VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
With the Commentary by
SAṄKARÂKÂRYA
translated by GEORGE THIBAUT
Fourth Adhyâya. First Pâda
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. Repetition (of the mental functions of knowing, meditating, &c., is required) on account of the text giving instruction more than once.
The third adhyâya was taken up chiefly with a discussion of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and lower vidyâs. In the fourth adhyâya we shall now discuss the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some other topics also.--In the beginning, however, we shall carry on, in a few adhikaranas, a special discussion connected with the means of knowledge. 'Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'Let a wise Brâhmana after he has discovered him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'That it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7. 1).
Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises whether the mental action referred to in them is to be performed once only or repeatedly.--Once only, the pûrvapakshin says; as in the case of the prayâga-offerings and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is accomplished; while to practise repetitions not demanded by scripture would be to accomplish what is not the purpose of scripture.--But passages have been quoted which teach repetition 'it is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on,' &c.!--Let us then repeat exactly as scripture says, i.e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where scripture teaches something once only--viz. in such passages as 'He knows,' 'Let him meditate,' &c.--no repetition has to be practised.--To this we reply as
follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction contained in passages such as 'He is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on' intimates the repetition of the required mental acts.--But the pûrvapakshin has said above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what scripture says and not to go further!--This is wrong, we reply, because all those mental activities have for their end intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the action of beating. &c., terminates in freeing the rice grains from their husks. Moreover also such terms as 'meditating,' 'being devoted to,' and 'reflecting 'denote actions in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say in ordinary life that a person 'is devoted' to a teacher or a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him; and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him with longing. And (that also 'knowing' implies repetition, follows from the fact that) in the Vedânta-texts the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used one in the place of the other. In some passages the term 'knowing' is used in the beginning and the term 'meditating' in the end; thus e.g. 'He who knows what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and: Teach me, sir, the deity which you meditate on' (Kh. Up. IV, 1, 4; 2, 2). In other places the text at first speaks of 'meditating' and later on of 'knowing;' thus e.g. 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1; 6).--From this it follows that repetition has to be practised there also, where the text gives instruction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is directly intimated.
2. And on account of an indicatory mark.
An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repetition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation
on the udgîtha, the text rejects the meditation on the udgîtha viewed as the sun, because its result is one sun only, and (in the clause 'Do thou resolve his rays,' &c.) enjoins a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the possession of many suns (Kh. Up. I, 5, 1; 2); which shows that the repetition of meditations is something well known. Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all of them.
Here the following objection may be raised. With regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us Brahman as the universal Self characterised by eternal purity, thought, and freedom? Should it be said that repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing a text once only, we reply that in that case it will not spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text such as 'Thou art that' does not originate the true notion of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the desired effect should be produced by its repetition?--Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuite Brahman as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition would be useless; for the reasoning will lead to the desired intuition even if gone through once only.--Again it will perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object known, not of its specific individual character. When, to exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart another person can infer from this statement--and certain accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs--only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to intuite its specific character; all he knows is 'This man suffers a pain.' But what removes ignorance is (not
a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the specific character of something. And repetition serves to produce such knowledge.--This also is not so. For if so much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case they will do so even if acting once only; and repetition therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a binding rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no case produce intuitive knowledge; for their effect will after all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition may be admitted in the case of worldly things which consist of several parts and possess generic character as well as individual difference; for there the student may grasp by one act of attention one part of the object, and by another act another part; so e.g. in the case of long chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true knowledge of Brahman whose Self is mere intelligence and which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition.
To this we make the following reply. Repetition would indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the sentence 'Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the teacher in the Khândogya, having given instruction in the sentence 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu,' and being again and again asked by his pupil--'Please, sir, inform me still more'--removes his pupil's reasons for doubt, and again and again repeats the instruction 'Thou art that.' We have already given an analogous explanation of the passage 'The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected upon.'--But has not the pûrvapakshin declared that if the first enunciation of the sentence 'Thou art that' is not able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will likewise
fail of the desired effect?--This objection, we reply, is without force, because the alleged impossibility is not confirmed by observation. For we observe that men by again and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full understanding of the true sense.--Moreover the sentence 'Thou art that' teaches that what is denoted by the term 'thou' is identical with what is denoted by 'that.' Now the latter term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the thinking Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of the world; which is known from other passages such as 'Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Brahman that is knowledge and bliss' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28); 'That Brahman is unseen, but seeing; unknown, but knowing' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 11); 'not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'not subject to old age, not subject to death' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'not coarse, not fine; not short, not long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as 'not produced' deny the different phases of existence such as origination; such terms as 'not coarse' deny of it the qualities of substances such as coarseness; and such terms as 'knowledge' declare that the luminousness of intelligence constitutes its nature. The entity thus described--which is free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman--is known, by all students of the Vedânta, as what is denoted by the term 'that.' They likewise know that what is denoted by the term 'thou' is the inward Self (pratyagâtman); which is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) apprehended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, the sentence 'Thou art that' cannot produce a right knowledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the words; for them therefore the repetition of the scripture
text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose, viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words.--And although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body, the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses, the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we may discard one of these parts, and by another act of attention another part; so that a successively progressing cognition may very well take place. This however is merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self (in which there can be no successive stages).
Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of the sentence 'Thou art that' on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged.--All this might be so--an objection is raised--if cognition did spring up in any mind in the way described. (But this is not the case); for the cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all absence of pain and so on.--This objection, we reply, is without force; for it can be shown that the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less than the conceit of the body being the Self. For we clearly observe that when the body is cut or burned a wrong notion springs up, 'I am being cut,' 'I am being burned;' and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c. who are even more external to the Self than one's own body--suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the Self. Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c.; for like the body and so on, the condition of being subject to pain is observed as something external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and the like; while scripture expressly declares that in deep
sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 22). Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, 'My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. Thus scripture says, 'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smriti also says, 'But that man who loves the Self, is satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the Self only, for him there is no further work' (Bha. Gîtâ III, 12).--For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the teaching, 'Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as 'I have a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent; this is to be done by me 1.' But if a learner, naturally slow-minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the understanding of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on.--All this establishes the conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition may be repeated.
Footnotes
337:1 Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end aimed at, i.e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is identical with Brahman's Self, to which no notions of duty or action apply.
3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us comprehend (the Lord).
The Sûtrakâra now considers the question whether the highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is
to be understood as the 'I' or as different from me.--But how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits the term 'Self' whose sphere is the inward Self?--This term 'Self'--a reply may be given--may be taken in its primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual soul and the Lord as non-different; but in the other case the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only 1.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the term 'Self is not to be taken as meaning the 'I.' For that which possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., cannot be understood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of a contrary nature.--Moreover, if the transmigrating soul constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning; while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and knowledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning. The latter assumption would moreover run counter to perception and the other means of proof.--Should it be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different, they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis of scripture, just as Vishnu and other divinities are contemplated in images and so on; the answer is that this contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the transmigrating soul.
To all this we make the following reply. The highest Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter treating of the highest Lord the Gâbâlas acknowledge him to be the Self, 'Thou indeed I am. O holy divinity; I indeed thou art, O divinity!'--In the same light other
texts have to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord as the Self, such as 'I am Brahman' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover certain Vedânta-texts make us comprehend the Lord as the Self, 'Thy Self is this which is within all' (Bri. Up. III. 4, 1); 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'That is the True, that is the Self, thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7).--Nor can we admit the truth of the assertion, made by the pûrvapakshin, that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contemplation of Vishnu in an image. For that would firstly involve that the texts have not to be understood in their primary sense 1; and in the second place there is a difference of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the contemplation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning through a single enunciation such as 'Brahman is Mind' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1), or 'Brahman is Âditya' (Kh. Up. III, 10, 1). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says, 'I am Thou and thou art I.' As here the form of expression differs from that of texts teaching the contemplation of symbols, the passage must be understood as teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the express prohibition of the view of difference which a number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e.g. 'Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death to death goes he who here perceives any diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6).--Nor is there any force in the objection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false.--Nor is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmigrating
soul, but maintain that by denying the transmigrating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error.--Nor is it true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody is entitled to works, &c., and is contrary to perception and so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' &c., teach that as soon as true knowledge springs up, perception, &c., are no longer valid.--Nor do we mind your objecting that if perception, &c., cease to be valid, scripture itself ceases to be so; for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the ground of the text, 'Then a father is not a father' up to 'Then the Vedas are not Vedas' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 22), we ourselves assume that when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to be valid.--And should you ask who then is characterised by the absence of true knowledge, we reply: You yourself who ask this question!--And if you retort, 'But I am the Lord as declared by scripture,' we reply, 'Very well, if you have arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess such knowledge.'--This also disposes of the objection, urged by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience.
Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the Self.
Footnotes
338:1 And in that case the identity of the highest Self and the 'I' would not follow from the term 'Self.'
339:1 And this is objectionable as long as it has not been demonstrated that the primary meaning is altogether inadmissable.
4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contemplated); for he (the meditating person) (may) not (view symbols as being the Self).
'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman; this is said with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether as Brahman; this is said with reference to the Devas' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1); 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine'
[paragraph continues] (Kh. Up. III, 19, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 5). With regard to these and similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that it is right to apprehend the Self in them also because Brahman is known from scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well.
We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea of Brahman. For he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the nature of the Self.--Nor is it true that the symbols are of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman they are of the nature of Brahman; for (from their being of the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of (them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far as the individual character of those effects of Brahman is sublated; and when that character is sublated how then can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be apprehended in them? Nor does it follow from the fact of Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self can be established on the ground of texts teaching a contemplation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman is the Self depends on the doing away with agentship and all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on the ground of the meditating person being the same as the symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold constitutes the Self of both. And that from that oneness (of symbol and meditating person) which depends on Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations
enjoined), we have explained above.--For these reasons the Self is not contemplated in symbols.
5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be superinduced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols).
With regard to the texts quoted above there arises another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Âditya and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the contemplation of Brahman on Âditya and so on 1.--But whence does this doubt arise?--From the absence of a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination. For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of the term 'Brahman' with the terms 'Âditya,' &c. 'Âditya is Brahman,' 'Prâna is Brahman,' 'Lightning is Brahman;' the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for co-ordination because the words 'Brahman' on the one hand, and 'Âditya' and so on on the other hand, denote different things; not any more than there exists a relation of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence 'The ox is a horse.'--But cannot Brahman and Âditya and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the relation connecting a causal substance and its effects, analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels?--By no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal substance, and that--as we have already explained--would imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scriptural passages would then be statements about the highest Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would be sublated 2; and further the mention of a limited effect would be purposeless 3. It follows herefrom that we have
to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation of one thing on another thing--just as in the case of the text, 'The Brâhmana is Agni Vaisvânara,'--and the doubt therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two things is to be superimposed on the other.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text establishing such a rule.--Or else, he says, contemplations on Âditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon by means of contemplations on Âditya, and scripture decides that meditations on Brahman are what is productive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are not to be superimposed on Âditya and so on.
To this we make the following reply. The contemplation on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Âditya and so on.--Why?--'On account of exaltation.' For thus Âditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the contemplation of something higher than they being superimposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when we view--and speak of--the king's charioteer as a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters, because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous; for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial.--But an objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise; and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations based on scripture by secular rules!--That might be so, we reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained; but as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means
is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on something lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower contemplation upon something higher.--As moreover in the passages under discussion the words 'Âditya' and so on stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the word 'Brahman,' which supervenes later on, cannot be co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman (superinduced on Âditya and so on).--The same sense follows from the circumstance that the word 'Brahman' is, in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word 'iti,' 'thus 1.' 'He is to meditate (on Âditya, &c.) as Brahman.' The words 'Âditya' and so on, on the other hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences as 'He views the mother o’ pearl as silver,' in which the word 'mother o’ pearl' denotes mother o’ pearl pure and simple, while the word 'silver' denotes, by implication, the idea of silver; for the person in question merely thinks 'this is silver' while there is no real silver.' Thus our passages also mean, 'He is to view Âditya and so on as Brahman.'--The complementary clauses, moreover, which belong to the passages under discussion ('He who knowing this meditates (upon) Âditya as Brahman;' 'Who meditates (on) speech as Brahman;' 'Who meditates (on) will as Brahman') exhibit the words 'Âditya' and so on in the accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct objects of the action of meditation 2.--Against the remark that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used
above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Âditya and so on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of hospitality shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Âditya and so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2, 28. And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contemplation on Vishnu is superinduced on his images.
Footnotes
342:1 I. e. whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as Âditya, or Âditya as Brahman.
342:2 While, as a matter of fact, scripture enjoins the meditations.
342:3 It would serve no purpose to refer to limited things, such as p. 343 the sun and so on, as being resolved into their causal substance, i.e. Brahman. True knowledge is concerned only with the resolution of the entire world of effects into Brahman.
344:1 Which in the translations given above of the texts under discussion is mostly rendered by 'as' before the words concerned.
344:2 While the word 'Brahman' does not stand in the accusative case.
6. And the ideas of Âditya and so on (are to be superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial action); owing to the effectuation (of the result of the sacrifice).
'He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as udgîtha' (Kh. Up. I, 3, i); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold Sâman in the worlds' (Kh. Up. II, 2, i); 'Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Sâman in speech' (Kh. Up. II, 8, i); 'This earth is the Rik, fire is Sâman' (Kh. Up. I, 6, i).--With regard to these and similar meditations limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgîtha and so on superinduced on Âditya and so on, or else contemplations on Âditya, &c. superinduced on the udgîtha and so on.
No definite rule can here be established, the pûrvapakshin maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in the present case we are unable to ascertain any special pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert definitively that it is superior to Âditya and so on; the udgîtha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to any of them any pre-eminence.--Or else we may decide that the ideas of the udgîtha and so on arc to be superinduced exclusively on Âditya and so on. For the udgîtha and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is known that the fruit is attained through the work, Âditya
and so on if meditated upon as udgîtha and so on will themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be causes of fruit.--Moreover, the text, 'This earth is the Rik, the fire is the Sâman,' is followed by the complementary passage, 'this Sâman is placed upon this Rik,' where the word 'Rik' denotes the earth and the word 'Sâman' the fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth 'Rik' and calling the fire 'Sâman') is possible only if the meaning of the passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as Rik and Sâman; not if the Rik and the Sâman were to be contemplated as earth and fire. For the term 'king' is metaphorically applied to the charioteer--and not the term 'charioteer' to the king--the reason being that the charioteer may be viewed as a king.--Again in the text, 'Let a man meditate upon the fivefold Sâman in the world,.' the use of the locative case 'in the worlds' intimates that the meditation on the Sâman is to be superimposed on the worlds as its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage, 'This Gâyatra Sâman is woven on the vital airs' (Kh. Up. II, 11, 1).--Moreover (as proved before), in passages such as 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the instruction.' Brahman, which is mentioned last, is superimposed on Âditya, which is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, &c., are mentioned first, and the hiṅkâra, &c., mentioned last in passages such as 'The earth is the hiṅkâra' (Kh. Up. II. 2, i).--For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial action has to be transferred to Âditya and so on, which are not such members.
To this we make the following reply. The ideas of Âditya and so on are exclusively to be transferred to members of sacrificial action, such as the udgîtha and so on. For what reason?--' On account of effectuation '--that means: Because thus, through their connexion with the supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under discussion), when the udgîtha and so on are ceremonially qualified by being viewed as Âditya and so on, the sacrificial work is successful 1. A scriptural passage--viz. Kh. Up. I, 1.10,
[paragraph continues] 'Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful'--moreover expressly declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial work.--Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted with regard to those meditations which have for their result the success of certain works; but how is it with meditations that have independent fruits of their own? Of this latter nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in Kh. Up. II, 2, 3, 'He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Sâman in the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and a descending scale).'--In those cases also, we reply, the meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading of which it is mentioned; the case being analogous to that of the godohana-vessel 1.--And as Âditya and so on are of the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior to the udgîtha and so on which are of the nature of action only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of Âditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain works.--Moreover the initial passages, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the udgîtha,' and 'Of this syllable the full account is this' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), represent the udgîtha only as the object of meditation, and only after that the
text enjoins the contemplations on Âditya and so on.--Nor can we accept the remark that Âditya and so on being meditated upon as udgîtha, &c., assume thereby the nature of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable of producing a result. And if the udgîtha and so on are meditated upon as Âditya, &c., they do not therefore cease to be of the nature of work.--In the passage, 'This Sâman is placed upon this Rik,' the words 'Rik' and 'Sâman' are employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of implication (lakshanâ), and implication may be based, according to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage is to enjoin the contemplation of the Rik and the Sâman as earth and Agni, yet--as the Rik and the Sâman are mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are mentioned close by--we decide that, on the ground of their connexion with the Rik and Sâman, the words 'Rik' and 'Sâman' are employed to denote them (i.e. earth and Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the word 'charioteer' may, for some reason or other, metaphorically denote a king.--Moreover the position of the words in the clause, 'Just this (earth) is Rik,' declares that the Rik is of the nature of earth; while if the text wanted to declare that the earth is of the nature of Rik, the words would be arranged as follows, 'this earth is just Rik'--Moreover the concluding clause. 'He who knowing this sings the Sâman,' refers only to a cognition based on a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one based on the earth and so on.--Analogously in the passage, 'Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Sâman in the worlds,' the worlds--although enounced in the locative case--have to be superimposed on the Sâman, as the circumstance of the 'Sâman' being exhibited in the objective case indicates it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are superimposed on the Sâman, the Sâman is meditated upon as the Self of the worlds; while in the opposite case the worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Sâman.--The same remark applies to the passage, 'This Gâyatra
[paragraph continues] Sâman is woven on the prânas' (Kh. Up. II, 11, 1).--Where again both members of the sentence are equally exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Sâman (as) the sun' (Kh. Up. II, 9, 1), we observe that the introductory passages--viz. 'Meditation on the whole Sâman is good;' 'Thus for the fivefold Sâman;' 'Next for the sevenfold Sâman' (Kh. Up. II, 1, 1; 7, 2; 8, 1)--represent the Sâman only as the object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Âditya has to be superinduced on it. and not the reverse.--From this very circumstance of the Sâman being the object of meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two members of the sentence have a reverse position--such as 'The earth (is) the hiṅkâra,' &c.--the hiṅkâra, &c., have to be viewed as earth and so on; and not the reverse.--From all this it follows that reflections based on things not forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Âditya and so on, are to be superimposed on the udgîtha and the like which are such constituent members.
Footnotes
346:1 Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action--such as p. 347 the udgîtha--undergo a certain ceremonial purification (samskâra) by being meditated upon as Âditya and so on. The meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the constituent members, towards the apûrva, the supersensuous result of the entire sacrifice.
347:1 The sacred text promises a special fruit for the employment of the milking-pail (instead of the ordinary kamasa), viz. the obtainment of cattle; nevertheless that fruit is obtained only in so far as the godohana subserves the accomplishment of the apûrva of the sacrifice. Analogously those meditations on members of sacrificial works for which the text promises a separate fruit obtain that fruit only in so far as they effect a mysterious samskâra in those members, and thereby subserve the apûrva of the sacrifice.
7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of the possibility.
As meditations connected with members of sacrificial action depend on action, we need not raise the question whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only. With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand, the author of the Sûtras raises the question whether they may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing, sitting, or lying down, or only by a person sitting.
The pûrvapakshin here maintains that as meditation is something mental there can be no restriction as to the attitude of the body.--No, the author of the Sûtras rejoins; 'Sitting' only a man is to meditate.--Why?--'On account of the possibility.' By meditation we understand the lengthened carrying on of an identical train of thought; and of this a man is capable neither when going nor when running, since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind.
] The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on maintaining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down, finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person, on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on meditations.
8. And on account of thoughtfulness.
Moreover also the word 'thoughtfulness' denotes a lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now 'thoughtfulness' we ascribe to those whose mind is concentrated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness is easy for those who sit; and we therefore conclude herefrom also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting person.
9. And with reference to immobility (scripture ascribes thought to the earth, &c.).
Moreover, in the passage 'The earth thinks as it were' scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is the occupation of one who is sitting.
10. And Smriti-passages say the same.
Authoritative authors also teach in their Smritis that a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation: cp. e.g. Bha. Gîtâ VI. 11,--Having made a firm seat for one's self on a pure spot.' For the same reason the Yogasâstra teaches different sitting posture, viz. the so-called lotus position and so on.
11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there (meditation may be carried on), on account of there being no difference.
A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and
time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not.--Against the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c., of Vedic works, the Sûtrakâra remarks that all rules concerning direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely; that is to say: Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever place and facing whatever region, he may with case manage to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping towards the cast for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentration may be managed indifferently anywhere.--But, an objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules, as e.g. the following one, 'Let a man apply himself (to meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles, fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of caves and shelters' (Svet. Up. II, 10).--Such particular rules are met with indeed; but the teacher being friendly-minded says that there is no binding rule as to the--particulars mentioned therein. The clause 'favourable to the mind' moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever concentration of the mind may be attained.
12. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated); for then also it is thus seen in scripture.
The first adhikarana (of the present adhyâya) has established that repetition is to be observed with regard to all meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate--in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is terminated by the husks becoming detached from the grains--with their effect being accomplished; for as soon as the effect, i.e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no further effort can be commanded since scriptural instruction does not apply to him who knows that Brahman--which is not the object of injunction--constitutes his Self. On the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of
exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop; or whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as he lives.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that such meditations are to be carried on for some time only and then to be given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition.
To this we make the following reply. The devotee is to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached by means of the extreme meditation. For such works also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced; as appears from such passages as, 'Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with that knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2); 'Whatever his thought (at the time of death), with that he goes into Prâna, and the Prâna united with light, together with the individual Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of death)' (Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10). This also follows from the comparison to the caterpillar (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3). But the meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death, require any other creative cognition but a repetition of themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the scriptural text, Sat. Brâ. X, 6, 3, 1--'With whatever thought he passes away from this world'--declares that the meditation extends up to the time of death. Similarly Smriti says, 'Remembering whatever form of being he in the end leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes, assimilated to its being' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 6); and 'At the time of death with unmoved mind' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 10). And that at the moment of death also there remains something to be done, the scriptural passage (Kh. Up. III, 17. 6) also proves. 'Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge with this triad.'
13. On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there take place) the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared (by scripture).
The supplement to the third adhyâya is finished herewith, and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman.--The doubt here presents itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extinguished, the pûrvapakshin maintains, before they have given their results, because the purpose of all works is their result. For we understand from scripture that work possesses the power of producing results; if, therefore, the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result, scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. Smriti also declares that 'works do not perish.'--But from this it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding expiatory ceremonies is meaningless!--This objection is without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences; as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion of the house (of one who has established the sacred fireplace) being burned 1.--Let us moreover admit that expiatory ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish that mischief. But there is no analogous injunction of the knowledge of Brahman.--But if we do not admit that the works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his works and thus cannot obtain release!--This follows by no means; but in the same way as the results of works, release will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special causes.--For these reasons the obtainment of Brahman does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) misdeeds.
To this we make the following reply. On the obtainment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior ones.--'On account of this being declared.' For in a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scripture expressly declares that future sins which might be presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him who knows: 'As water docs not cling to a lotus-leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Kh. Up. IV, 34, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction of previously accumulated evil deeds: 'As the fibres of the Ishîkâ reed when thrown into the fire are burned, thus all his sins are burned' (Kh. Up. V, 24, 3). The extinction of works the following passage also declares, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8).--Nor is there any force in the averment that the assumption of works being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny the fruit-producing power of works; this power actually exists; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only with the existence of this power in general, not with its obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the Smriti passage, 'For work is not extinguished,' expresses the general rule; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural and Smriti passages such as 'All sins transcends he, the murder of a Brâhmana transcends he who offers the asvamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus' (Tai. Samh. V, 3, 12, 1).--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences (without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil,
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and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit.--Against the objection that knowledge is not actually enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding complementary passages declare that he who possesses such knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin. Now there is no reason why the passages should not expressly aim at declaring these two things 1, and we therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyâs is the acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment of all sin. In the case of vidyâs referring to Brahman devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding injunction; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent. (With relation to these vidyâs about Brahman as devoid of qualities) the term 'non-clinging' shows that, as far as future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works past, although he has entered as it were into that state owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are dissolved when, through the power of know ledge, wrong cognition comes to an end; this is conveyed by the term 'destruction.' 'That Brahman whose nature it is to be at all times neither agent nor enjoyer. and which is thus opposed in being to the (soul's) previously established state of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I; hence I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time, nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such at any future time;' this is the cognition of the man who knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which have been running on from eternity could not be cut short, release
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could never take place.--Nor can final release be dependent on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is; for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is non-permanent and cannot be.
It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining Brahman there results the extinction of all sin.
Footnotes
353:1 Scripture enjoins the ishti in question merely on the occasion of the house being burned, not as annulling the mischief done.
355:1 I.e. there is no reason to assume that those passages mention the acquisition of lordly power and the cessation of sin merely for the purpose of glorifying the injunction, and not for the purpose of stating the result of our compliance with the injunction.
14. Of the other (i.e. good works) also there is, in the same way, non-clinging; but at death.
In the preceding adhikarana it has been shown that, according to scriptural statements, all natural sin--which is the cause of the soul's bondage--does, owing to the power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo destruction. One might now think that works of religious duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel this notion the reasoning of the last adhikarana is formally extended to the case under discussion. For him who knows there is 'in the same way,' i.e. as in the case of sin, 'non-clinging' and destruction 'of the other also,' i.e. of good works also; because such works also, as productive of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the result of knowledge. Scripture also--in passages such as 'He overcomes both' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22)--declares that good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and the extinction of works which depends on the cognition of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage making a general statement without any distinction, viz. 'And his works are extinguished' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And even there where the text mentions evil works only, we must consider good works also to be implied therein, because the results of the latter also are inferior to the result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the term 'evil works' to good works also, viz. in the passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, i, 'Day and night do not pass that bank,' where good works are mentioned together with evil works, and finally the term 'evil' is without any distinction applied to all things mentioned before, 'All evil things
turn back from it.'--'But at death.' The word 'but' is meant for emphatical assertion. As it is established that good as well as evil works--which are both causes of bondage--do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo destruction, there necessarily results final release of him who knows as soon as death takes place.
15. But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge); because (scripture states) that (i.e. the death of the body) to be the term.
In the two preceding adhikaranas it has been proved that good as well as evil works are annihilated through knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those works whose effects have already begun to operate as well as to those whose effects have not yet begun; or only to works of the latter kind.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that on the ground of scriptural passages such as 'He thereby overcomes both,' which refer to all works without any distinction, all works whatever must be considered to undergo destruction.
To this we reply, 'But only those whose effects have not begun.' Former works, i.e. works, whether good or evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of existence as well as in the current form of existence before the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attainment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed--i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises--are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is founded on the scriptural passage, 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body)' (Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2), which fixes the death of the body as the term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise,
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i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge, there would be no reason for the continuance of the current form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would therefore be immediately followed by the state of final release; in which case scripture would not teach that one has to wait for the death of the body.--But, an objection is raised, the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works; how then should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected? We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and seeds come into contact the germinative power of some seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains unimpaired!--The origination of knowledge, we reply, cannot take place without dependence on an aggregate of works whose effects have already begun to operate, and when this dependence has once been entered into, we must--as in the case of the potter's wheel--wait until the motion of that which once has begun to move comes to an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim. The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge; but wrong knowledge--comparable to the appearance of a double moon--lasts for some time even after it has been refuted, owing to the impression it has made.--Moreover it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman--vouched for by his heart's conviction--and at the same time continuing to enjoy bodily existence? This same point is explained in scripture and Smriti, where they describe him who stands firm in the highest knowledge.--The final decision therefore is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works only--whether good or evil--whose effects have not yet begun to operate.
16. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards the same effect; scripture showing this.
The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the
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non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this extension comprehends all good works alike, the Sûtrakâra remarks, 'But the Agnihotra and so on.'--The word 'but' is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra, tend 'towards the same effect,' i e. have the same effect as knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the following one, 'Brâhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).--But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have different effects, it is impossible that they should have one and the same effect!--It is observed, we reply, that sour milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the poison taken while certain mantras are recited; in the same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final release.--But final release is something not to be effected at all; how then can you declare it to be the effect of works?--Works, we reply, may subserve final release mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release. For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment of the Self of Brahman--which Brahman is not subject to injunction--lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are not excluded. Such works also--because they have no other effect if undertaken without a view to reward--may be brought into connexion with knowledge.
To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction, and to what works the following statement made in some Sâkhâ about the application of works,' His sons enter upon
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his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies upon his evil works?'--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
17. For (there is) also (a class of good works) other than this, according to some. (There is agreement) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those works.)
'For also one other than this,' i.e. there is also a class of good works different from works of permanent obligation, viz. those good works which are performed with a view to a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above from some Sâkhâ ('His friends enter on his good works') teaches the application. And first of those works Sûtra 14 teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers, Gaimini as well as Bâdarâyana, are agreed that such works, undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.
18. For (the text) 'Whatever he does with knowledge' (intimates that).
In the preceding adhikarana the following conclusion has been established:--Works of permanent obligation such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purification of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of Brahman, which leads to final release; they therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are either connected with a special knowledge based on the constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute (non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from scriptural texts such as 'He who knowing this sacrifices; he who knowing this makes an offering; he who knowing this recites; he who knowing this sings; therefore let a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest
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[paragraph continues] (Kh. Up. IV, 17, i); therefore both perform the work, he who knows this and he who does not know it' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 10).--We have now to consider the question whether only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires release and thus operate towards the same effect as knowledge; or whether both kinds of works--those connected with knowledge and those not so connected--equally act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on the one hand from scriptural passages such as 'That Self they seek to know by sacrifice' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), which represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to Agnihotras, &c., if connected with knowledge.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that only such sacrificial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from various scriptural and Smriti passages that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge; cp. e.g. 'On the very day on which he sacrifices on that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 2); and 'Possesser of this knowledge thou wilt cast off the bonds of action;' 'Action is far inferior to concentration of mind' (Bha. Gîtâ II, 39; 49).
To this the Sûtrakâra replies, 'For what with knowledge only.' It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge, in the same way as a Brâhmana possessed of knowledge is superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with knowledge are not altogether ineffective; for certain scriptural texts declare that such works are, all of them without any difference, causes of knowledge; so e.g. the passage, 'That Self they seek to know through sacrifices.'--But, as we understand from scripture that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge, we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if unaccompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the
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cognition of the Self!--By no means, we reply. The proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self; while the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agnihotra and similar works which scripture, without making any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. 'they seek to know through sacrifices') should not subserve it. With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, 'Whatever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad that is more powerful' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 10); for this text--in speaking of the greater power of work joined with knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such work with regard to its effect--intimates thereby that work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards the same effect. By the 'power' of work we understand its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept as settled the following conclusion: All works of permanent obligation, such as the Agnihotra--whether joined with or devoid of knowledge--which have been performed before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous of release with a view to release; all such works act, according to their several capacities, as means of the extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment, subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devotion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman.
19. But having destroyed by fruition the two other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman.
It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose effects have not yet begun are extinguished by the power of knowledge. 'The two others,' on the other hand, i.e. those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man
has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences, and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears from scriptural passages such as 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman'(Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); and 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6).--But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue after the death of the body, just as it continued before death; analogously to the visual appearance of a double moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized as false).--Not so, we reply. After the death of the body there no longer exists any cause for such continuance; while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction of the remainder of works to be enjoyed.--But a new aggregate of works will originate a new fruition!--Not so, we reply; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed. What, on the death of the body, could originate a new period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works depend on false knowledge; but such false knowledge is completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect isolation.
VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
With the Commentary by
SAṄKARÂKÂRYA
translated by GEORGE THIBAUT
Fourth Adhyâya. Second Pâda
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. Speech (is merged) in mind, on account of this being seen, and of the scriptural statement.
Being about to describe the path of the gods which leads those who possess the lower kind of knowledge towards the attainment of their reward, the Sûtrakâra begins by explaining, on the basis of scriptural statements, the successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body; for, as will be stated later on, the departure of the soul is the same in the case of him who possesses the (lower) knowledge and of him who is devoid of all knowledge.
About the process of dying we have the following passage, 'When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the highest deity' (Kh. Up. VI, 6, 1). A doubt here arises whether the passage means to say that speech itself, together with its function, is merged in the mind, or only the function of speech.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that speech itself is merged in the mind. For this explanation only is in agreement with the direct statement of the sacred text, while the other alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied meaning; now wherever direct enunciation and implied meaning are in conflict the preference has to be given to the former, and we therefore maintain that speech itself is merged in the mind.
To this we reply that only the function of speech is merged in the mind.--But how can this interpretation be maintained, considering that the teacher (in the Sûtra) expressly says 'Speech in the mind?'--True we reply; but later on he says 'There is non-division, according to scriptural statement' (Sûtra 16), and we therefrom conclude that what is meant in the present Sûtra is merely cessation of the function of speech. For if the intention were to
express absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech) itself, there would be 'non-division' in all cases, and for what reason then should 'non-division' be specially stated in another case (i.e. in the case of which Sûtra 16 treats)? The meaning therefore is that the different functions are retracted, and that while the function of the mind continues to go on the function of speech is retracted first.--Why so?--'Because this is seen.' It is a matter of observation that while the mind continues to act the function of speech comes to an end; nobody, on the other hand, is able to see that the organ of speech itself, together with its function, is merged in the mind.--But are we not justified in assuming such a merging of speech in the mind, on the ground of scriptural statement?--This is impossible, we reply, since mind is not the causal substance of speech. We are entitled to assume only that a thing is merged in what is its causal substance; a pot e.g. (when destroyed) is merged in clay. But there is no proof whatever for speech originating from mind. On the other hand we observe that functions originate and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal substances. The function of fire, e.g. which is of the nature of heat, springs from fuel which is of the nature of earth, and it is extinguished in water.--But how do you, on this interpretation, account for the scriptural statement that 'speech is merged in the mind?'--'And on account of the scriptural statement,' the Sûtrakâra replies. The scriptural statement also may be reconciled with our interpretation, in so far as the function and the thing to which the function belongs are viewed as non-different.
2. And for the same reason all (sense-organs) (follow) after (mind).
'Therefore he whose light has gone out comes to a new birth with his senses merged in the mind' (Pr. Up. III, 9); this passage states that all senses without difference are merged in the mind. 'For the same reason,' i.e. because there also as in the case of speech, it is observed that the eye and so on discontinue their functions, while the mind together with its functions persists, and because the organs
themselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text admits of that interpretation; we conclude that the different organs follow after, i.e. are merged in, the mind only as far as their functions arc concerned.--As all organs 1 without difference are merged in the mind, the special mention made of speech (in Sûtra 1) must be viewed as made in agreement with the special example referred to by scripture, 'Speech is merged in mind.'
3. That mind (is merged) in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.
It has been shown that the passage, 'Speech is merged in mind,' means a merging of the function only.--A doubt here arises whether the subsequent clause, 'mind in breath,' also means to intimate a merging of the function only or of that to which the function belongs.--The pûrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative. For that, he says, agrees with scripture, and moreover breath may be viewed as the causal substance of mind. For scripture--'Mind is made of earth, breath of water' (Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5)--states that mind comes from earth and breath from water, and scripture further states that 'Water sent forth earth' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 4). When mind therefore is merged in breath, it is the same as earth being merged in water; for mind is earth and breath is water, causal substance and effect being non-different.
To this we reply as follows. 'The subsequent clause' intimates that the mind, after having absorbed within itself the functions of the outer senses, is merged in breath only in the way of its function being so merged. For we observe in the case of persons lying in deep sleep or about to die that, while the function of breath persists, the functions of the mind are stopped. Nor is the mind capable of being itself merged in breath, since breath does not constitute its causal substance.--But it has been shown above that breath is the causal substance of mind!--This is not valid,
we reply. For the relation of causality, made out in such an indirect way, does not suffice to show that mind is really merged in breath. Were it so, then mind would also be merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor is there, on the alternative contemplated, any proof of mind having originated from that water which had passed over into breath.--Mind cannot therefore, in itself, be merged in breath. And that the scriptural statement is satisfied by a mere merging of the function--the function and that to which the function belongs being viewed as identical--has been shown already under the preceding Sûtra.
4. That (viz. breath) (is merged) in the ruler (i.e. the individual soul), on account of the (statements as to the prânas) coming to it and so on.
We have ascertained that a thing which has not originated from another is not itself merged in the latter, but only through its functions. A doubt now arises whether, according to the word of scripture, the function of breath is merged in heat, or in the individual soul which is the ruler of the body and senses.--According to the pûrvapakshin we must conclude that the breath is merged in heat only, since the scriptural statement allows no room for doubt and we are not entitled to assume something not declared by scripture. The breath under discussion persists 'in the ruler,' i.e. the intelligent Self (the individual soul) which possesses nescience, work, and former knowledge as limiting adjuncts; i.e. the function of breath has that soul for its substratum.--Why so?--'On account of (the prânas) going towards him,' &c.--Another scriptural passage declares that all prânas without any difference go to the soul, 'All the prânas go to the Self at the time of death when a man is thus going to expire' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38). Another passage again specially declares that the prâna with its five functions follows the individual soul, 'After him thus departing the prâna departs, 'and that the other prânas follow that prâna, 'And after the prâna thus departing all the other prânas depart' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). And the text, 'He is furnished with intelligence' (ibid.), by declaring the individual soul to
be of intimately intelligent nature, suggests that in it, viz. the soul, the prâna--into which the different organs of knowledge have been merged--has taken its abode.--But scripture also says, 'The prâna (is merged) in heat;' why then make the addition implied in the doctrine--that breath is merged in the individual soul?--We must make that addition, we reply, because in the process of departure &c. the soul is the chief agent, and because we must pay regard to specifications contained in other scriptural passages also.--How then do you explain the statement, 'Breath is merged in heat?'--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
5. To the elements (the soul, with prâna, goes), on account of the subsequent scriptural clause.
The soul joined by the prâna takes up its abode within the subtle elements which accompany heat and form the seed of the (gross) body. This we conclude from the clause, 'Breath in heat.'--But this passage declares, not that the soul together with the prâna takes up its abode in heat, but only that the prâna takes up its abode!--No matter, we reply; since the preceding Sûtra intercalates the soul in the interval (between prâna and tegas). Of a man who first travels from--Srughna to Mathurâ and then from Mathurâ to Pâtaliputra, we may say shortly that he travels from--Srughna to Pâtaliputra. The passage under discussion therefore means that the soul together with the prâna abides in the elements associated with heat.--But how are you entitled to draw in the other elements also, while the text only speaks of heat?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
6. Not to one (element) (the soul goes); for both (i.e. scripture and Smriti) declare this.
At the time of passing over into another body the individual soul does not abide in the one element of heat only; for we see that the new body consists of various elements. This matter is declared in the question and answer about the waters called man (Kh. Up. V, 3, 3); as explained by us in III, 1, 2.--Scripture and Smriti alike
teach this doctrine; compare e.g. 'Consisting of earth, water, wind, ether, heat' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'The subtle perishable parts of the five (elements) from them all this is produced in due succession' (Manu I, 27).--But is there not another scriptural text--beginning--'Where then is that person?'--which teaches that at the time of the soul attaining a new body, after speech and the other organs have been withdrawn within the soul, work constitutes the soul's abode, 'What those two said, as work they said it; what they praised, as work they praised it' (Bri. Up. III, 2. 13)?--That passage, we reply, describes the operation of bondage consisting of the senses and their objects--there called grahas and atigrahas--and therefore work is spoken of as the abode; here on the other hand the elements are said to be the abode because we have to do with the origination of a new body out of the matter of the elements. The expression 'they prayed' moreover intimates only that work occupies the chief place in the process, and does not exclude another abode. The two passages therefore do not contradict each other.
7. And common (to him who knows and him who does not know) (is the departure) up to the beginning of the way; and the immortality (of him who knows) (is relative only) without having burned (nescience and so on).
The question here arises whether the departure of the soul, as described hitherto, is the same in the case of him who knows and him who is destitute of knowledge; or whether there is any difference.--There is a difference, the pûrvapakshin maintains. For the departure as described has for its abode the elements, and this abiding in the elements is for the purpose of a new birth. But he who possesses true knowledge cannot be born again, since scripture declares that 'He who knows reaches immortality.' Hence only he who is devoid of knowledge departs in the way described.--But as that departure is described in chapters treating of knowledge it can belong only to him
who knows!--Not so, the pûrvapakshin replies. In the same way as sleep and the like, the departure of the soul is only referred to in the texts as something established elsewhere (not as something to be taught as part of true knowledge). Passages such as 'When a man sleeps,--is hungry,--is thirsty' (Kh. Up. VI, 8), although forming part of chapters concerned with true knowledge, mention sleep and so on which are common to all living beings, because they assist the comprehension of the matter to be taught, but do not aim at enjoining them specially for those who know. Analogously the texts about the soul's departure refer to that departure only in order to teach that 'that highest deity in which the heat of the dying man is merged, that is the Self, that art thou.' Now that departure is (in other scriptural passages) specially denied of him who knows; it therefore belongs to him only who does not know.
To this we make the following reply. That departure which is described in the passage, 'speech is merged in mind,' &c., must be 'common' to him who knows and him who does not know 'up to the beginning of the way;' because scripture records no distinction. The soul destitute of true knowledge having taken its abode in the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and being impelled by its works, migrates into a new body; while the soul of him who knows passes into the vein, revealed by true knowledge, which is the door of release. In this sense the Sûtra says 'up to the beginning of the way.'--But he who knows reaches immortality, and immortality does not depend on a change of place; why then should the soul take its abode in the elements or set out on a journey?--That immortality, we reply, is 'without having burned.' i.e. for him who, without having altogether burned nescience and the other afflictions, is about to obtain, through the power of the lower knowledge, a relative immortality only, there take place the entering on the way and the abiding in the elements. For without a substratum the prânas could not move. There is thus no difficulty.
8. This (aggregate of the elements) (continues to exist) up to the (final absolute) union (with Brahman); on account of the declarations of the samsâra state (made by scripture).
With regard to the final clause, 'Heat in the highest deity,' the force of its connexion with what precedes shows that the meaning is 'the heat of the dying man is--together with the individual soul, the prâna, the aggregate of the organs and the other elements--merged in Brahman.'--We now have to consider of what kind that merging is.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that it is an absolute absorption of the things merged, since it is proved that those things have the highest deity for their causal matter. For it has been established that the deity is the causal substance of all things that have an origin. Hence that passing into the state of non-separation is an absolute one.
To this we reply as follows. Those subtle elements--heat and so on--which constitute the abode of hearing and the other organs persist up to the 'union,' i.e. up to final release from the samsâra, which is caused by perfect knowledge. 'On account of the declarations of the samsâra state' made in passages such as 'Some enter the womb, for embodied existence as organic beings; others go into inorganic matter, according to their work and according to their knowledge' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 7). Otherwise the limiting adjuncts of every soul would, at the time of death, be absorbed and the soul would enter into absolute union with Brahman; which would render all scriptural injunction and scriptural doctrine equally purportless. Moreover bondage, which is due to wrong knowledge, cannot be dissolved but through, perfect knowledge. Hence, although Brahman is the causal substance of those elements, they are at the time of death--as in the case of deep sleep and a pralaya of the world--merged in it only in such a way as to continue to exist in a seminal condition.
9. And (heat is) subtle in measure; as this is thus observed.
The elementary matter of heat and the other elements
which form the substratum for the soul when passing out of this body, must be subtle in its nature and extent. This follows from the scriptural passages, which declare that it passes out by the veins and so on. Their thinness renders them capable of passing out, and their transparency (permeability) is the cause of their not being stopped by any gross substance. For these reasons they, when passing out of the body, are not perceived by bystanders.
10. For this reason (it is) not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body).
On account of this very subtlety the subtle body is not destroyed by what destroys the gross body, viz. burning and the like.
11. And to that same (subtle body) that warmth (belongs), on account of the proof (which observation furnishes).
To that same subtle body belongs the warmth which we perceive in the living body by means of touch. That warmth is not felt in the body after death, while such qualities as form, colour and so on continue to be perceived; it is on the other hand, observed as long as there is life. From this it follows that the warmth resides in something different from the body as ordinarily known. Scripture also says, 'He is warm if going to live, cold if going to die.'
12. Should you say that on account of the denial (made by scripture) (the soul of him who knows Brahman does not depart); we deny this, (because scripture means to say that the prânas do not depart) from the embodied soul.
From the distinction conveyed by the clause, 'and (relative) immortality without having burned' (Sûtra 7), it follows that in the case of absolute immortality being reached there is no going and no departure of the soul from the body.--The idea that for some reason or other
a departure of the soul might take place in this latter case also, is precluded by the following scriptural passage, 'But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, of him the vital spirits do not depart,--being Brahman, he goes to Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6). From this express denial--forming part of the higher knowledge--it follows that the prânas do not pass out of the body of him who knows Brahman.
This conclusion the pûrvapakshin denies. For, he says, the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the prânas from the body, but from the embodied (individual) soul.--How is this known?--From the fact that in another Sâkhâ we have (not the sixth, genitive, case 'of him,' but) the fifth, ablative, case 'from him'--'From him the vital spirits do not depart' (Mâdhyandina Sâkhâ). For the sixth case which expresses only relation in general is determined towards some special relation by the fifth case met with in another Sâkhâ. And as the embodied soul which has a claim on exaltation and bliss is the chief topic of the chapter, we construe the words 'from him' to mean not the body but the embodied soul. The sense therefore is 'from that soul when about to depart the prânas do not depart, but remain with it.' The soul of him who dies therefore passes out of the body, together with the prânas. This view the next Sûtra refutes.
13. For (in the text) of some (the denial of the soul's departure) is clear.
The assertion that also the soul of him who knows Brahman departs from the body, because the denial states the soul (not the body) to be the point of departure, cannot be upheld. For we observe that in the sacred text of some there is a clear denial of a departure, the starting-point of which is the body.--The text meant at first records the question asked by Ârtabhâga, 'When this man dies, do the vital spirits depart from him or not?' then embraces the alternative of non-departure, in the words, No, replied Yâgñavalkya; thereupon--anticipating the objection that
a man cannot be dead as long as his vital spirits have not departed--teaches the resolution of the prânas in the body 'in that very same place they are merged;' and finally, in confirmation thereof, remarks, 'he swells, he is inflated, inflated the dead man lies.' This last clause states that swelling, &c., affect the subject under discussion, viz. that from which the departure takes place (the 'tasmât' of the former clause), which subject is, in this last clause, referred to by means of the word 'He.' Now swelling and so on can belong to the body only, not to the embodied soul. And owing to its equality thereto 1 also the passages, 'from him the vital spirits do not depart;' 'in that very same place they are resolved,' have to be taken as denying a departure starting from the body, although the chief subject of the passage is the embodied soul. This may be done by the embodied soul and the body being viewed as non-different 2. In this way we have to explain the passage if read with the fifth case.--If again the passage is read with the sixth case ('of him the vital spirits do not depart'), it must be understood as denying the departure of him who knows, as its purport manifestly is to deny a departure established elsewhere. But what it denies can only be a departure from the body; for what is established (viz. for ordinary men not possessing the highest knowledge) is only the departure (of the soul, &c.) from the body, not the departure (of the prânas, &c.) from the embodied soul.--Moreover, after the passage, 'Either through the eye or through the skull or through other places of the body, him thus departing the prâna departs after, and after the departing prâna all prânas depart,' &c., has at length described the departure and transmigration of the soul as belonging to him who does not know, and after the account of him
who does not know has been concluded with the words. 'So much for the man who has desires,' the text designates him who knows as 'he who has no desires;' a designation which, would be altogether inappropriate if the text wanted to establish departure, &c., for that person also. The passage therefore has to be explained as denying of him who knows the going and departing which are established for him who does not know. For thus only the designation employed by the text has a sense.--And for him who knowing Brahman has become the Self of that omnipresent Brahman, and in whom all desires and works have become extinct, departing and going are not even possible, as there is not any occasion for them. And such texts as 'there he reaches Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7) indicate the absence of all going and departing.
Footnotes
374:1 I.e. its belonging to the same chapter and treating of the same subject.
374:2 The two being viewed as non-different, the pronoun (tasmât), which properly denotes the soul, the person, may be used to denote the body.--Abhedopakârena dehadehinor dehaparâmarsinâ sarvanâmnâ deha eva parâmrishta iti. Bhâ.
14. And Smriti also says that.
In the Mahâbhârata also it is said that those who know do not go or depart, 'He who has become the Self of all beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the gods themselves are perplexed, seeking for the path of him who has no path.'--But, an objection is raised, other passages speak of men knowing Brahman as going, so e.g. 'Suka the son of Vyâsa being desirous of release travelled to the sphere of the sun; being called by his father who had followed him, he gave an answering shout.'--That passage, we reply, describes (not the effects of the highest knowledge but only) how an embodied person, through the power of Yoga (which is of the nature of the lower knowledge), reached some special place and freed himself from the body. This appears from it being mentioned that he was seen by all beings; for the beings could not see a person moving without a body. The conclusion of the story makes all this clear, 'Suka having moved through the air more rapidly than wind, and having shown his power, was known by all beings.'--It thus follows that he who knows Brahman neither moves nor departs. To what sphere the scriptural texts about going and so on refer we shall explain later on.
15. Those (elements, &c.) (are merged) in the highest Brahman; for thus (scripture) says.
Those, i.e. the sense organs--denoted by the term 'prâna'--and the elements of him who knows the highest Brahman, are merged in that same highest Brahman.--Why?--Because scripture declares that 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person, when they have reached the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI, 5).--But another text which refers to him who knows teaches that the parts also are merged in something different from the highest Self, 'The fifteen parts enter into their elements' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 7).--No, we reply. This latter passage is concerned with the ordinary view of the matter, according to which the parts of the body which consist of earth and so on are merged in their causal substances, earth and so on. The former passage, on the other hand, expresses the view of him who knows; according to which the whole aggregate of the parts of him who knows the highest Brahman is merged in Brahman only.--There is thus no contradiction.
16. (There is absolute) non-division (from Brahman, of the parts merged in it); according to scriptural declaration.
When the parts of him who knows are merged in Brahman, is there a remainder (which is not so merged), as in the case of other men; or is there no such remainder? As the merging of him also who knows falls under the general heading of merging, it might be assumed that of him also there remains a potential body, and the Sûtrakâra therefore teaches expressly that the elements, &c., of him who knows enter into the relation of (absolute) non-division from Brahman.--On what ground?--Because scripture declares this. For after having taught the dissolution of the parts, the text continues, 'Their name and form are broken, and people speak of the person only; and he becomes without parts and immortal' (Pr. Up. VI, 5). And when parts that are due to nescience are dissolved
through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder should be left. The parts therefore enter into absolute non-division from Brahman.
17. (There takes place) a lighting up of the point of its (the soul's) abode (viz. the heart); the door (of its egress) being illuminated thereby; owing to the power of knowledge and the application of meditation to the way which is part of that (knowledge); (the soul) favoured by him in the heart (viz. Brahman) (passes upwards) by the one that exceeds a hundred (i.e. by the hundred and first vein).
Having absolved the inquiry into a point of the higher knowledge into which we were led by a special occasion, we now continue the discussion connected with the lower knowledge.--It has been stated that up to the beginning of the way the departure of him who knows and him who does not know is the same. The present Sûtra now describes the soul's entering on the way. The abode of the soul, when--having taken within itself speech and the other powers--it is about to depart, is the heart, according to the text, 'He taking with him those elements of light descends into the heart' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 1). Of the heart the point becomes lighted up, 'and subsequent to that is the departure of the soul, starting from the eye or some other place, according to the passage, 'The point of his heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the Self departs, either through the eye or through the skull or through other places of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). The question here arises whether that departure is the same for him who knows and him who does not know, or if there is a special limitation in the case of the former; and the prima facie view might be upheld that there is no such limitation since scripture records no difference. Against this the teacher states that although, equally for him who does know and him who does not know, the point of the heart becomes shining and the door of egress thereby
is lighted up, yet he who knows departs through the skull only, while the others depart from other places.--Why so?--'On account of the power of knowledge.' If also he who knows departed, like all others, from any place of the body, he would be unable to reach an exalted sphere; and then all knowledge would be purportless. 'And on account of the application of meditation on the way forming a part of that.' That means: in different vidyâs there is enjoined meditation on the soul's travelling on the way connected with the vein that passes through the skull;--which way forms a part of those vidyâs. Now it is proper to conclude that he who meditates on that way should after death proceed on it 1. Hence he who knows, being favoured by Brahman abiding in the heart on which he had meditated, and thus becoming like it in nature departs by the vein which passes through the skull and 'exceeds the hundred,' i.e. is the hundred and first. The souls of other men pass out by other veins. For thus scripture says, in a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman dwelling in the heart, 'There are a hundred and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; by that moving upwards a man reaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different directions' (Kh, Up. VIII, 6, 5).
18. (The soul after having passed forth from the body) follows the rays.
There is the vidyâ of him within the heart, which begins, 'There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1). A subsequent section of that chapter--beginning with the words, 'Now these veins of the heart'--describes at length the connexion of the veins and the rays, and the text then continues, 'When he departs from this body, he departs upwards by those very rays,' and further on, 'By that
moving upwards he reaches immortality.' From this we understand that the soul passing out by the hundred and first vein follows the rays.--A doubt here arises as to whether the soul of him who dies by night as well as of him who dies by day follows the rays, or the soul of the latter only.--Since scripture mentions no difference, the Sûtra teaches that the souls follow the rays in both cases.
19. (Should it be said that the soul does) not (follow the rays) by night; (we reply) not so, because the connexion (of veins and rays) exists as long as the body; and (scripture) also declares this.
It might perhaps be said that the veins and rays are connected during the day, so that the soul of a person who dies during the day may follow those rays; but not the soul of one who dies by night when the connexion of the veins and rays is broken.--But this is a mistaken assumption, because the connexion of rays and veins lasts as long as the body exists. This scripture also declares, 'They (the rays) stretch out from yonder sun and slip into these veins; they stretch from these veins and slip into yonder sun' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 2). We moreover observe that the rays of the sun continue to exist in the nights of the summer season; for we feel their warmth and other effects. During the nights of the other seasons they are difficult to perceive because then few only continue to exist; just as during the cloudy days of the cold season.--This the following scriptural passage also shows,' Day he makes in the night.'--If, moreover, he who dies at night mounted upwards without following the rays, the following of the rays would be generally meaningless. For the text gives no special direction to the effect that he who dies by day mounts upwards by means of the rays, while he who dies by night mounts without them.--Should, on the other hand, even he who knows be prevented from mounting upwards, by the mere mischance of dying by night, knowledge would in that case produce its fruit eventually only, and the consequence would be that--as the time of death is not
fixed--nobody would apply himself to knowledge.--If, again, a man dying at night should wait for the dawn (to mount upwards), it might happen that, owing to the action of the funeral fire, &c., his body would, at the time of daybreak, not be capable of entering into connexion with the rays. Scripture moreover expressly says that he does not wait, 'As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to the sun' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5).--For all these reasons the soul follows the rays by night as well as by day.
20. And for the same reason (the departed soul follows the rays) also during the southern progress of the sun.
For the same reason, viz. because waiting is impossible, and because the fruit of knowledge is not a merely eventual one, and because the time of death is not fixed, also that possessor of true knowledge who dies during the southern progress of the sun obtains the fruit of his knowledge. Because dying during the northern progress of the sun is more excellent, and because Bhîshma is known to have waited for that period, and because scripture says, 'From the light half of the month (they go) to the six months when the sun goes to the north,' it might be thought that the northern progress of the sun is needful for dying. This notion the Sûtra refutes. The greater excellence of the sun's northern progress applies to those only who do not possess the highest knowledge.--Bhîshma's waiting for the sun's northern progress was due to his wish of upholding good customs and of showing that by the favour of his father he could choose the time of his death.--And the sense of the scriptural passage quoted will be explained under IV, 3, 4.--But we have the following Smriti-text, 'At what times the Yogins depart either not to return or to return, those times I will declare to thee' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 23), which determines specially that to die by day and so on causes the soul not to return. How then can he who dies by night or during the sun's southern progress depart not to return? Concerning this point the next Sûtra remarks:
21. (These details) are recorded by Smriti with reference to the Yogins; and both (Sâṅkhya and Yoga) are Smriti (only).
The rules as to dying by day and so on in order not to return are given by Smriti for the Yogins only. And those two, viz. Yoga and Sâṅkhya are mere Smriti, not of scriptural character. As thus it has a different sphere of application and is based on a special kind of authority, the Smriti rule as to the time of dying has no influence on knowledge based on scripture.--But, an objection is raised, we have such passages as the following one, 'Fire, light, the day, the light half of the month, the six months of the northern progress; smoke, night, the dark half of the month, the six months of the southern progress' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 24; 25); in which though belonging to Smriti we recognise the path of the gods and the path of the fathers just as determined by scripture!--Our refutation, we reply, of the claims of Smriti applies only to the contradiction which may arise from the teaching of Smriti regarding the legitimate time of dying. 'I will tell you the time,' &c. In so far as Smriti also mentions Agni and the other divinities which lead on the departed soul, there is no contradiction whatever.
Fourth Adhyâya. Third Pâda
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. On the road beginning with light (the departed soul proceeds), on account of that being widely known.
It has been explained that up to the beginning of the way, the departure is the same. About the way itself, however, different texts make different declarations. One passage describes it as constituted by the junction of the veins and rays, 'Then he mounts upwards by just those rays' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5), Another passage describes it as beginning with light, 'They go to the light, from light to day' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 1). Another way is described, Kau. Up. I, 3, 'Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to the world of Agni.' Another, Bri. Up. V, 10, 1, 'When the person goes away from this world, he comes to the wind.' Another again. Mu. Up. I, 2, 11, 'Free from passions they depart through the gate of the sun.' A doubt here arises whether these ways are different from each other, or whether there is only one road of which the different texts mention different particulars.--The pûrvapakshin embraces the former alternative, for the reason that those roads are referred to in different chapters and form parts of different meditations. If, moreover, we regarded the statements about light and so on, the emphatical assertion 1 made in the first of the passages quoted above would be contradicted; and the statement about the quickness of mounting, 'As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to the sun,' would also be interfered with. We therefore conclude that the roads described are different roads. To this we reply, 'On the road beginning with light;'
i.e. we maintain that every one who desires to reach Brahman moves on the road beginning with light.--Why so?--'On account of its being widely known.' That road is known to all who possess knowledge. Thus the chapter of the vidyâ of the five fires ('And those also who in the forest meditate on the True as faith,' &c., Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15) expressly states that the road beginning with the light belongs to those also who practise other meditations.--That road, an objection is raised, may present itself to the mind in the case of those meditations which do not mention any road of their own; but why should it be accepted for such meditations as mention different roads of their own?--This objection would be valid, we reply, if the various roads mentioned were entirely different; but as a matter of fact there is only one road leading to the world of Brahman and possessing different attributes; and this road is designated in one place by one attribute and in another place by another attribute. For this relation of attributes and what possesses attributes is established by the circumstance that we recognise, in all the passages quoted, some part of the road 1. And if the chapters which mention the roads are different, we, as long as the meditation is one, have to combine the different attributes of the road (mentioned separately in the different chapters), in the same way as (in general) the different particulars of one meditation (which are stated in different chapters) have to be combined. And even if the meditations (in which the particulars of the road are mentioned) are different, the road must be viewed as one and the same, because we recognise everywhere some part of the road and because the goal is everywhere the same. For all the following passages declare one and the same result, viz. the obtainment of the world of Brahman: 'In these worlds of Brahman they dwell for ever and ever' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15); 'There he dwells eternal years' (Bri. Up. V, 10, 1);
[paragraph continues] 'Whatever victory, whatever greatness belongs to Brahman, that victory he gives, that greatness he reaches' (Kau. Up. I, 2); 'Those who find the world of Brahman by Brahmakarya' (Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 3).--To the remark that the emphatical assertion (made in the passage, 'Just by those rays,' &c.) would be contradicted by our admitting light and so on as stages of the road, we reply that no such difficulty exists, because that passage aims only at establishing the rays (as part of the road). For the one word 'just' cannot at the same time establish the rays and discard light and so on. The passage therefore must be understood as only emphasising the connexion with the rays.--Nor does the regard paid by us to the statements about light and so on being stages of the way contradict what one passage says about speed; for that passage means to say that one goes (to the world of Brahman) more quickly than anywhere else, so that its sense is, 'In the twinkling of an eye one goes there 1.'--Moreover the passage, 'On neither of these two ways' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 8)--in teaching that there is a third inferior road for those who have missed the other two roads--shows that besides the road of the fathers there is only one further road, viz. the road of the gods, of which light and so on are stages. The text about light and so on mentioning a greater number of stages while other texts mention a smaller number, it stands to reason that the less numerous should be explained in conformity, with the more numerous. For this reason also the Sûtra says, 'On the road beginning with light, on account of its being widely known.'
Footnotes
382:1 The emphasis lies in the word 'eva,' i.e. 'just' or 'only,' which seems to exclude any stages of the way but those rays.
383:1 Each passage mentions at least one of the stages of the road leading to the world of Brahman, and we thus conclude that the same road--of which the stations are the attributes--is meant everywhere.
384:1 Read in the text--tvarâvakanam tv arkirâdyapekshâyâm api gantavyântarâpekshayâ kshaipryârtha°.--Ânandagiri comments--tvareti, arkirâdimârgasyaikyeऽpi kutaskid anyato gantavyâd anenopâyena satyalokam gat iti gakkhantîti gantavyabhedâpekshayâ vakanam yuktam ity arthah.
2. From the year to Vâyu; on account of the absence and presence of specification.
But by what special combination can we establish between
the different attributes of the road the relation of what is determined by attributes and of determining attributes? The teacher out of kindness to us connects them as follows.--The Kaushîtakins describe the road of the gods as follows, 'Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vâyu, to the world of Varuna, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pragâpati, to the world of Brahman' (Kau. Up. I, 3). Now the world of Agni means the same as light, since both terms denote burning, and we therefore need not, with regard to them, search for the order in which they are to be combined. Vâyu, on the other hand, is not mentioned in the road beginning with light; in what place then is he to be inserted?--We read, Kh. Up. V, 10, 1, 'They go to the light, from light to day, from day to the waxing half of the moon, from the waxing half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the north, from those months to the year, from the year to Âditya.' Here they reach Vâyu after the year and before Âditya.--Why so?--'On account of the absence and presence of specification.' About Vâyu--concerning whom the passage, 'He goes to the world of Vâyu,' contains no specification--another passage does state such a specification, viz. Bri. Up. V, 10, 1, 'When the person goes away from this world he comes to Vâyu. Then Vâyu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel. and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Âditya.' On account of this specification which shows Vâyu to come before Âditya, Vâyu must be inserted between the year and Âditya.--But as there is a specification showing that Vâyu comes after Agni, why is he not inserted after the light?--There is no such specification, we reply.--But a scriptural passage has been quoted which runs as follows, 'Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vâyu.'--In that passage, we reply, we have only two clauses, of which the text exhibits one before the other, but there is no word expressing order of succession. We have there only a simple statement of facts, 'He goes to this and to that.' But in the other text we perceive a regular order of succession;
for it intimates that after having mounted on high through an opening as large as the wheel of a chariot, granted by Vâyu, he approaches the sun. The Sûtra therefore rightly says, 'On account of the absence and presence of specification.'--The Vâgasaneyins in their text record that he proceeds 'from the months to the world of the gods, from the world of the gods to the sun' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). Here, in order to maintain the immediate succession of Vâyu and Âditya, we must suppose the souls to go from the world of the gods to Vâyu. What the Sûtra says about the soul going to Vâyu from the year has reference to the text of the Khândogya. As between the Vâgasaneyaka and the Khândogya, the world of the gods is absent from one, the year from the other. As both texts are authoritative, both stages have to be inserted in each, and the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connexion with the months, the year has the first place (i.e. after the months and before the world of the gods), and the world of the gods the second place.
3. Beyond lightning (there is) Varuna, on account of the connexion (of the two).
The Khândogya continues, 'From Âditya to the moon, from the moon to lightning.' Here Varuna (mentioned in the Kaushîtaki-upan.) has to be brought in so that above that lightning he goes to the world of Varuna. For there is a connexion between lightning and Varuna; the broad lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the sound of deep thunder, and then water falls down. And a Brâhmana also says, 'It lightens, it thunders, it will rain' (Kh. Up. VII, 11, 1). But the lord of all water is Varuna, as known from Sruti and Smriti.--And above Varuna there come Indra and Pragâpati, as there is no other place for them, and according to the force of the text, as it stands. Varuna and so on should be inserted at the end, for that reason also that they are merely additional, no particular place being assigned to them. And lightning is the end of the road beginning with light 1.
4. (They are) conductors, this being indicated.
With regard to those beginning with light a doubt arises whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment, or leaders of the travelling souls.--The first possible view of the question is that light and so on are marks of the road, because the instruction has that character. For as in ordinary life a man wishing to go to a village or a town is told, 'Go from here to that hill, from there to a fig-tree, from that to a river, from that to a village; after that you will reach the town;' so here the text also says, 'from light to day, from day to the waxing half of the month,' &c.--Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoyment. For the text connects Agni and so on with the word 'world'; 'He comes to the world of Agni,' &c. Now the term 'world' is used to denote places of enjoyment of living beings, as when we say, 'The world of men; the world of the Fathers; the world of the gods.' A Brâhmana passage also says, 'They remain attached to the worlds which consist of day and night' (Sat. Brâ. X, 2, 6, 8). Therefore light and the rest are not conductors. Moreover, they cannot be conductors because they are without intelligence. For in ordinary life intelligent men only are appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult roads.
To all this we reply as follows. They must be conductors, because the text indicates this. For we read, 'From the moon to the lightning; there a person that is not a man leads them to Brahman;' which shows their conductorship to be something settled. Should it be objected that this last sentence exhausts itself in conveying its own purport 1; we say No; for the attribute ('that is not a man') has only the meaning of excluding his previously established humanity. Only if in the case of the light and the rest personal conductors are settled, and those of human nature, it is appropriate to use the attribute
But mere indication has no force, as there is nothing to prove (that there must be such personal conductors).--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
Footnotes
387:1 And has not the additional power of indicating, i.e. enabling us to infer that also the beings previously mentioned are 'leaders' of the soul.
388:1 Why should it be specially stated that this 'conducting person' is amânava? Only, because it is a settled matter that the previously mentioned beings are also 'conducting persons,' and at the same time 'mânava.' The last clause therefore does not only directly teach that a person conducts the souls to Brahman, but at the same time 'indicates' that the beings mentioned before in connexion with the road are also 'personal conductors.'
5. (There are personal conductors) because that is established on the ground of both (i.e. road and travellers) being bewildered (i.e. unconscious).
As, owing to their separation from a body, the organs of those who go on the road beginning with light are wrapped up, they are incapable of ruling themselves; and the light &c., as they are without intelligence, are equally incapable. Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities who represent light and the rest are appointed to the conductorship. For in ordinary life also drunken or senseless people whose sense-organs are wrapped up follow a road as commanded by others.--Again light and the rest cannot be taken for marks of the road because they are not always present. A man who dies in the night cannot come to day in its true (physical) nature; and he cannot wait (for the break of day), as we have already explained above (IV, 2, 19). But this objection does not apply to gods who are permanent. And gods may be called light and so on, because they represent light and so on. Nor is the expression, 'From light to day,' &c. objectionable, even if we adopt the sense of conductorship; for it means, through the light as cause they come to the day; through the day as cause, to the waxing half of the moon. And such instruction is seen also in the case of conductors known in ordinary life, for they say, Go hence to Balavarman, thence (i.e. Balavarman conducting you) to Gayasimha, thence to
[paragraph continues] Krishnagupta. Moreover, in the beginning where the text says that they go to the light, a relation in general only is expressed, not a special relation; at the end, however, where it is said he leads them to Brahman, a special relation is expressed, viz. that between conducted and conductor. Therefore this is accepted for the beginning also.--And as the organs of the wandering souls are wrapped up together there is no possibility of their enjoying anything. Although, however, the wanderers do not enjoy anything, the word 'world' may be explained on the ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other beings dwelling there--The conclusion therefore is that he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni, and he who has reached the world ruled by Vâyu, by Vâyu.
But how, if we adopt the view of conductorship, can this apply to Varuna and the rest? Varuna and the rest were inserted above the lightning; but scripture states that after the lightning until Brahman is reached a person leads who is not a man.--To this doubt the next Sûtra replies.
6. From thence (the souls are led) by him only who belongs to the lightning; the sacred text stating that.
From thence, i.e. after they have come to the lightning they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the worlds of Varuna and the rest by the person, not a man, who follows immediately after the lightning. For that that person leads them is stated in the following passage, 'When they have reached the place of lightning a person, not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). Varuna and the rest, we must understand, favour them either by not hindering or somehow assisting them.--Therefore it is well said that light and so on are the gods who act as conductors.
7. To the effected (Brahman) (the souls are led); (thus opines) Bâdari; because going to him is possible.
With regard to the passage, 'He leads them to Brahman.'
the doubt arises whether that person leads the souls to the effected, lower, Brahman, or to the highest, non-modified, chief Brahman.--Whence the doubt?--Because the (ambiguous) word Brahman is used, and because scripture speaks of going.--The opinion of the teacher Bâdari is that the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower, qualified, effected Brahman; because it is possible to go to that. For the effected Brahman which occupies a definite place can be the goal of a journey. With the highest Brahman, on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas of one who goes, or object of going, or act of going; for that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self of all.
8. And on account of (the Brahman to which the Souls are led) being qualified (in another passage).
That the soul's going has for its object the effected Brahman, we conclude from another scriptural passage also which qualifies Brahman in a certain way, 'He leads them to the worlds of Brahman; in these worlds of Brahman they live for ever and ever' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). For it would be impossible to qualify the highest Brahman by means of the plural number ('worlds'); while the plural number may be applied to the lower Brahman which may abide in different conditions.--The term 'world' also can directly denote only some place of enjoyment falling within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of being entered into, while it must be understood in a metaphorical sense in passages 1 such as 'Brahman is that world '(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).--And also what the text says concerning an abode and some one abiding within it ('in these worlds of Brahman,' &c.), cannot be directly understood of the highest Brahman.--For all these reasons the leading of the souls has the lower Brahman for its goal.
But even on this interpretation the word 'Brahman' is inappropriate, as it has been proved that Brahman is the
cause of the origination and so on of the entire world.--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
9. But on account of its proximity (to the higher Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman) as that.
The word 'but' indicates the setting aside of the doubt.--As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one, there is nothing unreasonable in the word 'Brahman' being applied to the former also. For when the higher Brahman is, for the purposes of pious meditation, described as possessing certain effected qualities--such as consisting of mind and the rest--which qualities depend on its connexion with certain pure limiting adjuncts; then it is what we call the lower Brahman.--But with the assumption of the lower Brahman there does not agree what scripture says about the souls not returning; for there is no permanence anywhere apart from the highest Brahman. And scripture declares that those who have set out on the road of the gods do not return, 'They who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man' (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6); 'For them there is no return here' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15); 'Moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5).
To this objection we make the following reply.
10. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of that (world) to what is higher than that; on account of scriptural declaration.
When the reabsorption of the effected Brahman world draws near, the souls in which meanwhile perfect knowledge has sprung up proceed, together with Hiranyagarbha the ruler of that world, to 'what is higher than that i.e. to the pure highest place of Vishnu. This is the release by successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be directly reached by the act of going.
11. And on account of Smriti.
Smriti also agrees with this view; cp. the following passage, 'When the pralaya has come and the end of the highest (i.e. Hiranyagarbha), then they all, together with Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place.'--The final conclusion (siddhânta) therefore is that the going of the souls, of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the effected Brahman.--But what is the primâ facie view, with regard to which this final conclusion has been established in Sutras 7-11?--This required primâ facie view is now set forth in the following Sûtras.
12. To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led); Gaimini (opines); owing to this being the principal sense (of the word 'Brahman').
The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that the passage, 'He leads them to Brahman,' refers to the highest Brahman. For the highest Brahman constitutes the principal, primary sense, of the word 'Brahman,' which denotes the lower Brahman only in a secondary, metaphorical way. And where both senses are possible, the primary sense has to be preferred.
13. And because scripture declares that.
The text, 'Going upwards by that he reaches immortality,' declares that immortality is reached by going. But immortality is possible only in the highest Brahman, not in the effected one, because the latter is transitory. So scripture says, 'Where one sees something else, that is little, that is mortal' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1). According to the text of the Katha-upanishad also the going of the soul is towards the highest Brahman; for after the highest Brahman has been introduced there as general subject-matter--in the passage, 'That which thou seest,' &c., I, 2, 14, no other kind of knowledge is taken up later on.
14. And the intention of entering (can) not (be referred) to the effected (Brahman).
Moreover the intention of entering into which is expressed
in the passage, 'I enter the hall of Pragâpati, the house' (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1), cannot have the lower Brahman for its object. For the immediately preceding passage, 'That within which these forms and names are contained is the Brahman,' shows that the highest Brahman, different in nature from the effected one, is the general subject-matter; and the subsequent passage, 'I am the glory of the Brâhmans,' represents the soul as the Self of all; it being known from another scriptural passage that 'Glory' is a name of the highest Brahman, 'There is no likeness of him whose name is great glory' (Vâg. Samh. XXXII, 3). And in the vidyâ of Brahman within the heart it is said of this same entering the house that it is preceded by going 1, 'There is the city of Brahman Aparâgitâ, and the golden hall built by Prabhu' (Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 3). And that the performing of a journey is intended follows also from the use of the verb 'pad,' which denotes going (prapadye, I enter).--The other (primâ facie) view therefore is that all the passages about the soul's going refer to the highest Brahman.
These two views have been embodied by the teacher in the Sûtras; one in the Sûtras 7-11, the other in the Sûtras 12-14. Now the arguments contained in the former set are capable of proving the fallaciousness of the arguments in the latter set, but not vice versâ; from which it follows that the former set states the final view and the latter set the primâ facie view only.--For nobody can compel us to accept the primary sense of a word (such as Brahman) even where it is impossible to do so.--And although met with in a chapter that treats of the highest knowledge, the reference to the going to Brahman--which belongs to another kind of knowledge--may be explained as aiming merely at the glorification of the highest knowledge (not at teaching that the going to Brahman is the result of higher
knowledge).--And with reference to the passage, 'I enter the hall of Pragâpati the house,' there is no reason why we should not separate that passage from what precedes and refer the intention of entering to the effected Brahman. And the qualified Brahman also may be spoken of as being the Self of all, as shown by other passages such as 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. (Kh. Up. III, 14, 2). The texts about the going therefore all belong to the lower knowledge.--Others again, in accordance with the general principle that the earlier Sûtras set forth the primâ facie view, while the later ones contain the siddhânta view, maintain that the passages about the soul's going fall within the sphere of the higher knowledge. But this is impossible, because nothing may go to the highest Brahman. 'Omnipresent and eternal like the ether;' 'The Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self that is within all' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 1); 'Self only is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman only is all this, it is the best' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11): from all these passages we ascertain that the highest Brahman is present everywhere, within everything, the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is altogether impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For we do not go to what is already reached; ordinary experience rather tells us that a person goes to something different from him.--But we observe in ordinary experience also that something already reached may become an object of going, in so far as qualified by a different place; a man living on the earth, e.g. goes to the earth, in so far as he goes to another place on the earth. In the same way we see that a child reaches the adult state which in reality belongs to the child's identical Self, but is qualified by a difference of time. Analogously Brahman also may be an object of going in so far as it is possessed of all kinds of powers.--This may not be, we reply, because scripture expressly negatives Brahman's possessing any distinctive qualities.--'Without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'Neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); 'He who is without and within, unproduced '(Mu. Up. II, 1, 2);
[paragraph continues] 'This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'He is to be described by No, no!' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); from all these scriptural texts, as well as from Smriti and reasoning, it follows that the highest Self cannot be assumed to possess any differences depending on time or space or anything else, and cannot therefore become the object of going. The cases of places on the earth and of the different ages of man are by no means analogous; for they are affected by differences of locality and so on, and therefore can be gone to or reached.--Nor will it avail our opponent to say that Brahman possesses manifold powers, because scripture declares it to be the cause of the world's origination, sustentation, and final retractation; for those passages which deny difference have no other sense (but just the absolute denial of all difference).--But in the same way also those passages which state the origination and so on of the world have no other sense! (i.e. cannot be understood to teach anything but just the origination and so on of the world).--This is not so, we reply; for what they aim at teaching is the absolute oneness of Brahman. For texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay, &c., teach that only that which is, viz. Brahman, is true, while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at teaching the origination, &c. of the world.--But why should the passages about the origination, &c. of the world be subordinate to those which deny all difference, and not vice versa?--Because, we reply, the texts which negative all difference effect the cessation of all desire. For when the absolute oneness, permanence, and purity of the Self have once been apprehended, we cognize that the highest aim of man has been attained, and therefore conceive no further desires. Compare the following texts: 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who beholds that unity?' (Îsâ-up. 7); 'Thou hast reached fearlessness, O Ganaka'(Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'He who knows does not fear anything; he does not distress himself with the thought, Why did I not do what is good? Why did I do what is bad?' (Taitt. Up. II, 9.) This also follows from our observing that those who know realise
contentment of mind; and from the fact that scripture blames the false notion of (the reality of) effects, 'From death to death goes he who sees here any difference' (Ka. Up. II. 4, 10). The texts negativing all difference cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the origination of the world and so on have no similar power of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire. At the same time it is manifest that they have another (than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having said at first, 'Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot be without a root' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end that Being which is the root of the world is the only object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. III, 1. 'That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know that; that is Brahman.' As thus the passages about origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self, Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers, and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going.--And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6 ('Of him the prânas do not depart; being Brahman he goes to Brahman'), denies any going to the highest Brahman.
Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes, i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from Brahman; for if the two were absolutely identical no going could take place.--Well, what then?--We reply as follows. If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be without parts.--The same objection lies against the hypothesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman; for also that which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to
which the parts or the effects would belong, i.e. Brahman is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Samsâra state could not be accounted for.--Let then, in the third place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for. The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this work (II, 3, 19 ff.). And from the soul's being different from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such texts as 'Thou art that' are futile. This latter objection also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different from the whole and the causal substance; for that kind of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense--From all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the soul cannot obtain final release, because its Samsâra condition could never come to an end. Or else, if that condition should come to an end, it would follow that the very essence of the soul perishes; for those theories do not admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
Here now some come forward with the following contention. Works of permanent obligation and works to be performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end that harm may not spring up; such works as are due to special desires, and such as are forbidden, are eschewed, in order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be obtained, and those works whose fruits are to be enjoyed in the current bodily existence are exhausted by just that fruition. Hence, as after the death of the present body, there is no cause for the origination of a now body, that blessed isolation which consists in the soul's abiding within its own nature will accomplish itself for a man acting in the way described above, even without the cognition of his
[paragraph continues] Self being identical with Brahman's Self.--All this is inadmissible, we reply, because there is no proof of it. For scripture nowhere teaches that he who desires release should conduct himself in the way described. To say that because the Samsâra state depends on works, it will cease when works are absent, is an altogether arbitrary style of reasoning. And (whether arbitrary or not) this reasoning falls to the ground, because the absence of the cause is something that cannot be ascertained. It may be supposed that each living being has, in its former states of existence, accumulated many works which have part of them pleasant, part of them unpleasant results. As these works are such as to lead to contrary results, which cannot be enjoyed all of them at the same time, some works whose opportunity has come, build up the present state of existence; others sit inactive waiting for a place, a time, and operative causes (favourable to them). As these latter works cannot thus be exhausted in the present state of existence, we cannot definitely assert, even in the case of a man who conducts himself as described above, that at the end of his present bodily existence all cause for a new bodily existence will be absent. The existence of a remainder of works is, moreover, established by scriptural and Smriti passages, such as, 'Those whose conduct has been good' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 7); 'Then with the remainder.'--But may not, an objection is raised, those remaining works be wiped out (even in the present existence) by the performance of works of permanent obligation and such works as are due to special occasions?--This may not be, we reply, because the two sets of works are not of contrary nature. Where there is contrariety of nature, one thing may be wiped out by another; but good deeds performed in previous states of existence, and works of permanent obligation and so on (performed in the present life), are both of them equally pure and therefore not of opposite nature. Bad works indeed, as being of impure nature, are opposed to works of permanent obligation, &c., and therefore may be extinguished by the latter. But even from this admission it does not follow that the causes for a new embodied existence
are altogether absent; for those causes may be supplied by good deeds, and we do not know that the evil works have been extinguished without a remainder. Nor is there anything to prove that the performance of works of permanent obligation, &c., leads only to the non-origination of harm, and not at the same time to the origination of new results (to be extinguished in future states of existence); for it may happen that such new results spring up collaterally. Thus Âpastamba says, 'When a mango tree is planted for the sake of its fruits, it in addition gives shade and fragrance; thus additional advantages spring from the performance of religious duty.'--Nor can anybody who has not reached perfect knowledge promise to refrain altogether, from birth to death, from all actions either forbidden or aiming at the fulfilment of special wishes for we observe that even the most perfect men commit faults, however minute. This may be a matter of doubt; all the same it remains true that the absence of causes for a new existence cannot be known with certainty.--If, further, the soul's unity with Brahman's Self--which is to be realised through knowledge--is not acknowledged, the soul whose essential nature it is to be an agent and enjoyer cannot even desire the state of blissful isolation; for a being cannot divorce itself from its true essence, not any more than fire can cease to be hot.--But, an objection is raised, what is of disadvantage to the soul is the state of agentship and fruition in so far as actually produced, not its mere potentiality. Release of the soul may, therefore, take place if only that actual condition is avoided while its potentiality remains.--This also, we reply, is not true: for as long as the potentiality exists it ill inevitably produce the actuality.--But, our opponent resumes, potentiality alone, without other co-operative causes, does not produce its effect; as long therefore as it is alone it cannot, though continuing to exist, do any harm!--This also, we reply, is not valid; for the co-operative causes also are, potentially, permanently connected (with the acting and enjoying soul). If, therefore, the soul whose essence is acting and enjoying is not considered to possess fundamental identity with Brahman
[paragraph continues] --an identity to be realised by knowledge--there is not any chance of its obtaining final release. Scripture, moreover (in the passage, 'There is no other way to go,' Svet. Up. III, 8), denies that there is any other way to release but knowledge.--But if the soul is non-different from the highest Brahman, all practical existence comes to an end, because then perception and the other means of right knowledge no longer act!--Not so, we reply. Practical life will hold its place even then, just as dreamlife holds its place up to the moment of waking. Scripture, after having said that perception and the rest are operative in the sphere of those who have not reached true knowledge ('For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the other,' &c.; Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15), goes on to show that those means of knowledge do not exist for those who possess that knowledge ('But when the whole of him has become the Self, whereby should he see another,' &c.). As thus for him who knows the highest Brahman all cognition of something to be gone to, &c. is sublated his going cannot in any way be shown to be possible.
To what sphere then belong the scriptural texts about the soul's going?--To the sphere of qualified knowledge, we reply. Accordingly the soul's going is mentioned in the chapter treating of the knowledge of the five fires, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman's couch, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Agni Vaisvânara (Kh. Up. V, 3-10; Kau. Up. I; Kh. Up. V, 11-24). And where the soul's going is spoken of in a chapter treating of Brahman--(as e.g. in the passages, 'He leads them to Brahman,' &c., Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6, in a chapter treating of Brahman, as shown by 'Breath is Brahman,' &c., IV, 10, 5; and 'He departs upward,' &c., Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5, in the chapter beginning 'There is this city of Brahman,' VIII, 1, 1)--such attributes as 'vâmanî,' i.e. Leader of blessings (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 3), and 'satyakâma,' i.e. having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul can go. No passage, on the other hand, speaks of the soul's going to the highest Brahman; while such going is specially
denied in the passage, 'Of him the prânas do not depart.' In passages, again, such as 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), we indeed meet with the verb 'to reach,' which has the sense of going; but because, as explained before, the reaching of another place is out of question, 'reaching' there denotes only the obtainment (realisation) of one's own nature, in so far as (through true knowledge) the expanse of names and forms which Nescience superimposes (on Brahman) is dissolved. Such passages are to be understood analogously to the text, 'Being Brahman he enters into Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6).--Besides, if the going were understood as connected with the highest Brahman, it could only subserve the purpose either of satisfying (the mind of him who knows) or of reflection. Now, a statement of the soul's going cannot produce any satisfaction in him who knows Brahman, since satisfaction is already fully accomplished through his perfect condition, bestowed on him by knowledge, of which he is immediately conscious. Nor, on the other hand, can it be shown that reflection on the soul's going in any way subserves knowledge, which is conscious of eternally perfect blessedness, and has not for its fruit something to be accomplished.--For all these reasons the soul's going falls within the sphere of the lower knowledge. And only in consequence of the distinction of the higher and lower Brahman not being ascertained, statements about the soul's going which apply to the lower Brahman are wrongly put in connexion with the higher Brahman.
But are there really two Brahmans, a higher one and a lower one?--Certainly there are two! For scripture declares this, as e.g. in the passage, 'O Satyakâma, the syllable Om is the higher and also the lower Brahman' (Pr. Up. V, 2).--What then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower?--Listen! Where the texts, negativing all distinctions founded on name, form, and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as that which is not coarse and so on, the higher Brahman is spoken of. Where, again, for the purpose of pious meditation, the texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction depending on name, form, and so on, using terms such as
[paragraph continues] 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prâna, whose shape is light' (Kh. Up. III. 14, 2), that is the lower Brahman.--But is there not room here for the objection that this distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman stultifies the scriptural texts asserting aduality?--Not so, we reply. That objection is removed by the consideration that name and form, the adjuncts (of the one real Brahman), are due to Nescience. Passages such as 'If he desires the world of the fathers' (Kh. Up. VIII, 2, 1), which the text exhibits in proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman, show that the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds; a fruit falling within the sphere of the Samsâra, Nescience having not as yet been discarded. And as that fruit is bound to a special locality, there is nothing contradictory in the soul's going there in order to reach it. That the soul, although all-pervading, is viewed as going because it enters into connexion with the buddhi and the rest of its adjuncts, just as general space enters into connexion with jars and the like, we have explained under II, 3, 29.
For all these reasons the view of Bâdari as set forth in Sûtra 7 is the final one; while Sûtra 12, which states Gaimini's opinion, merely sets forth another view, to the end of the illumination of the learner's understanding.
Footnotes
393:1 I am not quite sure which passage in the daharavidyâ is supposed to prove that the entering of Brahman's house is preceded by going. Probably VIII, 6, 5, 'He departs upwards; he is going to the sun.'
15. Those who do not take their stand on symbols he leads, thus Bâdarâyana (opines); there being no fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this opinion); and the meditation on that (i.e. Brahman) (is the reason of this twofold relation).
It is a settled conclusion that all going has reference to the effected Brahman, not to the highest Brahman. Another doubt now arises here. Does that person who is not a man lead to the world of Brahman all those who take their stand on the effected Brahman, without any difference; or only some of them?
The pûrvapakshin maintains that all those who possess knowledge--provided that knowledge be not of the highest Brahman--go to the world of Brahman. For in Sûtra III,
[paragraph continues] 3, 31 that going was put in connexion with all the different vidyâs (of the qualified Brahmans), without any distinction.
To this the Sûtrakâra replies, 'Those who do not take their stand on symbols.' That means: Excepting those who take their stand on symbols (i.e. who meditate on certain things as symbolically representing Brahman), that person who is not a man leads all others who take their stand (i.e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman, to the world of Brahman; this is the opinion of the teacher Bâdarâyana. For in acknowledging in this way a twofold relation there is no fault; since the argumentation as to the non-restriction of going (Sûtra III, 3, 31) may be understood as referring to all meditations with the exception of those on symbols. The words, 'and the meditation on that,' state the reason for this twofold relation. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, 'In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.' In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.--But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge of the five fires, 'He leads them to Brahman' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 2).--This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that where there is no such declaration the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman go to it, not any others.
16. And scripture declares a difference (in the case of meditations on symbols).
With reference to the meditations on symbols, such as name and so on, scripture declares that each following meditation has a different result from the preceding one, 'As far as name reaches he is lord and master;--speech is greater than name;--as far as speech reaches he is lord and master;--mind is greater than speech' (Kh. Up. VII, 1, ff.).
[paragraph continues] Now this distinction of rewards is possible because the meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no such distinction if they depended on the one non-different Brahman.--Hence those who take their stand on symbols cannot have the same reward as others.
(My humble salutations to Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
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