darsapûrnamâsa in which offerings are made to Pûshan.
29. And on account of the non-sublation.
And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish lawful and unlawful food, such as Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2, 'When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure,'--are non-sublated.
30. And this is said in Smriti also.
That in cases of need both he who knows and he who does not know may eat any food Smriti also states; compare e.g. 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'--On the other hand, many passages teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. 'Intoxicating liquor the Brâhmana must permanently forego;' 'Let them pour boiling spirits down the throat of the Brâhmana who drinks spirits;' 'Spirit-drinking worms grow in the
mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what is unlawful.'
31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.
There is also a scriptural passage prohibiting unlawful food, the purpose of which it is to stop procedure therein according to one's liking, viz. in the Samhitâ of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brâhmana is not to drink spirits.' This text also is more appropriate if we take the passage, 'To him who knows this,' as an arthavâda.--Hence passages of that kind are arthavâdas, not injunctions.
32. The works of the âsramas (are incumbent on him) also (who does not desire release); because they are enjoined.
Under Sûtra 26 it has been proved that the work's enjoined on the âsramas are means of knowledge. Now we will consider whether those works have to be performed also by him who does not desire final release and therefore takes his stand on his âsrama merely without wishing for knowledge--Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that as the works incumbent on the âsramas are enjoined as means of knowledge by the passage, 'Him the Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda' &c., the works of permanent obligation are not to be performed by him who, not desirous of knowledge, wishes for some other fruit. Or else they are to be performed by him also; but then they cannot be means of knowledge, since it would be contradictory to attribute to them a permanent and a non-permanent connexion. 1
Against this conclusion the Sûtrakâra remarks that the works of permanent obligation are to be performed by
him only who, not desirous of release, takes his stand on the âsramas merely, because they are enjoined by texts such 'as long as his life lasts he is to offer the agnihotra.' For to such texts no excessive weight must be ascribed.--The next Sûtra replies to the objection raised above in the words, 'but then they cannot be means of knowledge.'
33. And through the co-operativeness (of the works towards the origination of knowledge).
Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just because they are enjoined as such, viz. in passages such as 'Him the Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda,' &c. This has been explained under Sûtra 26. Nor must you think that the texts stating the co-operation of the works of the âsramas towards knowledge refer to the fruit of knowledge, as e.g. the offerings called prayâgas co-operate towards the fruit of the darsapûrnamâsa of which they are auxiliary members; for knowledge is not characterised by injunction, and the fruit of knowledge is not to be effected by means. Means characterised by injunctions such as the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice which aim at bringing about certain fruits such as the heavenly would require other (subordinate) means co-operating towards the fruit (such as the prayâgas). But not so knowledge. Compare on this point Sûtra 25. Therefore texts stating the cooperation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted as stating that works are means for the origination of knowledge.--Nor need we fear that thus there arises a contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connexion. For there may be difference of connexion even where there is no difference of work. One connexion is permanent, resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the agnihotra and so on; of this knowledge is not the result. The other connexion is non-permanent, resting on texts such as 'Him the Brâhmanas seek to know,' &c.; of this knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that of the one khadira, which through a permanent connexion serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non-permanent connexion the purpose of man.
34. In any case the same (duties have to be performed) on account of the twofold indicatory marks.
In any case, i.e. whether viewed as duties incumbent on the âsramas or as co-operating with knowledge, the very same agnihotra and other duties have to be performed.--What, it may be asked, does the teacher wish to preclude by the emphatic expression 'the very same?'--The suspicion, we reply, that those works might be separate works 1. In the ayana of the Kundapâyins indeed the injunctive statement,' They offer the agnihotra for a month 2,' enjoins a sacrifice different from the permanent (ordinary) agnihotra; but in our present case there is no analogous separation of works.--Why?--On account of the twofold indicatory mark; i.e. on account of both scripture and Smriti supplying indicatory marks. In the first place, the scriptural passage, 'Him the Brâhmanas seek to know through the study of the Veda,' &c., directs that sacrifices and the like--as things already established and the form of which is already in existence (viz. through previous injunctions)--are to be employed as means in the search for knowledge; and does not originate a new form of those works, while the passage quoted above, 'They offer the agnihotra for a month,' does originate a new separate sacrifice.--In the second place the Smriti-passage, 'He who performs the work to be done without aiming at the fruit of the work,' shows that the very same work which is already known as something to be performed subserves the origination of knowledge. Moreover the Smriti-passage, 'He who is qualified by those forty-eight purifications,' &c., refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has undergone those purifications.--The Sûtrakâra therefore rightly emphasizes the non-difference of the works.
Footnotes
314:1 That the works referred to in the Upanishads as means of knowledge, might be works altogether different from those enjoined in the karmakânda as means of bringing about certain special results such as the heavenly world.
35. And scripture also declares that (those performing works) are not overpowered (by passion and the like).
This Sûtra points out a further indicatory mark fortifying the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge. Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such means as Brahmakarya, &c., is not overpowered by such afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage, 'That Self does not perish which they find out by Brahmakarya' (Kh. Up. VIII,,";, 3).--It is thus a settled conclusion that sacrifices and so on are works incumbent on the âsramas as well as co-operative towards knowledge.
36. But also (persons standing) between (are qualified for knowledge); for that is seen (in scripture).
A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not possess means, &c., and therefore are not able to enter one or the other of the âsramas., standing between as it were, are qualified for knowledge or not.--They are not qualified, the pûrvapakshin maintains. For we have ascertained that the works incumbent on the âsramas are the cause of knowledge, and those persons have no opportunity to perform those works.--To this the Sûtrakâra replies. 'But also between.' Even a person who because he does not belong to an âsrama stands between, as it were, is qualified for knowledge. 'For that is seen.' For we meet with scriptural passages declaring that persons of that class--such as Raikva and the daughter of Vakaknu--possessed the knowledge of Brahman (Kh. Up. IV, 1; Bri. Up. III, 6, 8).
37. This is stated in Smriti also.
It is recorded in itihâsas also how Samvarta and others who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the âsramas, in going naked and so on, became great Yogins all the same.--But the instances quoted from scripture and Smriti furnish merely indicatory marks; what then is
the final conclusion?--That conclusion is stated in the next Sûtra.
38. And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special acts.
Also for widowers, &c., the favour of knowledge is possible through special acts of duty, such as praying, fasting, propitiation of divinities, &c., which are not opposed to their âsrama-less condition and may be performed by any man as such. Thus Smriti says, 'By mere prayer no doubt the Brâhmana perfects himself. May he perform other works or not, the kindhearted one is called Brâhmana (Manu Samh. II, 87), which passage shows that where the works of the âsramas are not possible prayer qualifies for knowledge. Moreover knowledge may be promoted by âsrama works performed in previous births. Thus Smriti also declares, 'Perfected by many births he finally goes the highest way' (Bha. Gîtâ VI, 45); which passage shows that the aggregate of the different purificatory ceremonies performed in former births promotes knowledge.--Moreover knowledge--as having a seen result (viz. the removal of ignorance)--qualifies any one who is desirous of it for learning and so on, through the mere absence of obstacles 1. Hence there is no contradiction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the part of widowers and the like.
39. Better than this is the other (state of belonging to an âsrama), on account of the indicatory marks.
'Than this,' i.e. 'than standing between,' a better means of knowledge it is to stand within one of the âsramas, since this is confirmed by Sruti and Smriti. For scripture supplies an indicatory mark in the passage, 'On that path goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy
works (as prescribed for the âsramas) and obtained splendour' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 9); and Smriti in the passage, 'Let a Brâhmana stay not one day even outside the âsrama; having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin.'
40. But of him who has become that (i.e. entered on a higher âsrama) there is no becoming not that (i.e. descending to a lower one), according to Gaimini also, on account of restrictive rule, absence of such like (i.e. statements of descent), and non-existence (of good custom).
It has been established that there are stages of life for which chastity is obligatory. A doubt here arises whether one who has entered them may for some reason or other fall from them or not.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that as there is no difference a person may descend to a lower stage, either from the wish of well performing the duties of that stage, or influenced by passion and the like.--To this we reply as follows, 'Of him who has become that,' i.e. of him who has reached the stages for which chastity is obligatory, there is no 'becoming not. that,' i.e. descending thence.--Why?--'On account of restrictive rule, absence of such like, and non-existence.' That means: there are, in the first place, restrictive rules declaring that a descent may not take place. Compare 'for life mortifying the body in the house of a tutor' (Kh. Up. II, 23. 2); 'He is to go into the forest, that is he is not to return thence, that is the Upanishad;' 'Having been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the four âsramas, according to rule, up to release from the body.'--In the second place there are texts teaching the ascent to higher âsramas ('Having completed the Brahmakarya state he is to become a householder; he may wander forth from the Brahmakarya state'); but there are none teaching the descent to lower âsramas.--And in the third place there exists no good custom of that kind.--The descent to a lower âsrama can in no way be based on the wish of well performing the duties of that âsrama; for
[paragraph continues] Smriti says, 'One's own duty, however badly performed, is better than another duty well carried out' (Bha. Gîtâ III, 35). And the principle is that whatever is enjoined on a certain person constitutes his duty, not what a person is able to perform well; for all duty is characterised by injunction. Nor is a descent allowed owing to the influence of passion, &c.; for restrictive rules are weightier than passion.--By the word 'also' the Sûtrakâra indicates the consensus of Gaimini and Bâdarâyana on this point, in order to confirm thereby the view adopted.
41. And not also (can the expiation take place) prescribed in the chapter treating of qualification, because on account of the inference of his lapse from Smriti he (the Naishthika) is not capable of it.
If a Brahmakârin for life breaks from inattention the vow of chastity, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice enjoined by the text, 'A student who has broken the vow of chastity shall sacrifice an ass to Nirriti 1' or not?--He is not, the pûrvapakshin says. For although in the chapter which treats of qualification (Pû. Mîm. Sû. VI, 8, 22) that expiatory ceremony has been settled (for Brahmakârins in general), it does not yet hold good for the professed Brahmakârin. For Smriti declares that such sins cannot be expiated by him any more than a head once cut off can again be healed on to the body, 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika again lapses from them, for him--a slayer of the Self--I see no expiation which might make him clean again. 'The Upakurvâna (i.e. he who is a Brahmakârin for a certain time only, not for life) on the other hand, about whose sin Smriti makes no similar declaration, may purify himself by the ceremony mentioned.
42. But some (consider the sin) a minor one, (and
hence claim) the existence (of expiation for the Naishthika also); as in the case of the eating (of unlawful food). This has been explained (in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).
Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the transgression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of a professed Brahmakârin, is a minor sin, not a mortal one, excepting cases where the wife of the teacher and so on are concerned. For they plead that that sin is not anywhere enumerated among the deadly ones such as violating a teacher's bed and so on. Accordingly they claim the expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naishthika as well as the Upakurvâna; both being alike Brahmakârins and having committed the same offence. The case is analogous to that of eating. Just as Brahmakârins (in general) who have broken their vow by eating honey, flesh, and the like may again purify themselves by a ceremony, so here also.--The reason for this decision is that for those who assume the absence of all expiation on the part of the Naishthikas no scriptural passage supporting their view is met with; while those who admit expiation can base their view on the passage quoted above ('A student who has broken the vow' &c.), which makes no distinction between Upakurvânas and Naishthikas. It therefore is more appropriate to assume the validity of the ceremony for Naishthikas also. The principle guiding the decision has been explained in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge (Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 3, 8).--On this view the Smriti-passage which declares that there is no expiation for the Naishthika must be explained as aiming at the origination of weighty effort on the Naishthika's part.--Similarly in the case of the mendicant and the hermit. The hermit, when he has broken his vows, undergoes the Krikkhra penance for twelve nights and then cultivates a place rich in plants. The mendicant proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of cultivating the Soma-plant, and undergoes the purifications prescribed for his state. The rules given by Smriti for those cases have to be followed.
43. But (they are to be kept outside) in either case, on account of Smriti and custom.
But whether lapses from the duties of one's order, committed by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins or minor sins, in either case such persons are to be excluded by honourable men (sishtas). For Smriti refers to them in terms of the highest reproach; cp. passages such as the one quoted under Sûtra 41; and the following one, 'He who touches a Brâhmana that has broken his vow and fallen from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms must undergo the Kândrâyana penance.' And good custom also condemns them; for good men do not sacrifice, study, or attend weddings with such persons.
44. To the lord (of the sacrifice) only (the agent-ship in meditations belongs), because scripture declares a fruit; this is the view of Âtreya.
With regard to meditations on subordinate members of sacrificial actions there arises a doubt whether they are to be carried out by the sacrificer (i.e. him for whom the sacrifice is performed) or by the officiating priests.--By the sacrificer, the pûrvapakshin maintains, because scripture declares fruits. For a fruit is declared in such texts as the following one, 'There is rain for him, and he brings rain for others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold Sâman as rain' (Kh. Up. II, 3, 2); and we must conclude that that fruit goes to the Lord of the sacrifice, because it is he who is entitled to the sacrificial performance together with its subordinate members, and because such meditations fall within the sphere of that to which he is entitled. And that the fruit belongs to him who carries out the meditations scripture states when saying, 'There is rain for him who meditates.'--But scripture declares a fruit for the priest also, viz. in the passage, 'Whatever desire he may desire either for himself or for the sacrificer he obtains by his singing.'--That passage, we reply, is of no force because it expressly declares the fruit (as belonging to the priest in a special case only). Hence the lord of the sacrifice only
is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit, this is the opinion of the teacher Âtreya.
45. (They are) the work of the priest, this is the view of Audulomi; since for that (i.e. the entire sacrificial work) he is feed.
The assertion that the meditations on subordinate members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer is unfounded. They rather are the work of the priest, as the teacher Audulomi thinks. For the priest is rewarded for the work together with its subordinate members; and the meditations on the udgîtha and so on fall within the performance of the work since they belong to the sphere of that to which the person entitled (viz. the lord of the sacrifice) is entitled. Hence they are to be carried out by the priests only, the case being analogous to that of the restrictive rule as to the work to be performed by means of the godohana vessel. In agreement herewith scripture declares the udgâtri to be the agent in knowledge, in the following passage, 'Him Vaka Dâlbhya knew. He was the udgâtri of the Naimishîya-sacrificers' (Kh. Up. I. 2, 13). With reference to the circumstance noted by the pûrvapakshin that scripture states the fruit to belong to the agent, we remark that this makes no difference: For with the exception of cases expressly stated the priest cannot be connected with the sacrifice since he subserves the purposes (acts for) another (viz. the lord of the sacrifice).
46. And on account of scriptural statement.
'Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice, they pray for the good of the sacrificer; thus he said' (Sat. Brâ. I, 3, 1, 26); 'Therefore an udgâtri who knows this may say: what wish shall I obtain for you by my singing?' (Kh. Up. I, 7, 8). These scriptural passages also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest is the agent goes to the sacrificer.--All this establishes the conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of the sacrifice are the work of the priest.
47. There is the injunction of something else cooperating (towards knowledge) (which is) a third thing (with regard to bâlya and pânditya), (which injunction is given) for the case (of perfect knowledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such (i.e. the Samnyâsin possessing knowledge); as in the case of injunctions and the like.
'Therefore let a Brâhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state; and after he has done with the childlike state and learning (he is, or, may be) a Muni; and after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non-Muniship (he is, or, may be) a Brâhmana' (Bri. Up. III, 5). With reference to this passage a doubt arises whether it enjoins the state of a Muni or not.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that it does not enjoin it, since the injunction is completed with the clause, 'Let him wish to stand by a childlike state.' The following clause 'then a Muni' contains no verbal form of injunctive force and therefore must be viewed as a mere anuvâda (making a remark concerning the state of a Muni which is already established). Should it be asked how this conclusion is reached, we reply that Muniship is established by the clause 'having done with learning' (which forms part of the injunctive portion of the passage), as 'Muni' and 'learned man' both denote knowledge 1. It is, moreover, clear also that the last clause,' and after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non-Muniship (he is) a Brâhmana,' does not enjoin the condition of a Brâhmana, as that state is previously established (independently of that clause); but the words 'then a Brâhmana' are a mere glorificatory anuvâda. Now as the words 'then a Muni' show an analogous form of enunciation (to the clause 'then a Brâhmana'), they also can embody a glorificatory anuvâda only.
To all this we reply as follows. 'There is an injunction of something else which co-operates.' The passage must be understood as enjoining the state of a Muni--which co-operates towards knowledge--in the same way as it enjoins learning and a childlike state, because that state is something new (not enjoined before).--But it has been said above that the word 'learning' already intimates Muniship!--This, we reply, does not invalidate our case since the word 'muni' denotes (not only knowledge as the term 'learned man' does, but) pre-eminence of knowledge, on the ground as well of its etymology from 'manana,' i.e. thinking, as of common use, shown in such phrases as 'I am the Vyâsa of Munis also.'--But the term 'Muni' is also seen to denote the last order of life; cp. passages such as 'Householdership, studentship, the order of Munis, the order of hermits in the woods.'--Yes, but it has not that meaning exclusively, as we see that it does not apply to phrases such as 'Valmîki is the foremost among Munis.' In the passage quoted (about the four orders) the last order is referred to, by the term 'Muni,' because there it stands in proximity to the other orders of life, and, as the state of the Ascetic is the only one which remains (after we have assigned the three other terms to the stages of life clearly denoted by them), the last order may be denoted 'mauna' because knowledge is its principal requirement.--We therefore conclude that in the passage under discussion the state of the Muni--whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence of knowledge--is enjoined as something third--with regard to the childlike state and learning.--Against the objection that the injunction terminates with the childlike state, we remark that all the same we must view the Muniship also as something enjoined, as it is something new, so that we have to supplement the clause as follows: 'then he is to be a Muni.' That the state of a Muni is something to be enjoined, in the same way as the childlike state and 'earning, also follows from its being referred to as something to be done with (like bâlya and pânditya. It is enjoined 'on him who is such,' i.e. on the Samnyâsin possessing knowledge.--How do we know this latter point?--Because
the Samnyâsin who possesses knowledge forms the topic, as we see from the preceding passage, 'Having cognized the Self and risen above the desire for sons, &c., they wander about as mendicants.'--But if the Samnyâsin possesses knowledge, pre-eminence of knowledge is already established thereby; what then is the use of the injunction of Muniship?--To this the Sûtra replies 'in the case of.' That means: in the case of pre-eminence of knowledge not being established owing to the prevailing force of the (erroneous) idea of multiplicity; for that case the injunction (of Muniship, i.e. of pre-eminence of knowledge) is given. 'As in the case of injunctions and the like.' With reference to sacrifices such as are enjoined in the passage, 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to offer the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice,' the aggregate of subordinate members, such as the establishment of the sacred fires, is enjoined as something helpful; similarly in this text whose topic is knowledge and which therefore does not chiefly aim at injunction, Muniship is enjoined as something helpful to knowledge.
As thus the order of the ascetic, as distinguished by a childlike state and so on, is actually established by scripture, for what reason does the Khândogya Upanishad wind up with the householder, viz. in the passage, 'After having received his discharge from his teacher he settles in his own house,' &c.? For by concluding with the householder, scripture manifests special regard for him.--To this doubt the next Sûtra replies.
Footnotes
322:1 The state of a Muni is already enjoined by the clause 'pândityam nirvidya;' the clause 'atha munih,' therefore, may be viewed as an anuvâda (as which it could not be viewed, if there were no previous injunction of mauna).
48. On account of his being all, however, there is winding up with the householder.
The word 'however' is meant to lay stress on the householder's being everything. For the performance of many works belonging to his own âsrama, such as sacrifices and the like, which involve not a little trouble, is enjoined on him by scripture; and at the same time the duties of the other âsramas--such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint of the senses and so on--are incumbent on him also as far as circumstances allow. There is therefore nothing contradictory
in the Khândogya winding up with the householder.
49. On account of there being injunction of the others also, in the same way as of the state of a Muni.
As the state of the Muni (Samnyâsin) and the state of the householder are enjoined in scripture, so also the two other orders, viz. that of the hermit, and that of the student. For we have already pointed above to passages such as Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the house of a teacher is the third.' As thus the four âsramas are equally taught by scripture, they are to be gone through equally, either in the way of option (between them) or in the way of comprehension (of all of them).--That the Sûtra uses a plural form (of 'the others') when speaking of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to the different sub-classes of those two, or to their different duties.
50. (The passage enjoining bâlya means that the ascetic is to live) not manifesting himself; on account of the connexion (thus gained for the passage).
The passage, 'Therefore let a Brâhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state,' speaks of the childlike state as something to be undertaken. Now by the 'childlike state' we have to understand either the nature or the actions of a child. Childhood in so far as it means a period of life cannot be brought about at will, and we therefore must take the 'childlike state' to mean either the behaviour of a child--such as attending to the calls of nature without any respect of place, &c.--or inward purity, i.e. absence of cunning, arrogance, force of the sensual passions, and so on 1.--With regard to the
doubt thus arising the pûrvapakshin maintains that by 'childlike being' people more commonly understand behaving, talking, and eating according to one's liking, freely attending to the calls of nature and so on, and that therefore the word is to be understood here also in that sense.--But such free conduct is improper, because sinfulness and so on would follow from it!--Not so, the pûrvapakshin replies; for the Samnyâsin possessing knowledge is, through express scriptural statements, free from all sinfulness thus incurred; just as the sacrificer is declared to be free from the sin he might incur in slaying the sacrificial animal.
To this we reply that it is not so because the statement of the text may be understood in a different sense. For as long as another rational interpretation of the word 'bâlya' is possible we have no right to adopt an interpretation which involves the assumption of another injunction being rendered futile. Moreover subordinate matters are enjoined with a view to the furtherance of the principal matter, and what here is the principal matter is the endeavour after knowledge which ascetics have to take upon themselves. Now if we accepted the entire conduct of a child as what is enjoined here we could in no way show that the endeavour of knowledge is furthered thereby. We therefore understand by 'bâlya' the special inward state of a child, i.e. absence of strong sensual passions and the like. This the Sûtra expresses by saying 'Not manifesting.' The meaning of the clause under discussion thus is: Let him be free from guile, pride, and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning, and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others. For thus the passage gains a connexion with the entire chapter on the ground of co-operating towards the principal matter. In agreement herewith Smriti-writers have said, 'He whom nobody knows either
as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as well-conducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brâhmana. Quietly devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life unknown; let him step on this earth as if he were blind, unconscious, deaf.' Another similar passage is, 'With hidden nature, hidden conduct,' and so on.
Footnotes
325:1 I am doubtful as to the true reading in this place. The 'va' of the Calcutta edition (p. 1039, last line) has certainly to be struck p. 326 out. Some good MSS. read:--bâlakaritam antargatâ bhâvavisuddhir aprarûdhendriyatvam dambhâdirahitatvam vâ.--The 'antargatâ' seems to mean the same as the 'ântarah.' p.1041, II, 1-2.
51. In this life also (the origination of knowledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what is ready at hand; on account of this being seen (in scripture).
Beginning from Sûtra 26 of the present pâda we have discussed the various means of knowledge. We are now to consider whether knowledge--the fruit of those means--when accomplishing itself accomplishes itself only here in this life, or sometimes in the next life only,--The pûrvapakshin maintains that it accomplishes itself here in this life only. For, he argues, knowledge has for its antecedent the learning of scripture and so on, and nobody applies himself to learning, &c., with the intention that knowledge should result therefrom in the next life only; we rather observe that men begin to learn with a view to knowledge already springing up in this life. And also sacrifices and the like produce knowledge only mediately through learning and so on; for knowledge can be produced (directly) through the means of right knowledge only 1. Hence the origination of knowledge takes place in this life only.--To this we reply, 'The origination of knowledge takes place in this life if there is no obstruction of that which is ready at hand.' That means: When the means of knowledge which is operative is not obstructed by some other work the results of which are just then reaching maturity, knowledge already reaches maturity in this life.
[paragraph continues] But when such an obstruction takes place, then in the next life. And a work's reaching maturity depends on place, time, and operative cause presenting themselves. Nor is there any binding rule according to which the same time, place, and operative cause which ripen one work should ripen another work also; for there are works the fruits of which are opposed to each other. And scripture also goes only so far as to teach what the fruit of each work is,, without teaching the special conditions of place time, and operative cause. And owing to the specific strength of the means employed the supersensuous power of one, work manifests itself (i.e. the fruit of that work realizes itself), while that of another is obstructed thereby and comes to a standstill.
Nor is there any reason why a man should not form, with regard to knowledge, an unspecified intention 1; for we may freely form the intention that knowledge should spring up from us cither in this life or in some subsequent life. And knowledge although springing up through the mediation of learning and so on, springs up only in so far as learning destroys the obstacles in the way of knowledge. Thus scripture also declares the difficulty of knowing the Sell, 'He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom many even when they hear of him do not comprehend; wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him; wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an able teacher' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 7).--Moreover scripture relates that Vâmadeva already became Brahman in his mother's womb, and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in a later form of existence through means procured in a former one; for a child in the womb cannot possibly procure such means in its present state.
The same is shown by Smriti. Vâsudeva being asked by Arguna, 'What will be the fate of him, O Krishna, who has not reached perfection?' replies, 'None who performs good works undergoes an evil fate;' declares thereupon
that such a man reaches the world of the blessed and is, later on, born again in a good family; and finally states just what we at present maintain in the passage beginning, 'There he obtains that knowledge which corresponds to his former bodily existence,' and closing, 'Perfected by many states of existence he then goes the highest way.'--It therefore is an established conclusion that knowledge originates, either in the present or in a future life, in dependence on the evanescence of obstacles.
Footnotes
327:1 Of which study is one.--Sacrifices indeed may bear their special fruits in the next life only; but in so far as they co-operate towards knowledge they are effective in this life. For their only action in that line is to purify the mind and thus to render it fitter to receive knowledge.
328:1 I.e. there is no reason for the assertion made by the pûrvapakshin that men form a specified intention only, viz. that knowledge should spring up in this life only.
52. No such definite rule (exists) as to the fruit which is release, on account of the assertions as to that condition, on account of the assertions as to that condition.
We have seen that in the case of persons desirous of release who rely upon the means of knowledge there exists a definite difference of result, in so far as the knowledge resulting springs up either in this life or a future life according to the degree of strength of the means employed. It might now be supposed that there exists a similar definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification of the persons knowing.
With reference to this possible doubt the Sûtra now says, 'No such definite rule as to that fruit which is release.' That means: We must not suppose that in the case of that fruit which is release there exists an analogous definite rule a difference.--Why?--'On account of the assertions (by scripture about that condition.' For all Vedânta-texts assert the state of final release to be of one kind only. The state of final release is nothing but Brahman, and Brahman cannot be connected with different forms since many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only. Compare e.g. 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'Where one sees nothing else' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6);
'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4. 2, 5); 'When the Self only is all this how should he see another?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).--Moreover the means of knowledge might perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart a higher (or lower) degree to their result, viz. knowledge, but not to the result of knowledge, viz. release; for, as we have explained more than once, release is not something which is to be brought about, but something whose nature is permanently established, and is reached through knowledge. Nor does, in reality, knowledge admit of lower or higher degree; for it is, in its own nature, high only, and would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although therefore knowledge may differ in so far as it originates after a long or short time, it is impossible that release should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. And from the absence of difference of knowledge also there follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the result of knowledge (viz. release). The whole case is analogous to that of the results of works. In that knowledge which is the means of release there is no difference as there is between works. In those cognitions, on the other hand, which have the qualified Brahman for its object--such as 'he who consists of mind, whose body is prâna'--a difference is possible according to the addition or omission of qualities, and hence there may be a definite distinction of results, just as there is between the results of actions. This is also indicated by the passage, 'according as they meditate on him they become.' But in meditations on Brahman devoid of qualities it is otherwise. Thus Smriti also says, 'No higher road is possible for any one; for they speak of inequality only where there are qualities.'--The repetition of the clause on account of the assertions as to that condition' indicates the termination of the adhyâya
(My humble salutations to Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
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